May 15, 2013
In the Matter of Sea Cliff Equities, LLC, et al., appellants,
Board of Zoning Appeals of Incorporated Village of Sea Cliff, respondent. Index No. 10500/11
John L. MacCarone, Glen Cove, N.Y., for appellants.
Sahn Ward Coschignano & Baker, PLLC, Uniondale, N.Y. (Brian S. Stolar of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P. CHERYL E. CHAMBERS L. PRISCILLA HALL SYLVIA HINDS-RADIX, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Incorporated Village of Sea Cliff, dated May 5, 2011, which, after a hearing, revoked the petitioners' special use permit, the petitioners appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), entered October 3, 2011, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
" The classification of a "special permit" or "special exception" is tantamount to a legislative finding that, if the special permit or exception conditions are met, the use will not adversely affect the neighborhood and the surrounding areas'" (Matter of Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC v Village of Croton-On-Hudson, 7 A.D.3d 625, 627, affd 5 N.Y.3d 236, quoting Matter of C.B.H. Props. v Rose, 205 A.D.2d 686). "Judicial review of a determination by a zoning board is generally limited to determining whether the action taken by the zoning board was illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion" (Matter of Witkowich v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Yorktown, 84 A.D.3d 1101, 1102). Here, we agree with the Supreme Court that the determination under review, which revoked a previously-issued special use permit due to noncompliance with the stated conditions, was rational, and was neither illegal, arbitrary and capricious, nor an abuse of discretion (see Matter of Rossney v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Inc. Vil. of Ossining, 79 A.D.3d 894, 895; Matter of Halperin v City of New Rochelle, 24 A.D.3d 768, 770; see also Matter of Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC v Village of Croton-On-Hudson, 7 A.D.3d at 626-627; Matter of Bell v Szmigel, 171 A.D.2d 1032). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
DILLON, J.P., CHAMBERS, HALL and HINDS-RADIX, JJ., concur.