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CH Consulting Group, Inc. v. Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, LLP

Supreme Court of New York, New York County

May 30, 2013

MONTGOMERY, McCRACKEN, WALKER & RHOADS, LLP, Defendant. No. 652076/2012.

Editorial Note:

This decision has been referenced in a table in the New York Supplement.

Rubin & Bailin, LLP, for plaintiff.

Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, LLP, pro se for defendant.


Defendant Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, LLP (MMWR) moves for summary judgment against plaintiff CH Consulting Group, Inc. (CH) pursuant to CPLR 3212. Defendant's motion is granted for the reasons that follow.

Factual Background & Procedural History

Carol Hayden is the president of CH, a legal recruitment firm. MMWR is a law firm based in Pennsylvania that, as of 2008, also had offices in Delaware and New Jersey. In 2008 and 2009, Hayden separately solicited MMWR and Kurzman, Karelsen & Frank LLP (KKF), another law firm that was based in New York. In 2008, MMWR told Hayden of its interest in opening an office in New York. In 2009, Hayden spoke with Lee Unterman, a managing partner at KKF, who told her of KKF's interest in merging with another law firm. In 2010, MMWR and KKF entered into merger negotiations, which fell apart toward the end of that year. In the summer of 2011, KKR moved to new, larger offices, and sought to sublet some of that space to another law firm. Unterman recalled from the merger discussions in 2010 that MMWR was interested in opening a New York office. He therefore reached out to MMWR and offered to sublet them space in KKR's new offices. In September 2011, MMWR and KKF entered into a sublease, and MMWR began operating a New York office in that space. At some point thereafter, MMWR and KKF reopened merger negotiations, which ultimately led to the firms combining businesses as of March 1, 2012.[1] MMWR hired nearly all of KKF's attorneys and other employees, purchased some of KKF's assets, and KKF began the process of unwinding its business. From March 2012 through December 2012, MMWR operated as " Montgomery McCracken Kurzman Karelsen" to capitalize on the name recognition of KKF's partners, who, unlike MMWR, had a long established presence in New York. However, since January 1, 2013, MMWR has operated exclusively under its legal name (Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, LLP). KKF no longer has clients, who are now either represented by MMWR or, presumably, some other firm. KKF's lease was assigned to MMWR, and KKF's website was shut down and directs visitors to MMWR's website.

On May 29, 2012, Hayden sent a $400,000 invoice to MMWR for the " placement" of Unterman and approximately 13 other former KKF attorneys, including " five other attorneys ... whose identities are currently unknown." MMWR refused to pay. This action followed.

On June 14, 2012, CH commenced this action, asserting breach of contract and unjust enrichment against MMWR. CH's claims are based on an email purportedly sent by Hayden to Michael Epstein (a managing partner at MMWR) on April 16, 2008, which describes the terms of CH's engagement. The email sets forth two possible fee calculations: (1) a fee for placing an individual attorney with the firm, to be calculated based on 25% of the attorney's first year compensation with the firm; and (2) a fee for a " MERGER, or AFFILIATION [capitalization in original] which for purposes of this Agreement means the placement of two or more attorneys who are presently partners, or the formation of a new firm or office," to be calculated based on 10% of the billings of the new attorneys in the year prior to their joining the new firm. The email concludes by stating " [i]f the foregoing correctly sets forth the terms of our agreement, please sign, date, and return to us a copy of this letter.[2] Neither party signed it.

Between 2008 and 2012, Hayden sent numerous emails to MMWR and KKF regarding the status of the merger negotiations. The emails contained general information about the other firm, including practice areas, billing rates, and office locations. Hayden, however, did not discuss information about or solicit the employment of particular attorneys, nor did she vet any of their individual, professional experiences or review their resumes.


It is well established that summary judgment may be granted only when it is clear that no triable issue of fact exists. Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 325 (1986). The burden is upon the moving party to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562 (1980); Friends of Animals, Inc. v. Associated Fur Mfrs., Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 1065, 1067 (1979). A failure to make such a prima facie showing requires a denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers. Ayotte v. Gervasio, 81 N.Y.2d 1062, 1063 (1993). If a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact. Alvarez, 68 N.Y.2d at 324; Zuckerman, 49 N.Y.2d at 562. The papers submitted in support of and in opposition to a summary judgment motion are examined in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Martin v. Briggs, 235 A.D.2d 192, 196 (1st Dept 1997). Mere conclusions, unsubstantiated allegations, or expressions of hope are insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. Zuckerman, 49 N.Y.2d at 562. Upon the completion of the court's examination of all the documents submitted in connection with a summary judgment motion, the motion must be denied if there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue of fact. Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v. Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223, 231 (1978).

" GOL § 5-701(a)(10) requires that every agreement to pay compensation for services rendered in negotiating a business opportunity be (1) in writing and (2) subscribed by the party to be charged therewith. Although the statute of frauds does not apply to the services of employment agencies or placement firms with respect to the placement of individuals, it does apply where, as here, the recruiting firm is seeking a fee for services rendered with respect to effecting a merger or combination of two law firms." Mark Bruce Int'l, Inc. v. Blank Rome LLP, 19 Misc.3d 1140(A), at *5 (Sup Ct, N.Y. County 2008), aff'd 60 A.D.3d 550 (1st Dept 2009) (citations omitted), citing Howard-Sloan Legal Search, Inc. v. Todtman, Young, Tunick, Nachamie, Hendler & Spizz, P.C., 193 A.D.2d 404 (1st Dept 1993) (employment recruiting agency's services in effectuating a merger of two law firms was a " business opportunity" as defined by GOL § 5-701(a)(10)).

CH is seeking a fee " for services rendered with respect to effecting a merger or combination of two law firms." This claim is precluded under § 5-701(a)(10) because there is no signed written agreement for these services. Nonetheless, CH avers that when a recruiting firm's claim to enforce an engagement agreement is barred by the statute of frauds because the firm's services were exclusively limited to helping effectuate a merger (and did not entail any services related to the hiring of specific attorneys), the recruiting firm is still entitled to recover a fee for the ...

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