June 13, 2013
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,
DAVID L. PERKINS, Appellant.
Calendar Date: April 22, 2013
Eugene P. Grimmick, Troy, for appellant.
Richard J. McNally Jr., District Attorney, Troy (Kelly L. Egan of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Lahtinen, J.P., Stein, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Egan Jr., J.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County (Ceresia, J.), rendered October 11, 2011, which resentenced defendant following his conviction of the crimes of rape in the first degree, rape in the third degree (three counts), sodomy in the third degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, sexual misconduct (two counts), unlawfully dealing with a child in the first degree (six counts) and endangering the welfare of a child (three counts).
Following a 2003 jury trial, defendant was convicted of multiple crimes, including — insofar as is relevant here — rape in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree and, in this regard, was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 25 years on the rape conviction and seven years on the sexual abuse conviction. In July 2011, the sentencing court was advised by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision that defendant had not been sentenced to the mandatory period of postrelease supervision for such crimes and, further, that he was a "designated person" subject to resentencing under Correction Law § 601-d. A resentencing hearing was held in October 2011, at which time County Court resentenced defendant to the original terms of imprisonment followed by five years of postrelease supervision with respect to the rape conviction and three years of postrelease supervision as to the sexual abuse conviction . This appeal ensued.
We affirm. Defendant, as so limited by his brief, contends that the resentencing procedure was untimely within the meaning of Correction Law § 601-d (4) and/or CPL 380.30. Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have made clear, however, that the failure to comply with the time limits set forth in Correction Law § 601-d (4) does not require reversal (see People v Velez, 19 N.Y.3d 642, 647-649 ; People v Walker, 100 A.D.3d 1149, 1150 , lv denied 20 N.Y.3d 1066 ; People v Campbell, 93 A.D.3d 996, 997 , lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 862 ). Further, even assuming that the time limits set forth in CPL 380.30 apply to resentencing matters (see People v Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198, 213 , cert denied __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 125 ), the relevant time period here is not — as defendant contends — the approximately 8½ years that elapsed between his original sentencing date and his subsequent resentencing but, rather, the roughly 10 weeks that elapsed between defendant being deemed a designated person within the meaning of Correction Law § 601-d and the resulting resentencing hearing (see People v Williams, 14 N.Y.3d at 213). As such delay was not unreasonable, we discern no violation of CPL 380.30 (see People v Mehmel, 98 A.D.3d 1256, 1256 ; People v Howard, 96 A.D.3d 1691, 1692 , lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 1103 ).
Lahtinen, J.P., Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.