DECISION AND ORDER
H. KENNETH SCHROEDER, Jr., Magistrate Judge.
This case was referred to the Hon. Hugh B. Scott by the Hon. Richard J. Arcara, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), for all pretrial matters and to hear and report upon dispositive motions. Dkt. #2. Thereafter, Magistrate Judge Scott issued an Order of Recusal in the case as to all defendants (Dkt. #131) and Judge Arcara referred the case to the undersigned, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), for all pretrial matters and to hear and report upon dispositive motions. Dkt. #133.
The defendants, Eric J. Humphrey, Charles M. Humphrey, Jr., James Humphrey, Jr., John E. Humphrey and Anthony Taylor are charged in a one-count indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and to manufacture, possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846. Dkt. # 1. The defendants each also face forfeiture allegations. Id. Defendants Charles M. Humphrey, Jr., John E. Humphrey, Eric J. Humphrey and Anthony Taylor have filed dispositive and non-dispositive motions. See Dkt. ##50 (Charles Humphrey), 57 (John E. Humphrey), 60 (Eric J. Humphrey), 69 (Charles Humphrey (supplemental motion), 113 (Anthony Taylor). The government filed responses to the instant motions. Dkt. ##61, 70. Oral argument was held before Magistrate Judge Hugh B. Scott on February 16, 2011 and March 16, 2011.
With respect to defendants' motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to electronic surveillance, Magistrate Judge Scott ordered a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Dkt. #73. In addition, Magistrate Judge Scott further ordered a hearing with respect to the defendants' assertion that the recordings (tapes) obtained as a result of the eavesdrop warrants were not properly (timely) sealed. Id. Finally, Magistrate Judge Scott ordered a hearing concerning the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a search of 39 Phyllis Avenue and 236 Pine Street. Id. The hearings ordered by Magistrate Judge Scott on March 16, 2011, took place on April 28, 2011, March 7, 2012, May 15, 2012, July 5, 2012 and August 10, 2012. Dkt. ##84, 119, 124, 132 and 136. Thereafter, the parties filed post-hearing memoranda of law. Dkt. ##144, 146, 147, 148, 152 and 154. This Decision and Order will address defendant Eric J. Humphrey's non-dispositive motions. This Court's Report, Recommendation and Order with respect to Eric J. Humphrey's motion to suppress electronic evidence, as well as the dispositive and non-dispositive motions filed by the other defendants, will be filed separately.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
By this request, defendant Eric Humphrey seeks the disclosure of progress reports submitted to the issuing judge relating to the electronic eavesdrop warrants. Dkt. #60, ¶¶10-12. Although in its response, the government does not specifically respond to defendant Humphrey's request for the disclosure of progress reports, the government does state that pursuant to voluntary discovery, the wiretap applications, affidavits, warrants, sealing orders, conversations, transcripts, line sheets and minimization instructions were disclosed. Dkt. #61, ¶4. In an Order filed February 18, 2011, Magistrate Judge Scott found, "[i]n connection with their application for a hearing, the defendants have requested production of... the progress reports... involved in this case. The defendants have not demonstrated any nexus between the progress reports and the issue of necessity as presented to the judges issuing the warrants. This request is denied." Dkt. #68, p.5. To the extent a further ruling is necessary, in accordance with the reasoning set forth in United States v. Chimera, 201 F.R.D. 72 (W.D.N.Y. 2001), defendant Eric Humphrey's request for the disclosure of progress reports is denied.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6), a judge who issues an intercept order in accordance with § 2518(1) may direct that reports "showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective [of the order] and the need for continued interception" be provided. Such reports are to be filed with the judge "at such intervals as the judge may require." Id . The purpose of reports directed pursuant to § 2518(6) is "so that any possible abuses might be quickly detected and halted" by the court thereby furthering Congress' objective in enacting Title III of limiting the extent of court authorized intrusions on the privacy of oral communications. United States v. Kahn , 415 U.S. 143, 154-55, 94 S.Ct. 977, 39 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974).
Chimera, 201 F.R.D. at 76. Here, the electronic eavesdropping warrants at issue were issued by New York State Supreme Court Justices Michalski and Buscaglia. The Court notes that New York State has a nearly identical provision to section 2518(6) insofar as it states, "[a]n eavesdropping or video surveillance warrant may require reports to be made to the issuing justice showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continued eavesdropping or video surveillance. Such reports shall be made at such intervals as the justice may require." N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 700.50(1) (McKinney 2013). The only statement by defendant Humphrey in support of his request for the disclosure of progress reports is that "upon information and belief progress reports were not produced to the issuing courts in toto. " Dkt. #60, ¶12. Although each of the warrants at issue here provided the same language, "ORDERED, that the District Attorney or his agent shall submit progress reports to this Court, as the Court directs, showing what progress has been made toward achievement of authorized objectives of this warrant..., " there is nothing in the record before this Court to suggest that such progress reports were ever requested by the issuing Justices.
By this request, defendant Humphrey seeks the disclosure of all the sealing orders issued with respect to the electronic surveillance warrants. Dkt. #60, ¶13. As noted above, in its response, the government noted that the sealing orders were previously disclosed. Dkt. #61, ¶4. The government indicated during the February 16, 2011 oral argument that to the extent any sealing orders had not been disclosed, they would be immediately disclosed. Furthermore, the Court notes that the sealing orders and the timeliness of the sealing of intercepted conversations (tapes) is a matter that was the subject of an evidentiary hearing before Magistrate Judge Scott and is presently pending before the undersigned. This Court's Report, Recommendation and Order with respect to defendants' motion to suppress for failure to properly seal will be forthcoming.
Physical Surveillance Reports
Citing United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1983) and United States v. Concepcion, 579 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2009), defendant Eric J. Humphrey seeks the disclosure of any physical surveillance reports. Dkt. #60, ¶¶14-16. In its response, the government states that it "declines to provide those other materials requested in the motions as outside the purview of Rule 16." Dkt. #61, ¶4. Thereafter, in a footnote, the government specifically references defendant Eric Humphrey's request for physical surveillance reports. Indeed, the government states that the case of United States v. Concepcion , cited by the defendant, provides "no support for defendant's proposition that physical surveillance reports are discoverable pursuant to Rule 16." Dkt. #61, ¶4, n.3. Following the February 16, 2011 oral argument, Magistrate Judge Scott ordered the disclosure of the surveillance reports up to the dates of the respective warrant applications. Dkt. #68, p.5. By reason of the fact that defendants have sought suppression of the wiretap evidence on the basis that, inter alia, necessity for electronic surveillance had not been established, because traditional investigative techniques such as physical surveillance had been successful (as evidenced by the disclosed reports), and the fact that Buffalo Police Department Detective Pittorf testified at length about specific instances of physical surveillance, defendant Eric Humphrey's request is denied as moot.
By this request, defendant Eric Humphrey requests that the government be ordered to comply with the requirements set forth in Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning the disclosure of a written summary of anticipated expert testimony. Dkt. #60, ¶¶17-18. In its response, the government states, "[t]he government will comply with defendants' requests for expert testimony pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1)(G) of witnesses who will testify under Rules 702, 703 and 705 F.R.E." Dkt. #61, ¶5. Based on the government's response, defendant's request is denied as moot.
Bill of Particulars
In six separately lettered requests, defendant Eric Humphrey seeks information concerning the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base charged in Count 1 of the Indictment. Dkt. #60, ¶¶19(a)-(f). In addition, defendant Eric Humphrey seeks particularization with respect to the first forfeiture allegation. More specifically, defendant Eric Humphrey requests that the government be required to state with particularity: the identity of each unindicted co-conspirator known to the government; the actions taken by each individual in furtherance of the charged conspiracy; the identity of each unknown co-conspirator and the actions taken in furtherance of the charged conspiracy; the exact location, substance and identity of participants in each alleged act undertaken in furtherance of the charged conspiracy; and, the date, time, location and substance of each act performed by Eric Humphrey which rendered any of the assets set forth in the Indictment to be subject to forfeiture. Id.
In its response to defendant Eric Humphrey's request for particularization of the conspiracy charge and the forfeiture allegation, the government asserts that,
the volume of discovery provided thus far in this action provides an overall picture of each defendant's culpability and actions relative to the conspiracy and the combination of the wiretap applications, affidavits, warrants, sealing orders, search warrants and inventories and affidavits thereto, laboratory reports, two CDs containing all pertinent conversations, transcripts thereof, line sheets, and minimization instructions, constituting all material presently within its possession that is within the purview of Rule 16 and in compliance with Rule 12(b)(4)(B).
Dkt. #61, ¶23. In addition, the government maintains that the particulars sought by defendant Eric Humphrey relate to the specific details of the conspiracy and that the government should not be required to furnish particulars relating to the formation of a conspiracy, including when and how it was formed and when a particular defendant joined, because such details need not be proven at trial. Id. at ¶29.
It has become axiomatic that the function of a bill of particulars is to apprise a defendant of the essential facts of the crime for which he has been charged. United States v. Salazar, 485 F.2d 1272, 1277-78 (2d Cir. 1973); cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77 (1927). The charges in the Superseding Indictment, along with the discovery materials provided by the government, clearly inform the defendant of the essential facts of the crimes charged. As a result, the defendant is not entitled to, nor is he in need of, the "particulars" being sought for that purpose.
A bill of particulars should be required only where the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused." United States v. Feola, 651 F.Supp. 1068, 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 875 F.2d 857 (2d Cir.) (mem.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 834 , 110 S.Ct. 110, 107 L.Ed.2d 72 (1989); see also United States v. Leonelli, 428 F.Supp. 880, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). "Whether to grant a bill of particulars rests within the sound discretion of the district court." United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1141, 1148 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Burgin, 621 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 , 101 S.Ct. 574, 66 L.Ed.2d 474 (1980)); see also [United States v.] Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d  at 574 [(2d Cir. 1987)]. "Acquisition of evidentiary detail is not the function of the bill of particulars." Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d 45, 49 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 877 , 89 S.Ct. 176, 21 L.Ed.2d 149 (1968).
United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d 151, 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 994 (2004); United States v. Porter, No. 06-1957, 2007 WL 4103679 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1690 (2008). Accordingly, this Court concludes that the allegations in the Indictment, together with the representations made by counsel for the government concerning the voluminous discovery previously provided to the defendant are more than sufficient and the demand for a bill of particulars is unwarranted. Accordingly, the defendant's request for a bill of particulars is denied.
Rule 404(b), 608 and 609 Material
By this request, the defendant "respectfully requests that the government notify him of any evidence that the Government contends would be admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Dkt. #60, ¶20. In addition, the defendant also requests access to all information pertaining to the character and/or conduct that may be used to impeach any witness the government intends to call. Id. at ¶21(a)-(t). In its response, the government states that,
[d]efendant Eric J. Humphrey [ ] [has] requested specific instances of other crimes, wrongs and acts under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), which it may use as impeachment material. The government will provide this information consistent with its disclosure of Jencks material. It is submitted that any hearings on the admissibility of such evidence is a matter for the District Court at the time of trial.
Dkt. #61, ¶12.
Rule 404(b) only requires that "the prosecution... provide reasonable notice in advance of trial... of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial." (Emphasis added). Insofar as the government has indicated that it intends to comply with any pretrial disclosure order entered by the trial judge and further, that it understands its disclosure obligations, defendant's request is denied as moot. The Court notes that the issue of admissibility of such evidence pursuant to Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is best left to the determination of the trial judge at the time of trial. Accordingly, the defendant's request for an Order with respect to admissibility of such evidence is denied. With respect to the balance of defendant's request for impeachment ...