DECISION AND ORDER
MICHAEL A. TELESCA, District Judge.
Plaintiff Stephen LeClair ("LeClair" or "Plaintiff") instituted this action on February 6, 2012, asserting a claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. ("ERISA"), for long-term disability ("LTD") benefits payable by defendant Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston ("Defendant" or "Liberty"). Presently pending before the Court is Defendant's motion to remand (Dkt #19) the case for further administrative proceedings.
II. Factual Background and Procedural History
While LeClair was employed with Defendant's insured, Lowe's Companies, he was a participant in their LTD plan ("the Plan"). Benefits under the Plan are provided pursuant to a group disability income policy ("the Policy") issued by Liberty to Lowe's Companies. The Plan is governed by ERISA.
On or about May 1, 2006, LeClair ceased working at Lowe's Companies because he was disabled. After the elimination period, LeClair was approved for, and received, benefits under the Plan. On August 11, 2008, Liberty discontinued its payment of LTD benefits to LeClair, who then appealed the determination by submitting additional information. LeClair alleges that Liberty erroneously did not submit his appeal to its appeals unit, although it did reinstate his benefits in January 2009. By letter dated February 9, 2009, however, Liberty notified LeClair that he was not entitled to benefits after February 11, 2009, because he was no longer disabled.
LeClair alleges that after Liberty denied his claim in February 2009, a Liberty employee informed him that he had "lost his appeal and that his claim was closed, " that the decision was final, and that he could not appeal this determination. LeClair also claims that a Liberty employee left him a voicemail message indicating that the company had "reached a decision on his appeal." LeClair asserts that he relied on this information and believed he had no further recourse.
Liberty disputes LeClair's allegations that he is entitled to benefits under the Plan, that he was denied an opportunity to seek a "full and fair review" of the decision terminating benefits, and that Liberty breached its fiduciary duty to him. According to Liberty, the administrative record demonstrates that after terminating LeClair's benefits as of February 11, 2009, Liberty provided him with 180 days to request an administrative review. Liberty points to its letter to LeClair dated February 9, 2009, notifying LeClair that he had an opportunity to request a review within 180 days of his receipt of the letter. LeClair, however, did not request such further administrative review.
Liberty contests Plaintiff's claim that he believed he had no further opportunity to request an administrative review, pointing to his fax sent on April 2, 2009, indicating that he had not yet received Liberty's determination letter and that he believed his appeal had been approved. Liberty contends that Plaintiff's statements in his April 2, 2009 fax undermine the claim that he relied on a voicemail message from a Liberty representative on February 11, 2009, or on statements made to him on February 12, 2009, that his right to request an appeal had been exhausted.
Under Counts I and II of the First Amended Complaint, LeClair seeks LTD benefits from February 11, 2009, forward, pursuant to ERISA §502(a)(1)(B). LeClair also seeks a declaratory judgment regarding his rights under the Policy. Under Counts III and IV, LeClair alleges a breach of fiduciary duty by Liberty and seeks appropriate equitable relief pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(3).
Defendant has filed a motion to have this action stayed and to remand Plaintiff's claim for LTD benefits to Defendant for a full administrative review. (Dkt #19). Plaintiff has opposed the motion (Dkt #26), arguing that it is in actuality a motion for summary judgment. Defendant has filed a reply brief (Dkt #30). The matter is now fully submitted and ready for decision.
A. Defendant's motion is not tantamount to a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's motion to remand is not authorized under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the remand motion most resembles a request for partial summary judgment and should be construed as such. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law ("Pl's Mem.") at 2-3 (citing Muller v. First Unum Life Ins. Co. , 341 F.3d 119, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2003)). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's reliance on Muller is misplaced because that case did not involve a motion for remand. Muller instead involved a "motion for judgment on the administrative record[, ]" which, as the Second Circuit observed, did not appear to be authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 124. The Second Circuit noted that many courts have either explicitly or implicitly ...