SUSAN KENT as PRESIDENT of THE NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, and KAREN DANISH, JAMES CARR, ROBERT H. HARMS, JR., KENNETH R. HUNTER, MARY REID, CALVIN THAYER, and RAYMOND FERRARO on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs,
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, ANDREW M. CUOMO, as Governor of the State of New York, NEW YORK STATE CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENT, PATRICIA A. HITE, in her official capacity as Acting Commissioner, New York State Civil Service Department, NEW YORK STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, CAROLINE W. AHL and J. DENNIS HANRAHAN, in their official capacities as Commissioners of the New York State Civil Service Commission, ROBERT L. MEGNA, in his official capacity as Director of the New York State Division of the Budget, and THOMAS P. DiNAPOLI, in his official capacity as Comptroller of the State of New York, and NEW YORK STATE AND LOCAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM, NEW YORK STATE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, and GARY JOHNSON, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Governor's Office of Employee Relations, Defendants.
Rita J. Verga, Esq., New York State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO, Albany, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
John F. Kershko, Esq., Lisa M. King, Esq., Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO Office of General Counsel, Albany, New York, Charles J. Quackenbush, Esq., Asst. Attorney General, ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, New York, Attorney for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
MAE A. D'AGOSTINO, District Judge.
Plaintiffs commenced the within action alleging that defendants unilaterally increased the percentage of contributions that plaintiffs, active and retired employees, are required to pay for health insurance benefits in retirement and, thereby, violated the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, impaired plaintiffs' contractual rights under the terms of their Collective Bargaining Agreement, and violated state law. Presently before the Court is defendants' motion for reconsideration of portions of the prior Memorandum-Decision and Order ("MDO") issued on December 3, 2012. See Dkt. No. 26. (Dkt. No. 29). Plaintiffs have opposed the motion. (Dkt. No. 32). Familiarity with the facts of this case is assumed based on this Court's previous MDO and will not be repeated herein.
Defendants seek relief based upon Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 however, defendants do not specify whether the motion is based upon 60(a) or 60(b).
Rule 60(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Corrections Based on Clerical Mistakes; Oversights and Omissions. The court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without notice.
Rule 60(b) provides that, upon a motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence...;
(3) fraud... misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged... or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
"[A] motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided". Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Relief under Rule 60 is considered "extraordinary judicial relief." Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986). For that reason, the motion will generally be denied unless the moving party can show that the court overlooked facts or controlling law that "might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257 (citations omitted). Generally, "[a] court may justifiably reconsider its previous ruling if: (1) there is an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence not previously available comes to light; or (3) it becomes necessary to remedy a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice." Delaney v. Selsky, 899 F.Supp. 923, 925 (N.D.N.Y.1995). Motions to vacate or to reconsider should not be granted if a moving party seeks only to relitigate an issue that has already been fully considered by the court. Id. at 257. The Second Circuit has warned, that a Rule 60 motion may not be used as a substitute for appeal and that a claim based on legal error alone is inadequate. United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien, 588 F.3d 158, 176 (2d Cir. 2009).
Here, defendants argue that an intervening change in controlling law warrants reconsideration. Defendants cite to the December 17, 2012 Decision/Order/Judgment in the case of RPEA v. Cuomo, et. al. (Sup.Ct. Albany County) (Index No. 7586-11) (" RPEA ").
The RPEA case was discussed in this Court's prior MDO in the context of the Younger Doctrine. In the prior motion to dismiss, defendants argued that the Court should abstain from ruling in this matter based ...