July 24, 2013
In the Matter of Thomas Thomches, appellant,
Andrea Evans, etc., respondent.
Thomas Thomches, Otisville, N.Y., appellant pro se.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Richard Dearing and Valerie Figueredo of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, PLUMMER E. LOTT, SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Board of Parole dated April 13, 2011, which, after a hearing, denied the petitioner's request to be released to parole, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Marx, J.), dated March 29, 2012, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In determining whether to grant parole to an inmate, the New York State Board of Parole (hereinafter the Parole Board) is required to consider a number of statutory factors (see Executive Law § 259-i[c]; Matter of King v New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 790). However, the Parole Board is not required to give each factor equal weight, or to articulate each statutory factor considered (see Matter of Vigliotti v State of N.Y. Exec. Div. of Parole, 98 A.D.3d 789, 790; Matter of Stanley v New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948; Matter of Miller v New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691). "Absent a convincing demonstration to the contrary, the [Parole] Board is presumed to have acted properly in accordance with statutory requirements, and judicial intervention is warranted only where there is a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety" (Matter of Hanson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 57 A.D.3d 994, 994 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476; Matter of Hardwick v Dennison, 43 A.D.3d 406, 407).
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the record in this proceeding demonstrates that the Parole Board considered the requisite statutory factors in reaching its determination. In addition, in reviewing that determination, the Supreme Court did not impermissibly substitute its own grounds for those relied upon by the Parole Board. Since the petitioner failed to establish that the determination was irrational, the proceeding was properly dismissed (see e.g. Matter of Stanley v New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948; Matter of Miller v New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690; Matter of Samuel v Alexander, 69 A.D.3d 861; Matter of Hanson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 57 A.D.3d 994).
MASTRO, J.P., HALL, LOTT and SGROI, JJ., concur.