MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JESSE M. FURMAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Shamduh Wilson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. Defendants - five employees of the New York City Department of Correction (the "DOC") and the City of New York (the "City") itself - move pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint (the "TAC") for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED as to the individual Defendants and GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as to the City.
The following facts, taken from the TAC (Docket No. 46) are assumed, for purposes of this motion, to be true. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 2011)
Plaintiff Shamduh Wilson was housed at the Robert N. Davoren Complex ("RNDC") on Rikers Island in state custody from April 27, 2010 to May 12, 2010. (TAC ¶ 1. Ex. A). Plaintiff is a practicing Muslim and was, during the relevant time period, enrolled in a program administered by the DOC to serve halal meals - that is, meals in which the meat, if any, has been slaughtered in the manner prescribed by Muslim law. Plaintiff avers that, in order to adhere to his sincerely held religious beliefs, he had to be provided with halal meals (TAC ¶ 1). According to the TAC, however, the food-handling procedures at the RNDC were inadequate to the task. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that the use of trays to serve both halal and non-halal meals resulted in an unacceptably high risk of cross-contamination and "the accidental consumption of pork or leftover food particles on improperly cleaned trays." (TAC ¶¶ 2-3, 7).
Plaintiff alleges that he spoke to Defendant Coffiel, a corrections officer, on April 28, 2010, about the food distribution method. (TAC ¶ 1). The following day, after observing the use of food trays to serve both halal and non-halal meals, and in accordance with his Islamic faith, Plaintiff "requested a disposable tray to eat from and... was told none were available." (TAC ¶ 8). Plaintiff did not eat that particular meal "because of [his] fear of the potential contamination of the tray by either pork or uncleanliness." (TAC ¶ 8). On the same day, Plaintiff filed a grievance complaining of: (1) cross-contamination of non-halal food into halal meals, (2) the need for alternatives to the standard plastic eating trays, and (3) the handling of halal food by non-Muslims. (TAC ¶ 9, Ex. A). Additionally, Plaintiff mailed letters describing his grievances to Defendant Emmanuel Bailey, the RNDC's warden; Defendant James Robinson, the grievance coordinator; Defendant James Perrino, the deputy of programs; and Defendant Dixon Benoni, the head cook. (TAC ¶ 9).
Over the next two weeks, Plaintiff claims that he repeatedly requested meals that comported with his religious beliefs. ((TAC ¶ 11). His requests were denied. As a result, between April 28, 2010, and May 12, 2010, Plaintiff refused to eat "on average one meal (either lunch or dinner)" per day either because disposable trays were not available or because he was concerned that halal and non-halal meats had mixed. (TAC ¶ 12). On May 12, 2010, Plaintiff was moved to a correctional facility in upstate New York. At that point, Plaintiff still had not received any response to his grievance or letters Upon his transfer, Plaintiff "sent a second letter to the... warden and grievance coordinator informing them that [he] was back upstate and that they should forward any information or response to [his] grievance to [him] there." (TAC ¶ 12). Plaintiff never received a response. (TAC ¶ 12).
On April 16, 2012, Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit. (Docket No. 1). In his initial Complaint, Plaintiff asserted his complaints against five John Doe Defendants and the City of NEW York. (Compl. 3-4). Plaintiff also requested injunctive relief and monetary damages in the amount of $10, 000, 000. ( Id. at 7). On July 2, 2012, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint naming the individual Defendants and the City, and elaborating on the facts alleged in the original Complaint. (Docket No. 9; Am. Compl. 2-3). On August 1, 2012, before any Defendant had responded to the Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint without leave from this Court. (Docket No. 14). This Court retroactively granted such leave on August 10, 2012. (Docket No. 15). The Second Amended Complaint elaborated on the facts contained in the prior two Complaints, added detail about how Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies, and requested damages in the increased amount of $400, 000, 000. (Second Am. Compl. 3-8).
On November 13, 2012, Defendants collectively moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 36). On November 14, 2012, this Court ordered Plaintiff either to amend his Complaint or respond to the motion to dismiss; the order also stated that this was Plaintiffs only chance to amend in light of the motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 41). However, because the order was not mailed to Plaintiff until a month after it was issued, on January 3, 2013, this Court granted Plaintiff an extension to file his amendment. (Docket No. 44). Plaintiff filed the Third Amended Complaint on January 7, 2013. (Docket No. 46). On January 28, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the TAC that was substantially similar to its prior motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 47). By order issued on January 29, 2013, this Court informed Plaintiff that no further amendments to his Complaint would be accepted. (Docket No. 50).
Liberally construed, the TAC alleges that the five individual Defendants and the City violated Plaintiffs rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA. (TAC ¶¶ 13-18). Additionally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants conspired to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws "by gross negligence, deliberate indifference, and failure to act." (TAC ¶¶ 1-6). Finally, he claims that the City "refuses to ensure the enforcement" of DOC Directives concerning the observance of Islamic dietary laws (TAC ¶ 18). Plaintiff seeks $400, 000, 000.00 in punitive damages for his alleged injuries. (TAG 9 ¶ 1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 2009). To survive such a motion, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). More specifically, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.
A court, however, is "obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally." Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). Thus, when considering pro se submissions, a court must interpret them "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, even a pro se litigant's complaint must state a plausible claim supported by more than conclusory factual allegations. See Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013); Harris, 572 F.3d at 71-72. Put another way, the duty to liberally construe a plaintiff's complaint [is not] the equivalent of a duty to re-write it.'" Geldzahler v. N.Y. Med. Coll., 663 F.Supp.2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 12.34[b], at 12-61 (internal quotation marks omitted)); ...