CARLOS PETERSON 08-B-3052 Clinton Correctional Facility Dannemora, New York, Plaintiff pro se.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
MAE A. D'AGOSTINO, District Judge.
On May 16, 2013, the Court received for filing a pro se complaint and in forma pauperis application. See Dkt. Nos. 1 and 2. In his complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights by dismissing lawsuits that he filed. See Dkt. No. 1 at 2.
In an Order and Report-Recommendation dated May 24, 2013, United States Magistrate Judge Dancks "grant[ed] Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application and recommended that the action be dismissed without leave to amend." Dkt. No. 4 at 1. Magistrate Judge Dancks found that because all named Defendants are judges and said action relates to the exercise of their judicial function, they are entitled to absolute immunity. See id. at 3.
Currently before the Court are Plaintiff's "objections" to Magistrate Judge Danks' Order and Report-Recommendation.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Defendants engaged in "malicious act[s] of court fraud in the court of law and procedures during the course of many lawsuits individually at different dates and times[.]" Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Specifically, he states that "all the judges that are named basically are responsible for violating my rights tremendously. My cases that I had pending [ ] were dismissed without any legit good cause, the lawsuits and the 440.10 motion never got an opportunity for suppression in light of the evidence or either utilization of discovery, [and] none of the lawsuits were answered by the Defendants...." Id. at 2.
In her May 24, 2013 Order and Report-Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Dancks found that "Plaintiff's complaint is barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity" because the complaint references action that relates to the exercise of Defendants' judicial functions. See Dkt. No. 4 at 3.
Plaintiff's "objections" allege that judicial immunity does not preclude an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "when a judge cause[es] serious destruction to the basics law of Constitution." Dkt. No. 6 at 1. Plaintiff continues to allege that various court decisions violated his rights. See id. at 2-4. Plaintiff claims that Defendants committed fraud and that the judgments were a personal attack on him and his family. See id. at 2.
When a party files specific objections to a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the district court makes a " de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, when a party files "[g]eneral or conclusory objections or objections which merely recite the same arguments [that he presented] to the magistrate judge, " the court reviews those recommendations for clear error. O'Diah v. Mawhir, No. 9:08-CV-322, 2011 WL 933846, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011) (citations and footnote omitted). After the appropriate review, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
A litigant's failure to file objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, even when that litigant is proceeding pro se, waives any challenge to the report on appeal. See Cephas v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that, "[a]s a rule, a party's failure to object to any purported error or omission in a magistrate judge's report waives further judicial review of the point" (citation omitted)). A pro se litigant must be given notice of this rule; notice is sufficient if it informs the litigant that the failure to timely object will result in the waiver of further judicial review and cites pertinent statutory and civil rules authority. See Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 299 (2d Cir. 1992); Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a pro se party's failure to object to a report and recommendation does not waive his right to appellate review unless the report explicitly states that failure to object will preclude appellate review and specifically cites 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a), and former 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
When judges are acting in their judicial capacity, they are entitled to absolute immunity from suit. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). "Whether a judge acted in a judicial capacity' depends on the nature of the act [complained of] itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and [on] the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.'" Ceparano v. Southampton Justice Court, 404 Fed.Appx. 537, 539 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). Judicial immunity is "from suit, not just from the ultimate assessment of damages." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. It bars suits even when the allegation is for corrupt or malicious behavior. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 n.12 (1976) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). This immunity is not intended to protect or benefit a malicious or corrupt judge, but rather to ...