Michael L. Soshnick, Mineola, N.Y. (Adrian Diluzio of counsel), for appellant.
Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Judith R. Sternberg, Sarah S. Rabinowitz, Ilisa Fleischer, and Monica M.C. Leiter of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Sullivan, J.), rendered January 30, 2012, convicting him of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the second degree, reckless driving, driving while ability impaired by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(4-a), and speeding, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL 470.15(5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to vehicular manslaughter in the second degree was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633).
The trial court's original charge to the jury with respect to the definition of "cause of death, " which was in accordance with the language contained in the Criminal Jury Instructions, was proper (see CJI2d [NY] Penal Law art 125-causation; People v Prospect, 50 A.D.3d 1064, 1064; People v Lubrano, 43 A.D.3d 829, 830; People v Pedro, 36 A.D.3d 832, 833; People v McDonald, 283 A.D.2d 592, 593). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the court responded meaningfully to the jury's inquiry during deliberations regarding the scope of reasonable foreseeability by rereading the original charge (see People v Santi, 3 N.Y.3d 234, 248-249; People v Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, 303, cert denied 459 U.S. 847; People v Dawkins, 151 A.D.2d 495, 497; see generally People v Almodovar, 62 N.Y.2d 126, 131).
The County Court correctly imposed an interlock ignition requirement as an element of the defendant's sentence (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192[4-a], 1198). The sentence imposed ...