Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Joseph D. Valentino, J.), rendered January 9, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts).
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JAMES ECKERT OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
BERNARD DASHER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (STEPHEN X. O'BRIEN OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 ) and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03  [b]; ). We reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress his statements to the police. The evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports the court's determination that defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Contrary to defendant's contention, the record of the suppression hearing does not establish that he was under the influence of medication at the time he waived those rights "to the degree of mania, or of being unable to understand the meaning of his statements" (People v Schompert, 19 N.Y.2d 300, 305, cert denied389 U.S. 874; see People v Peterkin, 89 A.D.3d 1455, 1455, lv denied18 N.Y.3d 885; People v Marvin, 68 A.D.3d 1729, 1729, lv denied14 N.Y.3d 842). We reject defendant's contention that medically-induced intoxication requires application of the police-induced intoxication rule set forth in Schompert (19 N.Y.2d at 305-307), and instead conclude that medically-induced intoxication should be evaluated under the self-intoxication standard referenced above (see id.; see also People v ...