September 27, 2013
ATASH IMANVERDI AND SHEILA IMANVERDI, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
BRYAN G. POPOVICI, DPM, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN AGENT, OFFICER AND/OR EMPLOYEE OF BRYAN G. POPOVICI, DPM, PC, BY AND THROUGH ITS AGENTS, OFFICERS AND/OR EMPLOYEES, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, ET AL., DEFENDANT.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Anthony J. Paris, J.), entered April 23, 2012. The order, among other things, directed plaintiffs to produce contents of a Facebook page for in camera review, and denied the cross motion of plaintiffs for a protective order.
BOTTAR LEONE, PLLC, SYRACUSE (AARON J. RYDER OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS.
DAMON MOREY LLP, BUFFALO (AMY ARCHER FLAHERTY OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, AND LINDLEY, JJ.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiffs appeal from an order that, inter alia, directed plaintiffs to produce contents of a Facebook page for in camera review, denied their cross motion for a protective order and awarded defendant-respondent (defendant) attorney's fees and costs. We affirm. "It is well settled that [a] trial court has broad discretion in supervising the discovery process, and its determinations will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion' " (Giles v Yi, 105 A.D.3d 1313, 1315). " [E]very court retains continuing jurisdiction to reconsider its prior interlocutory orders during the pendency of the action' " (Lidge v Niagara Falls Mem. Med. Ctr. [appeal No. 2], 17 A.D.3d 1033, 1034, quoting Liss v Trans Auto Sys., 68 N.Y.2d 15, 20; see Pino v Harnischfeger, 42 A.D.3d 980, 983). Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in modifying its prior order to compel discovery by directing plaintiff Atash Imanverdi to produce her Facebook page for in camera review (see Richards v Hertz Corp., 100 A.D.3d 728, 730; Pino, 42 A.D.3d at 983; Lidge, 17 A.D.3d at 1034).
Furthermore, the court properly exercised its discretion in awarding costs and attorney's fees to defendant (see CPLR 3126; Riley v ISS Intl. Serv. Sys., 304 A.D.2d 637, 637-638; see also Danser v Carrols Corp., 11 A.D.3d 940, 940-941), and in denying plaintiffs' cross motion for a protective order (see Rawlins v St. Joseph's Hosp. Health Ctr., 108 A.D.3d 1191, 1191-1192).