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Oklahoma Police Pension & Retirement System v. U.S. Bank National Association

United States District Court, S.D. New York

December 13, 2013

OKLAHOMA POLICE PENSION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant

Decided December 12, 2013

For Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement System, Plaintiff: Beth Ann Kaswan, Scott Scott, L.L.P.( NYC), New York, NY; David R. Scott, Scott & Scott, LLC(CT), Colchester, CT; Deborah Clark-Weintraub, Scott䧊 LLP, New York, NY; Max Raphael Schwartz, Scott Scott, L.L.P.( NYC), New York, NY.

For U.S. Bank National Association, (as Trustee Under Various Pooling and Servicing Agreements), Defendant: Michael Stephan Kraut, LEAD ATTORNEY, John Michael Vassos, Morgan, Lewis and Bockius LLP (NY), New York, NY.

OPINION

Page 413

OPINION AND ORDER

John G. Koeltl, United States District Judge.

This case arose out of residential mortgage loans that were pooled and sold together as Bear Stearns mortgage backed

Page 414

securities (" MBS" ). The plaintiff, Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement System (" OPPRS" ), brought this putative class action against the defendant, U.S. Bank National Association (" U.S. Bank" ), which was the trustee for fourteen trusts (the " Covered Trusts" ) that issued the MBS. The plaintiff and the other members of the putative class invested in these trusts. The plaintiff alleges violations of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA), 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa et seq., breaches of contract, and breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New York law.

On May 31, 2013, this Court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. Specifically, the Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss with respect to the claim for breach of contract and part of the claim under the TIA. Okla. Police Pension & Ret. Sys. v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n (OPPRS I), 291 F.R.D. 47, 67, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The defendant now moves for partial summary judgment on OPPRS's breach of contract claim on the basis that OPPRS no longer holds securities issued by any of the Covered Trusts. For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted.

I.

The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. " The [C]ourt shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). " [T]he trial court's task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution." Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. The moving party bears the initial burden of " informing the district court of the basis for its motion" and identifying the matter that " it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The substantive law governing the case will identify those facts that are material and " [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)); see also Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223. Summary judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). If the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must produce evidence in the record and " may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible . . . ." Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1998) (collecting cases).

II.

The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the factual background and recites

Page 415

only those facts relevant to the present motion. For a more complete description of the background of this case, see OPPRS I, 291 F.R.D. at 52-57. The following ...


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