January 30, 2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent,
TROY A. BARKLEY, Appellant.
Calendar Date: January 15, 2014
Lisa A. Burgess, Indian Lake, for appellant.
Alexander Lesyk, Special Prosecutor, Norwood, for respondent.
Before: Peters, P.J., Stein, McCarthy and Garry, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Richards, J.), rendered September 24, 2012, which revoked defendant's probation and imposed a sentence of imprisonment.
In September 2007, defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), and sentenced to, as relevant here, five years of probation. Subsequently, defendant admitted to violating the conditions of his probation based upon multiple felony convictions in New Jersey. As a result, County Court vacated defendant's sentence of probation and sentenced him to a prison term of 1 to 3 years followed by a three-year conditional discharge with interlock ignition conditions. Defendant now appeals.
We affirm. Defendant first contends that the imposition of the three-year conditional discharge, in addition to his prison sentence, constituted a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. However, "[a]s long as the Legislature intended to impose cumulative punishments for a single offense, ... no constitutional double jeopardy claim is implicated" (People v Gonzalez, 99 N.Y.2d 76, 82 ). As relevant here, when a person is convicted of driving while intoxicated under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), "the court may sentence such person to a period of imprisonment... and shall sentence such person to a period of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 65] and shall order the installation and maintenance of a functioning ignition interlock device" (Penal Law § 60.21 [emphasis added]). Further, the sentence imposed was permissible in all respects, inasmuch as Penal Law § 65.05 (3) requires that the period of conditional discharge for a felony be three years, and Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (1) (b) (ii) requires that the ignition interlock condition be imposed for no less than six months. Finally, defendant's contention that his sentence was harsh and excessive is without merit, inasmuch as he received the minimum legally permissible sentence (see Penal Law § 70.00 , ; People v Iadicicco, 100 A.D.3d 1147 ; People v Caban, 89 A.D.3d 1321, 1323 ).
Stein, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.