United States District Court, S.D. New York
February 4, 2014
MARLON BLACK, Petitioner,
HAROLD GRAHAM, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility, Respondent.
VINCENT L. BRICCETTI, District Judge.
Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Lisa M. Smith's Report and Recommendation ("R&R"), dated December 11, 2013 (Doc. #17), on Marlon Black's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Judge Smith recommended the Court deny the petition.
For the following reasons, the Court adopts the R&R. The petition is DENIED.
Familiarity with the factual and procedural background of this case is presumed.
I. Standard of Review
A district court reviewing a magistrate judge's report and recommendation "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Parties may raise objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, but they must be "specific[, ] written, " and submitted within fourteen days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), or within seventeen days if the parties are served by mail. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d).
When a party submits a timely objection to a report and recommendation, the district court reviews the parts of the report and recommendation to which the party objected under a de novo standard of review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). The district court may adopt those portions of the recommended ruling to which no timely objections have been made, provided no clear error is apparent from the face of the record. See Wilds v. UPS, Inc. , 262 F.Supp.2d 163, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The clearly erroneous standard also applies when a party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments. See Ortiz v. Barkley , 558 F.Supp.2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). As petitioner is proceeding pro se, this Court "will read [his] supporting papers liberally, and... interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Id . (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins , 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief only if he can show that in adjudicating his claim on the merits, the state court either (i) unreasonably applied, or made a decision contrary to, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, or (ii) unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). The state court's determination of factual issues is presumed correct, and petitioner has "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Neither party objected to Judge Smith's thorough and well-reasoned R&R.
The Court has carefully reviewed the R&R and finds no error, clear or otherwise.
Accordingly, the Court adopts the R&R, and the petition is DENIED.
The Clerk is instructed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
As petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Love v. McCray , 413 F.3d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 2005). In addition, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States , 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).