United States District Court, E.D. New York
Mark Szuszkiewicz, Plaintiff, Pro se, Brooklyn, NY.
For J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, Defendant: Frederic L. Lieberman, LEAD ATTORNEY, J.P. Morgan Chase Legal Department, Chase Bank N.A., New York, NY.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
SANDRA L. TOWNES, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Mark Szuszkiewicz brings this employment discrimination suit against his former employer J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (hereinafter " J.P. Morgan" ), successor to Chase Investment Services Corp., incorrectly named in the complaint as JPMorgan Chase Bank. He claims that he was subjected to a hostile work environment and termination on account of his mental disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. J.P. Morgan now moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Under the now well-established Twombly standard, a complaint should be dismissed only if it does not contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim for relief that is " plausible on its face." Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). " A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). " While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 " marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, ... it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
The Supreme Court has clarified that Twombly sets out a two-pronged approach for district courts considering motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (2009). District courts should first " identify[ ] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth," and second, if a complaint contains " well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679.
The Court is generally limited to the " facts stated in the complaint or documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference." Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2005). It may also consider " matters of which judicial notice may be taken, or ... documents either in plaintiff[']s possession or of which plaintiff had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit," Brass v. Am. Film Technologies, Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted), such as the EEOC charge of discrimination and subsequent decision. See Morris v. David Lerner Associates, 680 F.Supp.2d 430, 435-36 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (considering EEOC charge of discrimination and right to sue letter as public documents and documents relied on in drafting the complaint).
Plaintiff's complaint consists of the Eastern District of New York Pro Se Office's five page form complaint for employment discrimination appended to which is a right to sue letter from the EEOC and an eight page single-spaced narrative, most of which details events and recollections that are irrelevant to the claims before this Court. As plaintiff proceeds pro se this Court construes his complaint liberally.
For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true, the following facts alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint:
1. Employment as a Financial Advisor
Plaintiff began working at J.P. Morgan on January 15, 2008. ...