United States District Court, E.D. New York
DECISION AND ORDER
WILLIAM F. KUNTZ, II, District Judge.
On June 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York, its police department, and two of its police officers alleging excessive force. Plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. However, the claims against Defendants New York City and New York City Police Department are dismissed. The claims raised against the individual Defendants may proceed as set forth below. The Clerk of Court shall send a copy of the Complaint and this Order to the New York City Law Department and a copy of this Order to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges that on January 18, 2012, he was awakened by the sound of a "boom." Dkt. 1 ("Compl.") ¶ 13. Before him was Defendant "John Doe One wearing a helmet and armed with a shield." Id. John Doe One allegedly told Plaintiff to freeze and then rushed at him. Id. Plaintiff suffered "lacerations to his forearms from the attempt to block the shield." Id. Then, Defendant "John Doe Two... slammed [Plaintiffs] head into a wall from which a glass framed picture hung, " breaking the glass and causing "an abrasion to his forehead." Id. ¶ 14. Defendants John Doe One and John Doe Two, both New York City police officers, stated that they had a search warrant and were looking for a gun, but failed to produce a search warrant. Id. ¶¶ 8, 15. The officers found no gun, but Plaintiff was arrested and charged with "marijuana in the fifth degree, " though it was later dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 16, 19. Plaintiff was transported to an unidentified hospital and treated for the "violent attack inflicted upon him" by Defendants. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff now sets forth claims for excessive force, a Monell claim against the City of New York, and the following state law claims: assault and battery, infliction of emotional distress, negligence, respondeat superior liability and negligent supervision and training.
A. Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss an informapauperis action where it is satisfied that the action is "(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." The Court construes plaintiffs prose pleadings liberally, particularly so when they allege civil rights violations. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d Cir. 2008).
Although courts must read pro se complaints with "special solicitude" and interpret them to raise the "strongest arguments that they suggest, " Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), a complaint still must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While "detailed factual allegations are not required, "[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions' or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Similarly, a complaint is insufficient to state a claim "if it tenders naked assertion[s]' devoid of further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
B. Plaintiff's Claims against the Municipal Defendants Fail
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. In order to maintain a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, Plaintiff must allege that (1) "the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law, " and (2) "the conduct complained of must have deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994).
1. City of New York
To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a municipal defendant, a plaintiff must show the existence of an officially adopted policy or custom that caused injury and a direct causal connection between that policy or custom and the deprivation of a constitutional right. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 689 (1978)); see also Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[T]o establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that action pursuant to official municipal policy caused the alleged constitutional injury.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1741 (2012). A single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability on a municipality unless a plaintiff can establish that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985). "[L]ocal governments are responsible only for their own illegal acts.They are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees' actions." Connick v. Thompson, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Because Plaintiff has not alleged a policy or practice attributable to the City that could plausibly confer Monell liability, the§ 1983 claim against the City of New York is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
2. New York City Police Department
Plaintiff also names the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") as a defendant. However, the NYPD is a non-suable agency of the City of New York. Jenkins v. City of New York, 06-CV-0182, 2007 WL415171, at *11 n.19 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 2007) (internal citation omitted); see also Araujo v. City of New York, 08-CV-3715, 2010 WL 1049583, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010) (Matsumoto, J.). Therefore, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the ...