United States District Court, S.D. New York
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge.
Before the Court are the Defendants' motions to dismiss. The City ofNew York, Detective Rodell Glover, and Detective Tyrone Tillman collectively are referred to herein as the "City Defendants, " while Riverbay Co-Op City, Riverbay Corporation, P.O. Catala (shield 03989), P.O. Melvin Gonzalez (shield 4237), and P.O. Jacinto Cruz (shield 2132) collectively are referred to herein as the "Riverbay Defendants." Although the City and Riverbay Defendants raise slightly different arguments in their separate moving papers, both raise the same dispositive issue that the Court will address here-whether Plaintiff's allegations state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court concludes that they do not and accordingly grants the motions to dismiss.
The factual allegations stated below are taken from Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), Dkt. No. 30, and are presumed true and construed in Plaintiff's favor for the purposes of deciding the City and Riverbay Defendants' motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Krassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen, Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2007).
On or about October 22, 2009, individual Defendant officers, possibly including Tillman, Glover, Catala, Gonzalez, and Cruz,  arrested an individual named Sharon Sutton in or near a housing development known as Co-Op City that is owned and operated by Riverbay Corporation. An agreement between Riverbay Corporation and the City of New York allegedly gives the Co-Op City Department of Public Safety and its officers the authority to make arrests and process prisoners arrested on the grounds of Co-Op City as if they were New York City police officers. Sutton was charged with driving under the influence and a hit-and-run offense. After taking her into custody, the officers determined that she was unruly, combative, violent, and otherwise acting in a bizarre manner, which led them to believe the she was in need of medical treatment. Thus, the officers transported Sutton to the Jacoby Medical Center.
At the Jacoby Medical Center, the officers kept Sutton's feet shackled to prevent her from fleeing, but left her hands and arms unsecured and apparently left Sutton unguarded while on a hospital gurney awaiting examination. Plaintiff, Virginia Tufaro, was a supervising nurse employed at Jacoby Medical Center. At some point, Plaintiff asked the officers whether there was any cause for concern as to the safety of her staff, and she was told that Sutton was securely in the custody of the officers as a prisoner and would not be a threat to Plaintiff, her staff, or anyone else in Jacoby Medical Center. Plaintiff then inquired about what Sutton had done and why the officers believed Sutton needed medical attention. The officers replied that Sutton had been charged with driving while intoxicated, hit and run, and assault and had acted bizarrely; Plaintiff apparently then suggested that patients such as Sutton were usually secured and closely guarded by accompanying officers. The officers replied that Plaintiff should not worry because they had the situation under control, telling Plaintiff"You don't have to worry, " Sutton would not bother anyone, and that the officers would be standing close by and would protect Plaintiff and those around her.
Based on these representations, Plaintiff continued to treat and examine Sutton. At some later point, while Plaintiff was attempting to administer an IV solution into Sutton's arm, Sutton used her free hands and arms to attack and assault Plaintiff. Sutton grabbed Plaintiffs left arm, dug her fingernails deeply into Plaintiffs arm, thereby puncturing Plaintiffs skin, and pulled and yanked Plaintiffs arm. The Officers were apparently not immediately available to protect Plaintiff and only secured Sutton's arms after the attack.
A. Legal Standard
On a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a district court is to accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and is to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Krassner, 496 F.3d at 237. Factual allegations are therefore afforded a presumption of truth, but a court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs pleading must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
B. Substantive Due Process Claims
Plaintiffs only federal law claims arise under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of her constitutional rights, specifically her substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff does not allege that she directly suffered any harm at the hands of government actors, be they New York City Police Department Officers or Co-Op City Officers operating under color of law; rather, she alleges the she was attacked by a private actor, Sutton, whom the officers failed to properly restrain. Because the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to state a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth Amendment against any officer, it need not decide whether the Co-Op City Officers were state actors and will instead assume that they were for the purposes of deciding this motion.
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department ofSocial Services, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "generally confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual." 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). Drawing on the reasoning of DeShaney, the Second Circuit has recognized two narrow exceptions to this rule. Matican v. City ofNew York, 524 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2008). The first exception covers acts of private violence where the state had a "special relationship" with the victim. Id. (citing Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 533 (2d Cir. 1993)). The second exception covers situations in which the state or its agents "in some way had assisted in creating or increasing the danger to the victim.'" Id. (quoting Dwares v. City ofNew York, 985 F.2d 94, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1993)). But even if Plaintiff is able to satisfy one of these exceptions, she "must [also] show that the officers' behavior was so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.'" Id. (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998) ("Lewis") ).
The special relationship exception requires some form of involuntary custody of the Plaintiff. Id. (citing Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 79 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007); Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adult v. Wingate, 101 F.3d 818, 824 (2d Cir. 1996); Doe v. N.Y City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981)). Because Plaintiff was not in ...