United States District Court, E.D. New York
ANTHONY J. CEPARANO, Plaintiff,
SUFFOLK COUNTY DEPT. OF HEALTH, S.C.C.F. MEDICAL UNIT, DEPT. OF HEALTH COMM. HUMAYUN CHAUNDRY, S.C.C.F. CHIEF ADAM VINCENT GERACI, DOCTOR
SANDRA J. FEUERSTIN, District Judge.
On December 4, 2013, this Court issued an order (the "Order") granting summary judgment to Alice Butkos ("Butkos") and the County of Suffolk ("the County, " together with Butkos, "defendants"), and dismissing the complaint filed against them by plaintiff Anthony Ceparano ("plaintiff"). [Docket Entry No. 133]. On December 9, 2013, judgment was entered and the action was closed. [Docket Entry No. 134].
Now before the Court is plaintiff's "Motion for Reconsideration [of the] Order, Or, In the Alternative, His Motion for Reargument" ("Motion for Reconsideration"). [Docket Entry No. 138]. For the reasons that follow, plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
I. Standard of Review
Motions for reconsideration in this district are governed by Local Civil Rule 6.3 ("Local Rule 6.3"), which provides, in relevant part, that a "notice of motion for reconsideration or reargument of a court order determining a motion shall be served within fourteen (14) days after the entry of the court's determination of the original motion, or in the case of a court order resulting in a judgment, within fourteen (14) days after the entry of the judgment." Local Rule 6.3. A movant under Local Rule 6.3 must submit "a memorandum setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked." Id.
"The standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Lothian Cassidy, LLC v. Lothian Exploration & Dev. II, L.P., 487 B.R. 158, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("A court must narrowly construe and strictly apply 6.3 so as to avoid duplicative rulings on previously considered issues, and to prevent Rule 6.3 from being used to advance different theories not previously argued or as a substitute for appealing a final judgment."). In determining a motion for reconsideration, the court should consider: (1) whether there has been "an intervening change of controlling law;" (2) whether there is new evidence presented that was not previously available on the original motion; and (3) whether there is a "need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Trust, 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd v. Nat'l Mediation Bd, 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992)). "[R]econsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked - matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257 (citations omitted).
A. December 4, 2013 Order
By Order dated December 4, 2013, this Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment upon finding that plaintiff had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his claims for: (i) deliberate indifference to his medical needs by Butkos, and (2) municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
1. Deliberate Indifference
As set forth in the Order, "[p]laintiff's claim that Butkos denied him adequate medical care in violation of his constitutional rights requires a showing of deliberate indifference to [a prisoner's] medical needs.'" Order, at 9 (citing Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976))). The Court set forth the standard for deliberate indifference:
The test for deliberate indifference to medical needs has both an objective and a subjective component. Callazo v. Pagano, 656 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996)); Hill, 657 F.3d at 122.
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To satisfy the objective element of deliberate indifference, "the alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious, in the sense that a condition. of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain, exists." Hill, 657 F.3d at 122 (quoting Hathaway, 99 F.3d at 553). In order to determine whether an alleged deprivation of medical care was objectively serious, the court must inquire whether (1) the inmate was "actually deprived of adequate medical care, " and ...