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Patterson v. Labella

United States District Court, N.D. New York

September 30, 2014

DANIEL LABELLA, individually and in his official capacity as Utica Police Chief; MARK WILLIAMS, individually and in his official capacity as Utica Police Chief; JOHN TOOMEY, individually and in his official capacity as Utica Police Captain; LOUIS CAPRI, individually and in his official capacity as Utica Police Lieutenant; EDWARD NOONAN, individually and in his official capacity as Utica Police Officer; HOWARD BRODT, individually and in his official capacity as Utica Police Officer; OFFICER JOSHUA GRANDE, individually and in his official capacity as Utica Police Officer; JAMES HOLT, individually and in his official capacity as Utica Police Officer; TODD DUVAL, individually and in his official capacity as Utica Police Officer; MICHAEL CURLEY, individually and in his capacity as Utica Police Officer; SAMUEL GEDDES, individually and in his official capacity as Utica Police Officer; STEVEN HAUCK, individually and in his official capacity as Utica Police Officer; BRIAN BANSNER, individually and in his official capacity as Utica Police Officer; LINDA FATATA, individually and in her official capacity as Utica Corporation Counsel; CITY OF UTICA; DANIEL COZZA, individually and in his official capacity as Codes Officer; GERALD FOSTER, individually and in his official capacity as Fire Fighter; JOHN DOE, unknown individually and in his official capacity as Utica city employee, Defendants.

STEPHEN PATTERSON, Utica, New York, Plaintiff pro se.

JOHN P. ORILIO, ESQ., ZACHARY C. OREN, ESQ., OFFICE OF CORPORATION COUNSEL, City of Utica, Utica, New York, Attorneys for Defendants.


MAE A. D'AGOSTINO, District Judge.


Plaintiff commenced this action on October 19, 2012, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated various constitutional rights. See Dkt. No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to, among other things, false arrest, malicious prosecution, unlawful search and seizure, conspiracy to violate his civil rights, First Amendment retaliation, cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that various Defendants failed to intervene when his constitutional rights were being violated. See generally Dkt. No. 13.

Currently before the Court are the parties cross motions for summary judgment. See Dkt. Nos. 38 & 43.


At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was a resident of Utica, New York. See Dkt. No. 13 at ¶ 1. The named Defendants in this action are all employed by the City of Utica. Defendant Linda Fatata is the City of Utica's Corporation Counsel. See id. at ¶ 3. Defendants Daniel Labella and Mark Williams are the former and current Chiefs of Police, respectively. See id. at ¶¶ 4-5. The remaining named Defendants are all Utica Police Officers. See id. at ¶¶ 6-19.

On August 31, 2008, Plaintiff signed a lease for the property located at 315 Nichols Street, Utica, New York. See id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff has "habitually referred to 315 Nichols Street, Utica, New York as Petes.'" Dkt. No. 54-36 at ¶ 62. Although Petes caught fire sometime in early January 2010, the premises were active until the fire. See id. at ¶ 63. Defendants contend that Plaintiff operated Petes as an "after-hours night club which serves alcohol[.]'" Id. at ¶ 68.

According to the amended complaint, Plaintiff contends that "Defendant Fatata began retaliation against plaintiff's business by placing his business on the police Hot Spot" list on September 7, 2008. Plaintiff was harassed and illegally videotaped by the Utica police for a year." Dkt. No. 13 at ¶ 25; see also Dkt. No. 54-36 at ¶ 55. On September 30, 2009, Plaintiff filed a civil rights lawsuit in response to this alleged conduct. See Patterson v. Utica, No. 6:09-cv-1102 (N.D.N.Y.).[3] Plaintiff alleges that, "[t]en days after the civil action was filed by the plaintiff the retaliation against plaintiff's business activities commenced with defendants Capri and Brodt initiating a[n] unjustified and unwarranted investigation against plaintiff without probable cause. This [led] to these defendants filing a false charge of illegal sale of alcohol on October 10, 2009 at 315 Nichols Street against the plaintiff." Dkt. No. 13 at ¶ 26.

Regarding the October 10, 2009 incident, the record indicates that Defendants used a confidential informant, Jacqueline Rodgers, who purchased alcohol at Pete's. See Dkt. No. 54-36 at ¶ 68; Dkt. No. 44 at ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 38-3 at 4. According to Ms. Rodgers statement to Defendant Brodt, upon entering Pete's and speaking with another individual, she went to the bar on the second floor. See Dkt. No. 38-3 at 4. Ms. Rodgers asked the bar tender what they were selling, and she said "E&J and Hennessey which is Cognac, alcohol and gin[.]" Id. Ms. Rodgers then purchased "a shot of E&J and a girl poured it in a cup from a cranberry juice container into a plastic cup" for five (5) dollars. Id. Ms. Rodgers then left Pete's and brought the purchased alcohol to Defendants Capri and Brodt who were waiting for her in a car nearby. See id. Ms. Rodgers then accompanied Defendants Capri and Brodt to the police station where she gave her statement. See id.

According to Defendant Capri, he maintained possession of the plastic cup that Ms. Rodgers had in her possession when she left Pete's. See id. at 7. The cup and liquid it contained were turned over to an evidence technician who sealed the evidence and sent it to the New York State Forensic Laboratory. See id. The "New York State Police Forensic Investigation toxicology report that identified the liquid that Jacqueline Rodgers purchased at 315 Nichols St on October 10th 2009 contain[ed] 35% Ethanol (alcohol) by volume.'" Dkt. No. 54-36 at ¶ 69.

On October 10, 2009, Defendant Nash was assigned to park his patrol car in front of 315 Nichols Street and was brief regarding the plan to have Ms. Rodgers enter the establishment and purchase alcohol. See id. at 7. At approximately 2:20 a.m., Defendant Nash observed Ms. Rodgers enter Pete's with nothing in her hands. See id. After approximately ten minutes, Defendant Nash claims to have observed Ms. Rodgers exit the building carrying a clear plastic cup with an unknown liquid in it. See id. at 7-8. Defendant Nash then watched as Ms. Rodgers proceeded to the vehicle containing Defendant Capri and Brodt. See id. at 8.

In an Information/Complaint filed on December 7, 2009, Defendants Brodt and Capri charged Plaintiff with intentionally and knowingly selling alcohol without a license. See id. at 10. Specifically, the complaint reads as follows:

On Saturday October 10th, 2009 at approximately 2:20am while at Pistol Pete's, 315 Nichols Street in the City of Utica, County of Oneida, State of New York, 13501, Stephen Patterson, who is the owner/operator/proprietor of the business enterprise Pistol Pete's, did knowingly and intentionally have for sale and sell a shot of E & J Brandy for a fee of $5.00. The defendant, Mr. Patterson, did this without first obtaining the appropriate license from the New York State Liquor Authority. This act was also completed with the assistance of an unknown black female bartender.


On January 8, 2010, Plaintiff was arraigned in Utica City Court. See Dkt. No. 38-3 at 143-44. In addition to the charges stemming from the events of October 10, 2009, Plaintiff also had the following charges pending against him as of the date of his arraignment:


Dkt. No. 38-3 at 145-47.

The remainder of Plaintiffs' allegations involve events occurring on October 24, 2009. Plaintiff contends that on October 24, 2009, Defendants Noonan, Holt, Geddes, Grande, Curley, and Duval of the Special Operations Unit under the command of Defendant Capri, "showed up at a charitable teen party hosted by a your lady at 315 Nichols Street[.]" Dkt. No. 13 at ¶ 29. Plaintiff contends that, according to the police narrative, Defendants "went to 315 Nichols Street for a premise check. There were no 911 calls, crimes in progress, or no police assistance required at the location." Id. at ¶ 30.

Plaintiff's trial on the charges stemming from the October 24, 2009 incident occurred on June 15, 2010 in Utica City Court in front of Judge Gerald J. Popeo. See Dkt. No. 54-10. At trial, Defendant Duval testified that he was patrolling the East Utica area shortly after midnight when he received a call for units to respond to Pistol Pete's to assist him. See id. at 9. When Defendant Duval arrived, he observed Defendants Noonan and Holt in front of the establishment speaking with Plaintiff. See id. at 10. Defendant Duval testified that he could hear loud music upon arriving and issued Plaintiff an appearance ticket for general noise violation. See id. at 10-11. As he was approaching, Defendant Noonan observed Plaintiff's business partner, Willie Walker, exit and enter the premises several times. See id. at 11. Thereafter, the neon sign outside the establishment was turned off and Defendant Duval observed "a large crowd of juveniles... beginning [to] exit[ ] the establishment." See id. Defendant Duval testified that there were approximately 100 individuals exiting the establishment and that there were anywhere between the ages of fifteen to seventeen. See id. at 11-12. Defendant Duval further testified that he observed Defendant Grande exit the premises with J.B., who was sixteen years of age and intoxicated. See id. at 13. While inside Pete's, Defendant Duval testified that he observed a bar area, empty liquor bottles scattered throughout the establishment, including some on the floor, and evidence that marijuana had been used. See id. at 19-20.

Defendant Holt testified that he and Defendant Noonan went to Pete's on October 24, 2009 because the illegal activity that generally occurred there happened on Friday and Saturday nights - "when they would have the gatherings there, the parties. The illegal cabaret activity." Dkt. No. 54-9 at 5-6. When he first arrived at Pistol Pete's, Defendant Holt testified that he and Defendant Noonan observed "numerous - they appeared to be juveniles - younger teenage males and females going in and out of the Nichols Street side door of the establishment, which is the common door that people normally use to enter and exit the establishment." Id. at 8. Defendant Holt estimated that the juveniles were anywhere between thirteen and seventeen years of age. See id. at 9. Defendant Holt heard loud music coming from the establishment and interviewed several of the teenagers who were loitering outside. See id. at 10. These teenagers advised Defendant Holt that there was "a party going on inside and there was an entry fee of $5." Id. Further, Defendant Holt testified that Mr. Walker advised him that they were having a private birthday party in the club. See id. at 11.

Defendant Holt also performed a breathalyzer test on J.B., an individual who was at Pete's on the evening of October 24, 2009 and was sixteen years of age at the time. See Dkt. No. 54-36 at ¶¶ 105, 114-15. The test indicated that J.B. had a blood alcohol content of at least 0.08%. See id. at ¶ 105; see also Dkt. No. 54-9 at 22-27. J.B.'s mother later confirmed that J.B. was not intoxicated before he left for the party. See id. at ¶ 106; see also Dkt. No. 54-9 at 32-33.

Defendants' testimony was supported by the deposition of Maurice D. Titus - the DJ hired to perform at the birthday party. See Dkt. No. 54-12 at 2-4. Mr. Titus stated that he was hired by T.S., who was celebrating her birthday at Pete's. See id. Mr. Titus further stated that the individuals at the party ranged from approximately fourteen to twenty-one years of age, "but the majority were definitely under twenty-one (21)." Id. at 3. Mr. Titus observed many under-aged attendants drinking alcoholic beverages, often straight from the bottle. See id. Mr. Titus also recalled a specific incident from that evening:

At one point some drunk girl came to my DJ table and told me that a girl was passed out on the floor near the wall. The girl came to me and pointed to the girl and said She dead, she dead, ' referring to the passed out girl. Soon after that I saw two other young girls helping the passed out girl to her feet. The girl was hardly able to walk, and was moving around like jelly, meaning that she was limp and was unable to stand on her own. I turned on the light when they were picking her up to see what happened, and when I saw them moving her I turned off the light and went back to playing music.

Id. ; see also Dkt. No. 54-13 at 2-3 (supporting deposition of T.S. corroborating Defendants' testimony at trial and also stating that she was at Pete's on the evening of October 10, 2009).

Although Plaintiff was acquitted after trial of most of the charges stemming from the October 24, 2009 incident, the court found him guilty of violating New York Penal Law § 240.26 and sentenced him to fifteen days in jail. See Dkt. No. 54-36 at ¶ 77. Plaintiff contends that Defendants lacked probable cause to enter and search the second floor of the premises. See Dkt. No. 13 at ¶ 34. Plaintiff further contends that Defendants "removed old liquor and beer bottles that were stored in the basement garbage from the prior owner and prior events that took place at the premise and placed these bottles on the second floor of the premise where the teen party took place. The defendants created a crime scene." Id. at ¶ 35. Further, Plaintiff alleges that the Utica Dispatch, WKTV, YNN, and Utica Daily news received a press release by Defendant LaBella accusing Plaintiff of serving alcohol to minors at the October 24, 2009 party. See id. at ¶ 40.

On January 1, 2010, Utica City Court Judge John Balzano issued a search warrant for the interior and exterior of Pete's, to be executed between 12:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. that same day. See Dkt. No. 54-21. The warrant indicated that it was to seek "[e]vidence of the operation of a cabaret' and/or of the illegal sale or consumption of alcohol; evidence of the names and addresses of persons on or about the premises." See id. at 2. Investigator Laurey submitted the search warrant application. See id. at 3. The application detailed the various incidents that Defendants had responded to in October of 2009, as well as road checks that they had conducted involving individuals who had been at 315 Nichols Street. See id. at 4. Additionally, the application noted that "[o]n December 16, 2009 the Honorable Samuel D. Hester Supreme Court Justice ruled that the owner of 315 Nichols St. Utica NY, Stephen Patterson, [is] prohibit[ed] persons from using the property for uses not permitted under the zoning of the property without having gotten either a special permit or variance from the zoning board of appeals and that would include operation as a bar or restaurant or similar commercial use." Id. After receiving the injunction, Plaintiff drafted a letter to Defendant Williams requesting that he be permitted to operate the premises at 315 Nichols Street on New Years Eve of 2009. See id. Further, the application indicates that, "[o]n December 31, 2009 a concerned citizen presented a flyer stating that Petes will be holding a New Years Eve party. The flyer also states that VH1 Miss New York will be attending along with numerous DJ's. The flyer further states that free food and free drinks will be provided." Id. Further, the flyer states "GIVE ME $20 B4 12AM. PETE'S LAST PARTY. PETE'S LAST PARTY. 10PM UNTIL YOU QUIT." Dkt. No. 54-26 at 2.

In the early morning hours of January 1, 2010, Defendants executed the search warrant for 315 Nichols Street. See Dkt. No. 54-29. When they arrived, Plaintiff was at the front door and was served with the warrant. See id. at 17. The first floor of the bar was empty, but Defendants could hear loud music coming from the second floor. See id. When Defendants proceeded to the second floor, they observed people dancing and at the bar. There was a DJ playing music and alcohol was being consumed. See id. Defendants included a video of their execution of the warrant, which corroborates their account of what was found. See Dkt. No. 53.

On May 12, 2010, a Report and Recommendation was issued by the Nuisance Abatement Hearing Panel following an administrative hearing. See Dkt. No. 38 at Exhibit "7." The Report and Recommendation recommended that Plaintiff and Willie Walker "be prohibited and banned from operating any night club, cabaret, cafe, restaurant, banquet hall, after-hours club, dance hall, concert hall, meeting room, or any other place of public assembly or public accommodation at the premises located at 313-315 Nichols Street in Utica, New York." Id. On May 14, 2010, Defendant LaBella, as the Commissioner of Public Safety, adopted the Report and Recommendation and determined that the prohibition shall be for one year. See id. Further, Defendant LaBella revoked any Certificate of Occupancy issued by the City of Utica. See id. Currently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.


A. Applicable law

1. Summary judgment standard

A court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if it determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant judgment for the movant as a matter of law. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). When analyzing a summary judgment motion, the court "cannot try issues of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried.'" Id. at 36-37 (quotation and other citation omitted). Moreover, it is well-settled that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not simply rely on the assertions in its pleading. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e)).

In assessing the record to determine whether any such issues of material fact exist, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 36 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)) (other citations omitted). Where the non-movant either does not respond to the motion or fails to dispute the movant's statement of material facts, the court may not rely solely on the moving party's Rule 56.1 statement; rather, the court must be satisfied that the citations to evidence in the record support the movant's assertions. See Giannullo v. City of N.Y., 322 F.3d 139, 143 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that not verifying in the record the assertions in the motion for summary judgment "would derogate the truth-finding functions of the judicial process by substituting convenience for facts").

"[I]n a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than that accorded to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Govan v. Campbell, 289 F.Supp.2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)) (other citations omitted). The Second Circuit has opined that the court is obligated to "make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants" from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights merely because they lack a legal education. Govan v. Campbell, 289 F.Supp.2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). "However, this does not mean that a pro se litigant is excused from following the procedural requirements of summary judgment. See id. at 295 (citing Showers v. Eastmond, 00 CIV. 3725, 2001 WL 527484, *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2001)). Specifically, "a pro se party's bald assertion, ' completely unsupported by evidence, is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Lee v. Coughlin, 902 F.Supp. 424, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Cary v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991)).

2. False arrest

"A § 1983 claim for false arrest, ... including arrest without probable cause, ... is substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law[.]" Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). Under both New York law and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the elements of a false arrest action are as follows: "(1) the defendant intended to confine [the plaintiff], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.'" Curry v. City of Syracuse, 316 F.3d 324, 335 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).

"Justification may be established by showing that the arrest was based on probable cause.'" Savino v. City of N.Y., 331 F.3d 63, 76 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Probable cause exists "when the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed a crime or is committing a crime.'" Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). "The existence of probable cause must be determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, ... and where law enforcement authorities are cooperating in an investigation..., the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all.'" Calamia v. City of New York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1032 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal citation and quotation omitted). "An officer retains probable cause to arrest a plaintiff even if the probable cause was for a crime different from what the police officers believed to have been committed.'" Davis v. City of New York, 373 F.Supp.2d 322, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quotation and other citations omitted).[5]

3. Malicious prosecution

"The Fourth Amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person - i.e., the right to be free of unreasonable or unwarranted restraints on personal liberty." Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1995). To assert a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution under section 1983, a plaintiff must show a deprivation of her liberty consistent with the concept of "seizure, " so as to ensure that the harm suffered is of "constitutional proportions." See id.

The elements of malicious prosecution under section 1983 are virtually identical to the elements of the same claim under New York law. See Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 366 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). To state a cause of action for malicious prosecution in New York, the plaintiff must prove "(1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in plaintiff's favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual malice as a motivation for defendant's actions.'" Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). To sustain a malicious prosecution claim pursuant to section 1983, "the state law elements must be met, and there must also be a showing of a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.'" Rutligliano, 326 Fed.Appx. at 8-9 (quoting Rohman v. New York City Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 2000)). "Unlike an arrest, which only requires probable cause that the suspect had committed... an offense[, ]' a prosecution requires probable cause to charge [the suspect] with each of the crimes.'" Kavazanjian v. Rice, No. 03-CV-1923, 2005 WL 1377946, *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2005) (quoting Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 569, 571 (2d Cir. 1996)) (emphasis added). As such, when considering Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim, the Court must individually consider each count with which Plaintiff was charged. See id. (quotation omitted).

a. Probable cause

"In the context of a malicious prosecution claim, probable cause under New York law is the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful grounds for prosecuting the defendant in the manner complained of." Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 629-30 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Colon v. New York, 60 N.Y.2d 78, 82 (1983) (holding that probable cause to prosecute consists of "such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances to believe plaintiff guilty"). "[T]he existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution in New York." Savino, 331 F.3d at 72; see also Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 751 (2d Cir. 2010).

"In order to survive a motion for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, [the plaintiff] must have submitted evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that his indictment was procured as a result of police conduct undertaken in bad faith." Savino, 331 F.3d at 73. The presumption of probable cause is not rebutted "with mere conjecture' and surmise.'" Id. (citing Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also Sclafani v. Spitzer, 734 F.Supp.2d 288, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that "mere conjecture and surmise that an indictment was procured as a result of conduct undertaken in bad faith cannot overcome the presumption of probable cause created in an indictment" (quotations and citation omitted)); Fernandez v. DeLeno, 71 F.Supp.2d 224, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("To ...

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