United States District Court, E.D. New York
THE MARGOLIN & WEINREB LAW GROUP, LLP, BY: Alan H. Weinreb, Esq., Syosset, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
DELISA LAW GROUP, PLLC, BY: Michael C. DeLisa, Esq., Bohemia, New York, Attorneys for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
LEONARD D. WEXLER, District Judge.
Before the Court is the Plaintiff's motion for a default judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). Defendants John Prestia and Monica Prestia oppose Plaintiff's motion. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs motion for a default judgment is denied.
This is an action to foreclose a mortgage secured by Defendants John and Monica Prestia (the "Prestias") on August 4, 2005 from National City Bank in the amount of $68, 950.00, which covers the premises located at 3067 Lonni Lane in Merrick, New York. (Compl. ¶ 8.) On June 26, 2013, National City Bank's successor by merger, PNC National Bank Association, assigned the Prestias' Mortgage, by written assignment, to Plaintiff Cactus Paper, LLC. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that the Prestias defaulted on their mortgage in January 2010 and that the default continues to date. (Compl. ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff commenced the within foreclosure action on April 7, 2014. By stipulation and Order dated July 15, 2014, Defendants were afforded an extension of time to answer the Complaint until July 21, 2014. On July 22, 2014, no Answer having been filed by Defendants, Plaintiff requested a Certificate of Default from the Clerk of the Court. Later that same day, Defendants filed their Answer - one day late. On July 23, 2014, the Clerk of the Court issued the requested Certificate of Default.
Plaintiff thereafter filed the within motion for a default judgment on August 22, 2014. The Prestias filed their opposition to Plaintiffs motion on September 5, 2014.
I. Legal Standard
"Default judgments are generally disfavored as the law prefers decisions based on the merits." Kauhsen v. Aventura Motors, Inc., No. 09-4114, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55554, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2010) (citing United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 33 (2d Cir. 1977)). "[W]hen doubt exists as to whether a default should be granted or vacated, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the defaulting party." Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993). Defaults "are particularly disfavored by the law when substantial rights are implicated, or when substantial sums of money are demanded." Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) provides that "[t]he court may set aside an entry of default for good cause." Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c). "The filing of a late answer is analogous to a motion to vacate a default, " John v. Sotheby's, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 39, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1981), since "the party filing the late answer receives the same opportunity to present mitigating circumstances that [it] would have had if a default had been entered and [it] moved under Rule 55(c) to set it aside.'" John, 141 F.R.D. at 35 (quoting Snow, 652 F.2d at 276). Accordingly, the Court construes the Prestias' filing of a late Answer as a motion to vacate the entry of default pursuant to Rule 55(c).
While Rule 55(c) does not define good cause, ' the Second Circuit has instructed that good cause "should be construed generously." Enron, 10 F.3d at 96. In determining whether to set aside a default, "courts must consider whether: (1) the default was willful; (2) defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) any prejudice will result to the non-defaulting party if relief ...