Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Silva v. Cofresi

United States District Court, S.D. New York

November 19, 2014

JULIAN SILVA, individually and on behalf of HANDLE WITH CARE PRODUCTIONS, INC., Plaintiffs,
v.
JOSE VASQUEZ COFRESI, individually, : Defendant, and HANDLE WITH CARE PRODUCTIONS, INC., A New York Corporation and Nominal, Defendant, Nominal Defendant.
v.
HANDLE WITH CARE PRODUCTIONS, INC., A New York Corporation and Nominal Defendant and JOSE VASQUEZ COFRESI, individually, Counter Claimants,
v.
JULIAN SILVA, individually, Counter Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

COLLEEN McMAHON, District Judge.

For the second time in a year-long discovery dispute, the plaintiff, Julian Silva, seeks a court order striking the defendant's answer and counterclaims and granting judgment by default to the plaintiff. For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the plaintiff's motion be granted.

Background

This case arises out of the dissolution of a musical partnership between Mr. Silva and the defendant, Jose Vasquez Cofresi. The partners are former band-mates who wrote and performed together in the band La Excelencia. (Complaint, ΒΆΒΆ 4-5, 21, 24). At issue here are outstanding discovery demands initially served by the plaintiff on October 25, 2013. (Memorandum in Support of Motion for Terminating Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 37 ("Pl. Memo.") at 2; Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and Motion for Default Judgment ("Reply") at 5-7). After many months of delays, compounded by the defendant's termination and replacement of counsel, I issued an order on March 25, 2014 requiring, among other things, that the defendant respond to the plaintiff's discovery demands by May 15, 2014.[1] (Order dated March 25, 2014 ("March 24 Order")). As of June 11, 2014, when the plaintitt filed his first motion for terminating sanctions, the defendant-had responded to the plaintiff's Requests for Admission but not to the Interrogatories or Second Request for Production. Silva, 2014 4 3809095, at *2. When the defendant belatedly answered the motion, he attached discovery responses that consisted entirely of objections. Silva, 2014 WL 3809095, at *2.

On August 1, 2014, I deemed the defendant's objections waived because they were untimely, ordered him to serve substantive responses by September 2, 2014, and ordered him to pay the plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs associated with filing the motion. Id. at *6.

The second motion for terminating sanctions was filed on September 16, 2014. (Notice of Motion dated Sept. 16, 2014). The plaintiff asserts that since the August 1, 2014 order, the "[d]efendant has again failed to provide any response to the outstanding discovery, " and moves for an order striking the defendant's counterclaims and directing the clerk to enter a default judgment for the plaintiff. (Pl. Memo. at 2, 5). The defendant (incorrectly) interprets the plaintiff's claims of outstanding discovery to be limited to Interrogatories 10-17 (Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37 Motion to Strike Defendant's Counterclaim and Answer ("Def. Memo.") at 1), and argues on that basis that any sanctions should be limited to the defendant's counterclaims (Def. Memo. at 4).

Discussion

Where "a party... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery... the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders." Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A). Such orders may include striking pleadings in whole or in part, staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action in whole or in part, and ordering default judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b) (2)(A); see also Agiwal v. Mid Island Mortgage Corp., 555 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that party's failure to comply with court-ordered discovery may result in terminating sanctions); Daval Steel Products v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1365 (2d Cir. 1991) ("When a party seeks to frustrate [discovery] by disobeying discovery orders, thereby preventing disclosure of facts essential to an adjudication on the merits, severe sanctions are appropriate."). Indeed, "[e]ven in the absence of a discovery order, a court may impose sanctions on a party for misconduct in discovery under its inherent power to manage its own affairs." Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2002); accord Hawley v. Mphasis Corp., ___ F.R.D. ___, ___, 2014 WL 3610946, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Sanctions under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serve a three-fold purpose: (1) to ensure that a party will not benefit from its failure to comply; (2) to obtain compliance with the Court's orders; and (3) to deter noncompliance, both in the particular case and in litigation in general. Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1988); accord Aliki Foods, LLC v. Otter Valley Foods, Inc., 726 F.Supp.2d 159, 178 (D. Conn. 2010); Richardson v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., No. 05 Civ. 6278, 2007 WL 2597639, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007). Harsh sanctions such as default judgments are reserved for extreme situations. See Agiwal, 555 F.3d at 302; see also Shcherbakovkiy v. Da Capo Al Fine, Ltd., 490 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that "the severity of sanction must be commensurate with the non-compliance").

When determining the appropriate sanction to impose under Rule 37, courts in this Circuit weigh several factors, including "(1) the willfulness of acts underlying noncompliance; (2) the efficacy of lesser sanctions; (3) the duration of noncompliance; and (4) whether the noncompliant party was on notice that it faced possible sanctions." Sentry Insurance A Mutual Co. v. Brand Management, Inc., 295 F.R.D. 1, 5 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Agiwal, 555 F.3d at 302-03); Peterson v. Apple Inc., No. 12 Civ. 6467, 2013 WL 3963456, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013). None of these factors alone is dispositive. SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 25 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that "these factors are not exclusive, and they need not each be resolved against the [sanctioned] party").

A. Willfulness

When evaluating willfulness, the court considers whether the order at issue was clear, whether the party to be sanctioned understood the order, and whether noncompliance was due to "factors beyond the party's control." See Davis v. Artuz, No. 96 Civ. 7699, 2001 WL 50887, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2001) (citing Baba v. Japan Travel Bureau International, Inc., 165 F.R.D. 398, 402-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 111 F.3d 2 (2d Cir. 1997)). "[A] party's persistent refusal to comply with a discovery order presents sufficient evidence of willfulness, bad faith or fault." Handwerker v. AT&T Corp., 211 F.R.D. 203, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

My August 1, 2014 order was indisputably clear. I directed the defendant to "provide substantive responses to the plaintiff's Interrogatories and Second Request for Production by September 2, 2014." Silva, 2014 WL 3809095, at *6. Further, noting that the defendant had "willfully [failed to] comply with [the March 25, 2014] court order and provided discovery responses only after the [first] motion [for terminating sanctions] was filed, " I warned that "[f]ailure to comply shall result in dismissal of the defendant's counterclaims and entry of a default judgment." Id . At no point did the defendant, who continues to be represented by counsel, seek an extension of the September 2 deadline. His opposition to the motion for terminating sanctions gives no indication that ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.