United States District Court, N.D. New York
JONATHAN JOHNSON, Plaintiff pro se.
DAVID J. SLEIGHT, Asst. Attorney General for Defendants.
ORDER and REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
ANDREW T. BAXTER, Magistrate Judge.
This matter has been referred to me for Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and LOCAL RULES N.D.N.Y. 72.3(c). On July 7, 2014, defendants removed this action from the New York State Supreme Court, Franklin County. (Dkt. No. 1). In this civil rights complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was the subject of a "retaliatory transfer" from Elmira Correctional Facility ("Elmira") to Upstate Correctional Facility ("Upstate") on November 16, 2006, and that after he arrived at Upstate, some of the defendants failed to protect him from attacks by unknown gang members in violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (Compl.) (Dkt. No. 2). Plaintiff seeks a substantial amount of monetary damages.
Presently before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 2). Plaintiff has responded in opposition to the motion and has moved to remand this case to New York State Supreme Court. (Dkt. Nos. 4, 5). Plaintiff's motion to remand contains a request for "sanctions" against defendants for the "impropriety of removal" pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1447. (Dkt. No. 5 at 1-2). Defendants have responded in opposition to the motion to remand. (Dkt. No. 6). Defendants have also requested that the court consider sanctions against plaintiff based upon his vexations litigation. (Dkt. No. 2-1 at 2). For the following reasons, this court will deny plaintiff's motion to remand and recommend that the defendants' motion to dismiss be granted, but will not recommend that sanctions be assessed at this time, either against plaintiff or against defendants.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges that in "2000, " he filed an Article 78 proceeding in Franklin County Court: Matter of Johnson v. Lucien LeClaire, Index. No. 2007-0204 - RJI No. 16-1-2007-0078. Plaintiff seems to claim that his Article 78 petition raised claims of "gang member enemies at Upstate... in June 2000." (Compl. ¶ 4). Plaintiff states that on "or about" June 23, 2000, plaintiff was transferred from Upstate to a one-person cell at Southport Correctional Facility ("Southport") for "unsuitable behavior." (Compl. ¶ 5). Plaintiff states that he was confined at Southport for six years until he was transferred to Elmira in January 2006. (Compl. ¶ 6).
Plaintiff claims that on November 13, 2006, he and the guards who were escorting him to the shower were "thrown on" by an inmate on the gallery in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU"). (Compl. ¶ 7). The inmate in question was subsequently moved to a different cell location so that he and plaintiff would not be taken to the shower at the same time. Plaintiff asked Superintendent John Burge to "preserve all [the] evidence, " which included a video tape of the "incident" for "future court actions." (Compl. ¶¶ 8-9). Plaintiff claims that on November 15, 2006, Superintendent Burge came through the SHU area and informed the plaintiff that he "was getting rid of him" because of his intent to file a lawsuit stemming from the November 13, 2006 incident. (Compl. ¶ 10). Plaintiff alleges that this "retaliatory transfer" occurred the next day (November 16, 2006).
Plaintiff claims that upon his arrival at Upstate, he "informed" defendants Brian Fischer, Theresa Lynn-Boyea, Norm Bezio, Lucien LeClaire, "and other officials" that plaintiff had enemies/gang members at Upstate. (Compl. ¶ 12). It is unclear from the complaint, but it appears that plaintiff alleges that the transfer from Elmira was requested by defendants Anthony Carozzoni (a counselor at Elmira) and Superintendent Burge. (Compl. ¶ 13). Plaintiff states that defendant John Carvill (Classification Analysist for the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS")) caused the transfer from Elmira to Upstate, even though plaintiff had been transferred out of Upstate in 2000. ( Id. )
Plaintiff alleges that on April 25, 2007, he wrote to defendants Fischer, Knapp-David, and LeClaire informing them of the numberous "inmate gang members at Upstate to no avail to date." (Compl. ¶ 14). Plaintiff claims that on November 16, 2006, he also told defendant Bezio (Deputy Superintendent for Security at Upstate) about the enemy gang members, but to "no avail to date." (Compl. ¶ 15).
Plaintiff claims that on an unspecified date in December of 2007, he was "attacked" by an "unknown gang member" on the Upstate/Downstate Correctional Bus coming from Federal custody back to Upstate. (Compl. ¶ 16). Plaintiff claims that he and his family were attacked by "gang members" in May of 2008 in the Upstate visiting room. (Compl. ¶ 17). Plaintiff states that on January 7, 2011, he was attacked by a "gang member" in the holding pen area at Upstate. (Compl. ¶ 18). The fourth alleged attack occurred on August 27, 2012 on the Upstate "draft bus" and subsequently, in the draft room area. (Compl. ¶ 19). Plaintiff claims that unnamed guards conspired to "cover up" this attack. ( Id. ) The fifth attack occurred on October 3, 2012, when feces was thrown on plaintiff during recreation in "Eight Building." (Compl. ¶ 20).
Plaintiff alleges that on October 24, 2012, plaintiff was being escorted back from court proceedings, and the "prison guard" who was assigned to the console, opened the door for "inmate gang members" to attack the plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 21). However, plaintiff states that the gang member "attempted to come at plaintiff." ( Id. ) Although the complaint lists a "Seven[th] Attack" in December of 2012, plaintiff does not describe any attack during that time period. (Compl. ¶ 22). He claims that "gang members" are putting notes on meal trays, stating that plaintiff raped a child. Plaintiff claims that this conduct put his life in danger and claims that no actions have been taken to protect his safety at Upstate. ( Id. ) Plaintiff claims that he has been confined at Upstate together with inmates who are on his "separatee" list, and that in 2008, he was housed in "Eleven Building" wherein a "listed enemy" was also housed, "under the supervision of David Rock, Trudy Lynn-Boyea, Brian Fischer, John Cavill, Theresa Knapp-David, Lucien LeClaire, and Douglas Botford. (Compl. ¶ 23). Plaintiff also claims that defendant Carozzoni "conspired" with defendants Carvil and Superintendent Burge to have plaintiff transferred to Upstate "where he is surrounded by gang members to date." (Compl. ¶ 24).
Plaintiff states that he brings this action pursuant to section 1983, raising claims of "deliberate indifference, cruelty [sic] and unusual punishment and retaliatory acts for court's access." (Compl. ¶ 25).
II. Motion to Remand
A. Legal Standards
"Any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441; see Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 83 (2005) (explaining that section 1441 "authorizes the removal of civil actions from state court to federal court when the action initiated in state court is one that could have been brought, originally, in a federal district court). However, "[i]n light of the congressional intent to restrict federal court jurisdiction, as well as the importance of preserving the independence of state governments, federal courts construe the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubts against removability.'" Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 1994)).
The procedural requirements for removal to federal court are as follows:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). The thirty-day window for removal contained in section 1446(b)(1), while not jurisdictional, is "rigorously enforce[d]" by courts absent a finding of waiver or estoppel. Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enters., Inc., 932 F.2d 1043, 1046 (2d Cir. 1991), superseded on other grounds by rule as stated in Contino v. United States, 535 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2008).
The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a federal question is presented or when the parties are of diverse citizenship, and the amount in question exceeds $75, 000. In this case, defendants' removal was pursuant to Section 1331, which sets forth federal-question jurisdiction, and states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1331. "Generally, [t]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.'" NYU Hosp. Ctr. Tisch v. Local 348 Health & Welfare Fund, No. 04 Civ. 6937, 2005 WL 53261, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2005) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
After an action is removed from state court to federal court, remand may be granted on one of two grounds: (1) a defect in removal procedure or (2) a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447. A motion to remand "on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made ...