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Grant v. Pexie Enterprises, Inc.

United States District Court, E.D. New York

January 8, 2015

COLEENIA GRANT, Plaintiff,
v.
PEXIE ENTERPRISES, INC., and CARL A. LASHLEY, Defendants.

ALEX UMANSKY, Phillips & Associates, PLLC, New York, NY For the Plaintiff.

FREDERICK K. BREWINGTON, Hempstead, NY, For the Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FREDERIC BLOCK, Senior District Judge.

On May 23, 2014, defendants Pexie Enterprises, Inc., and Carl A. Lashley (collectively, "defendants") moved to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that they are not "employers" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.[1] See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("The term employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year."). In support of their motion, defendants submitted various federal and state tax returns, which they contend establish that they employed less than fifteen employees at all times relevant to this action. See Docket Entry No. 49-4 ("Exhibits A-E").

As a general rule, a district court considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "must limit itself to facts stated in the complaint or in documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in the complaint by reference, " in addition to "matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991). Where, as here, the moving party submits extrinsic evidence in support of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court may only consider that evidence by treating the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 and by giving "[a]ll parties... a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); see also Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir. 1995) ("A district court may not convert a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment without sufficient notice to an opposing party and an opportunity for that party to respond.").

Accordingly, the Court hereby informs the parties that it intends to treat defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. By February 9, 2015, the parties shall submit to the Court all pertinent materials directed to the question of whether defendants fall within the statutory definition of "employer" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; see also Perry v. Manocherian, 675 F.Supp. 1417, 1425 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[T]o maintain an action [under Title VII], plaintiffs must establish that defendants fall within the statutory definition of employer.").

SO ORDERED.


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