United States District Court, S.D. New York
BERNARD B. IDLISAN, Plaintiff,
MOUNT SINAI MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant.
ORDER PARTIALLY ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAUL A. CROTTY, District Judge.
Pro se Plaintiff Bernard ldlisan brings this employment discrimination action against Defendant Mount Sinai Medical Center pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Plaintiff claims Defendant discriminated against him by failing to hire him because of his race, national origin, disability, and conviction history. Both parties moved for summary judgment.
On September 2, 2014, Magistrate Judge Ellis issued his Report and Recommendation ("R&R") that Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment be denied in its entirety and Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part. Defendant objected to the R&R's partial denial of its motion. For the reasons below, the Court (i) adopts the R&R's denial of Plaintiffs motion, (ii) adopts the R&R's partial granting of Defendant's motion, and (iii) declines to adopt the R&R's partial denial of Defendant's motion and instead grants the motion. Plaintiffs motion is DENIED in its entirety and Defendant's motion is GRANTED in its entirety.
Between April 20, 2010 and February 6, 2012, Plaintiff applied for eight externally advertised positions at Mount Sinai: (1) the 2010 accounting clerk position, which was never filled; (2) the accounts payable receivable position filled by K.H.; (3) the office supervisor position filled by K.P.; (4) the business associate position filled by E.P.; (5) the business associate position filled by L.C.; (6) the office assistant position filled by P.T.; (7) the 2012 accounting clerk position filled by N.S.; and (8) the 2012 accounting clerk position filled by A.E.F. For each application, Plaintiff used the same online application form in which he voluntarily disclosed his education (a bachelor's degree in accounting in the Philippines and a GED in the U.S.), employment (currently working part-time as an information clerk at the New York Board of Elections), race (Asian), national origin (the Philippines), physical disability (a heart condition), and criminal convictions (bail jumping and grand larceny in the second degree). Plaintiff was not selected for an interview for any of the positions and so was not hired.
Plaintiff claimed Defendant's hiring practices were discriminatory and filed complaints with Defendant in December 2011 and the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") in March 2012. On August 2012, the NYSDHR rejected Plaintiffs claim. Plaintiff requested the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to review the decision. In September 2012, the EEOC adopted the NYSDHR's finding. On November 21, 2012, Plaintiff timely commenced his Title VII and ADA action.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I. R&R Standards
District Courts may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). The Court "may adopt those portions of the [R&R] to which no objections have been made and which are not facially erroneous." La Torres v. Walker, 216 F.Supp.2d 157, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
When a party makes a timely objection raising new arguments, the contested portions are reviewed de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l); see Vega v. Artuz, 2002 WL 31174466, at *l (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002). ("[O]bjections that are merely perfunctory responses argued in an attempt to engage the district court in a rehashing of the same arguments set forth in the original petition will not suffice to invoke de nova review of the magistrate's recommendations.").
II. Summary Judgment Standards
Summary judgment may be granted when there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving µarty." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). But a genuine issue of material fact cannot exist if, "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, [a party] fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In such cases, "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment.... since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322-23.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The R&R recommends denying Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in its entirety, and neither party objected. Accordingly, the Court has reviewed ...