United States District Court, S.D. New York
For Stanacard, LLC, Plaintiff: Igor Krol, Krol & O'connor, New York, NY; Todd E. Zenger, PRO HAC VICE, Kirton McConkie, Salt Lake City, UT.
For Rubard, LLC, as subrogor of Centmobile, Artur Zaytsev, Alexander Dzerneyko, Defendants: Thomas Robert Makin, LEAD ATTORNEY, Kenyon & Kenyon, New York, NY; Anne Elise Li, Linnea Patt Cipriano, Kenyon & Kenyon LLP, New York, NY; Robert David Katz, Eaton & Van Winkle LLP, New York, NY.
For Aleksandr Palatkevich, Defendant, Counter Claimant: Mark Ira Koffsky, LEAD ATTORNEY, Koffsky Schwalb LLC, New York, NY; Robert David Katz, Eaton & Van Winkle LLP, New York, NY.
For Artur Zaytsev, Rubard, LLC, Alexander Dzerneyko, Counter Claimant: Thomas Robert Makin, LEAD ATTORNEY, Kenyon & Kenyon, New York, NY; Anne Elise Li, Linnea Patt Cipriano, Kenyon & Kenyon LLP, New York, NY; Robert David Katz, Eaton & Van Winkle LLP, New York, NY.
For Stanacard, LLC, Counter Claimant, Counter Defendant: Igor Krol, Krol & O'connor, New York, NY; Todd E. Zenger, Kirton McConkie, Salt Lake City, UT.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
COLLEEN MCMAHON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
In this patent infringement case, the Court's claim construction decision (Docket #44) was followed almost immediately by a motion for summary judgment, made by Defendants on the ground of obviousness.
The motion, in essence, charges that every salient feature save one of the claims in suit under U.S. Patent No. 7, 346, 156 (the '156 patent, which is the patent-in-suit) is disclosed either in U.S. Patent No. 6, 324, 263 (the '263 Patent) or in the '263 Patent read in combination with U.S. Patent No. 4, 310, 726 (the '726 patent), both of which qualify as prior art, since they issued more than one year before the earliest priority date of the patent-in-suit.
Legal standard on a motion for summary judgment
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there is no " genuine dispute as to any material fact" and the undisputed facts warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in his or her favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Whether any disputed issue of material fact exists is for the Court to determine. Balderman v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 870 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1989). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Once the motion for summary judgment is properly made, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who " must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The nonmovant " may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation, " Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998), but must support the existence of an alleged dispute with specific citation to the record materials. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
While the Court must view the record " in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, " Leberman v. John Blair & Co., 880 F.2d 1555, 1559 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and " resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought, " Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir. 1975) (citation omitted), the non-moving party nevertheless " must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586 (citations omitted). Not every disputed factual issue is material in light of the substantive law that governs the case. " Only disputes over ...