United States District Court, S.D. New York
ANN ZEAK, as Executor of the Estate of Steven Sullivan, Plaintiff,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge.
On June 22, 2011, Plaintiff Ann Zeak, the daughter of decedent Steven Sullivan, filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice, negligent hiring and retention, and failure to obtain informed consent. These claims were brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (the "FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680, against the United States of America (the "Government"), because the hospital at which Sullivan died was operated by the United States Department of Veteran Affairs (the "VA").
On March 10, 2014, the Government moved for summary judgment concerning Plaintiff's claims of medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent. (Dkt. #35). Plaintiff's opposition was filed on May 9, 2014 (Dkt. #48); and the Government filed its reply submission on May 23, 2014 (Dkt. #50). By Opinion and Order dated October 20, 2014, the Court granted the Government's motion. See Zeak v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 4253 (KPF), 2014 WL 5324319 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2014). (Dkt. #51). Among other things, the Court concluded that the report and testimony of Plaintiff's expert witness did not permit Plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of medical malpractice under either a traditional theory or a failure to obtain informed consent theory. Id. at *9-13. Of particular significance to the instant motion, the Court noted that the Government had not addressed, and the Court had therefore not considered, Plaintiff's claim of negligent hiring and retention, and scheduled a pretrial conference at which this remaining claim could be discussed. Id. at *13.
The pretrial conference was held on November 24, 2014. In advance of that conference, the Government submitted a pre-motion letter seeking leave to move for summary judgment. (Dkt. #52). At the conference, counsel for the Government observed that what had been an oversight (i.e., the failure to move with respect to the negligent hiring and retention claim) was actually a fortuity
In hindsight, I think it sort of turns out that it's almost a logical order of business that once the Court has made a determination as to the core of malpractice that did or did not occur or whether the plaintiff met her burden of moving forward on that claim, the Court can sort of as a second order of business decide whether the negligent retention claim is derivative of malpractice and since, at least as I understand it under the cases we cite, I think, as a matter of law the plaintiff cannot show that she's entitled to a trial on negligent hiring and supervision.
(Transcript of November 24, 2014 Conference at 7-8 (Dkt. #58)). Counsel for Plaintiff similarly suggested that "it makes sense to have another round of motions to flush out the issues and then once the Court makes a decision and then we'll file an appeal, we'll go to the Second Circuit." ( Id. at 4). At the conclusion of the conference, the Court set a briefing schedule for the second summary judgment motion. ( Id. at 11; see also Dkt. #54 (scheduling order)).
The Government filed its motion papers on December 8, 2014. (Dkt. #55-57). In its Preliminary Statement, the Government summarized its arguments as follows
First, a claim for negligent hiring can only succeed if there is an underlying finding of malpractice, and now that the Court has dismissed the plaintiff's malpractice claims, it should also dismiss the negligent hiring claim. Second, there is no evidence to show, as required, that the alleged negligence occurred outside of the VA surgeons' employment with the United States. Finally, there is no evidence showing that the Government was on notice that the surgeons were likely to commit malpractice (and they did not) during the operation.
(Def. Br. 1). Plaintiff's counsel responded by letter dated January 9, 2015, in which he advised that "I have concluded, after much effort on behalf of my client, that I do not have grounds to oppose defendant's motion for summary judgment on the negligent hiring and retention claim." (Pl. Ltr. 1).
A. Applicable Law
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), summary judgment may be granted only if all the submissions taken together "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, " and is genuinely in dispute "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson ). The movant may discharge this burden by showing that the nonmoving party has "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding summary judgment appropriate where the non-moving party fails to "come forth with evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to return a verdict in his or her favor on an essential element of a claim" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must "set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial" using affidavits or otherwise, and cannot rely on the "mere allegations or denials" contained in the pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24; Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). The nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted), and cannot rely on "mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment, " Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986). Furthermore, "[m]ere conclusory allegations or ...