United States District Court, S.D. New York
Sanjay Chaubey, Esq., Empire State Building, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Arvind Gupta Ashok Nagar, Kandivali (East) Mumbai, MH, India Respondent (Pro Se)
Shane Patrick Cargo, Assistant United States Attorney, U.S. Attorneys Office Southern District of New York, New York, NY, For Respondent Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of the United States Department of Labor.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, District Judge.
Compunnel Software Group, Inc. ("Compunnel") sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Actfrom an Administrative Review Board ("ARB") order. Arvind Gupta opposed Compunnel's petition and filed a series of fourteen counterclaims against Compunnel. In October, 2014, this Court dismissed Compunnel's petition without prejudice because the ARB had not yet issued a final decision. Gupta's First, Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth counterclaims were dismissed for the same reason.
All of Gupta's remaining counterclaims stemmed either from a 2007 Labor Condition Application ("LCA") filed by Compunnel or from a private employment agreement (the "Agreement") with Compunnel. Compunnel then filed a motion to dismiss the remaining counterclaims in December, 2014. Gupta filed a cross motion for judgement on the pleadings. Compunnel's motion for judgement on the pleadings was granted, and Gupta filed a motion for reconsideration. For the following reasons, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict. "Reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked - matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." "Reconsideration of a court's previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.'" Typical grounds for reconsideration include "an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice."
III. GUPTA'S CLAIMS
A. Due Process Claim
Gupta claims that he did not have an opportunity to brief the Court on administrative exhaustion or private rights of action, as well as on other issues. However, Gupta's state law claims are intertwined with those of administrative procedure, and it was perfectly fair for him to expect his claims to be decided on the principles that govern how state and administrative law intersect. His brief, for example, explicitly contemplates that he will need to prove the LCA to be a valid contract under state law. While Compunnel's brief is very poorly drafted, it makes the point that all of Gupta's claims are actually appeals from the ARB's decision and are therefore barred by the doctrine of exhaustion. Though the parties did not cite to each case in the Opinion, this is no basis for reconsideration.
B. Federal Question Jurisdiction
Gupta argues that this Court based its Opinion on federal question jurisdiction rather than diversity jurisdiction. This is incorrect. Both issues in the Opinion were dealt with on diversity grounds as state law ...