United States District Court, S.D. New York
RANDY COHEN, ANDREAS COHRSSEN, NICK GRAY, ABBY HAYWOOD, SHARON KLIEGMAN, DAN KOHN, HANI MANSOURIAN, MADELEINE MATSSON, ROBERT RAKOWITZ, BRAEDEN ROGERS, CHRIS SCARAFILE, SCOTT TRUDEAU, and NOAH WILDMAN, Plaintiffs,
The STATE OF NEW YORK, BARBARA FIALA, NEIL SCHOEN, IDA TRASCHEN, DEBBIE LANGEVIN and
OPINION & ORDER
PAUL A. CROTTY, District Judge.
Plaintiffs bring this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") class action claiming the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") overcharged them between $80 and $88 for bicycling violations and improperly added three penalty points to their New York State operator's licenses.
The Defendants are the State of New York, which operates the DMV; Barbara Fiala, the DMV Commissioner; Neil Schoen and Ida Traschen, DMV lawyers; Debbie Langevin, the DMV's Director of Ticketing Systems; and "John Doe, " a supervisor in the DMV's Plea Unit. Compl. ¶¶ 14-19. The individual Defendants are sued both in their official and personal capacity. Id. at ¶¶ 15-19.
Plaintiffs seek monetary relief-in the form of damages, unpaid interest, and attorney fees-and injunctive relief directing Defendants to (1) cease overcharging and applying penalty points to bicycling violations, (2) modify the DMV website, and (3) modify the UT-60 traffic ticket.
On January 16, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss the suit under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) based on sovereign immunity, lack of standing, mootness, qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim. For the reasons below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
I. Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claim against the State of New York
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim for monetary and injunctive relief under Rule 12(b)(1) based on, inter alia, New York's sovereign immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States does not extend "to any suit in law or equity" by a citizen against a state. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) ("[W]e have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.'" (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890))). There are only two exceptions to state sovereign immunity: "when Congress authorizes such a suit through enforcement of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and where a state consents to being sued." McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999)). Neither exception is applicable here. Section 1983 does not abrogate state sovereign immunity, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974); nor has New York consented to being sued.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claim against the State of New York is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
II. Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claim against the Individual Defendants in their Official Capacity
Plaintiffs sue the individual Defendants in their capacity as state officials for both monetary and injunctive relief under Section 1983. Defendants move to dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(1) based on, inter alia, the individual Defendants' sovereign immunity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) ("[The Eleventh Amendment's] bar remains in effect when State officials are sued for damages in their official capacity' (citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982))). The Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claim for monetary relief because "a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, " Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (citations omitted).
With respect to injunctive relief, however, the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), allows a claim where the "complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective." Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997). Plaintiffs, however, fail to allege an ongoing violation of federal law. Indeed, their claim is moot. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 721, 726-27 (2013) ("A case becomes moot-and therefore no longer a Case' or Controversy' for purposes of Article III-when the issues presented are no longer live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.'" (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982))).
Prior to bringing suit, Plaintiffs' counsel and a New York State Senator adopted the common sense approach of trying to resolve the problem. They contacted the DMV, pointed out the violations, and requested corrective action. Compl. ¶¶ 69-74. Defendants promptly initiated the actions requested, see id. at ¶ 75, and have since implemented the prospective relief sought in Plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants have (1) segregated bicycle summonses into a separate processing basket to "reduce the occurrence of data entry errors, " Traschen Decl. ¶ 32; (2) reminded staff and agencies about the proper handling of bicycle violations, id. at ¶¶ 33-34; (3) modified the UT-60 ticket,  id. at ¶ 35, Ex. H (noting that the "Mandatory Surcharge" for bicycles is "$0"); and (4) modified the DMV website, id. at ¶ 37, Ex. J (adding the following language to the website: "If ...