United States District Court, Southern District of New York
For Plaintiff: Marjory Cajoux
For Defendant State of New York: Samuel Yaggy Office of the New York State Attorney General
For Defendant City of New York: Joshua Joseph Lax
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
DENISE COTE, District Judge:
Eugene Lewis (“Lewis”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for false arrest, negligence, imprisonment, assault and battery, and malicious prosecution against the State of New York (“State”) and City of New York (“City”). On December 1, 2014, the defendants separately moved to dismiss the complaint. For the following reasons, both motions to dismiss are granted.
The following facts are taken from the complaint (“Complaint”). On August 10, 2005, Lewis was arrested at Bradhurst Park. Lewis was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance, criminal sale of a controlled substance, and resisting arrest. On September 29, 2006, a jury found Lewis guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance. Lewis was discharged from supervision on July 29, 2010. On October 28, 2010, the Appellate Division reversed Lewis’s conviction. People v. Lewis, 911 N.Y.S.2d 2 (App. Div. 2010). On July 15, 2011, following the remand, all charges against Lewis were dismissed.
Lewis filed this action on July 7, 2014. On December 1, the City moved to dismiss the claims as untimely and for failing to state a claim for municipal liability. The same day, the State moved to dismiss the claims as untimely and for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Lewis responded to both motions on January 29, 2015. Lewis concedes that all claims but the malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are untimely. In light of that concession, this Opinion addresses only the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., the court “must accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint, but [is] not to draw inferences from the complaint favorable to plaintiffs.” J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). A district court may consider evidence outside the pleadings when resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists.” Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., a court must “accept all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the non-moving party's favor.” LaFaro v. New York Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint must do more, however, than offer “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (citation omitted).
I. The State’s Motion to Dismiss
The State moves to dismiss the Complaint because it is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the State is immune from suits under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989). Accordingly, ...