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Medley v. Colvin

United States District Court, W.D. New York

July 8, 2015

DEANNA A. MEDLEY, Plaintiff,


WILLIAM M. SKRETNY, District Judge.

1. Plaintiff Deanna A. Medley[1] challenges an Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act ("the Act"). Plaintiff alleges that she has been disabled due to depression, anxiety, obsessive compulsive disorder, and panic attacks since September 2010. She contends that her medical conditions render her unable to work, and that she is therefore entitled to payment of Security Disability Insurance ("SSD") benefits under the Act.

2. On December 23, 2010, Plaintiff submitted an application for Social SSD benefits. She is insured for disability insurance benefits through September 30, 2012. Her claim was denied on April 5, 2011. Pursuant to Plaintiff's request, an administrative hearing was held before ALJ William M. Weir on April 29, 2011, at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. ALJ Weir considered the case de novo, and on August 31, 2012, issued a decision denying Plaintiff's application for SSD. On March 10, 2014, the Appeals Council declined Plaintiff's request for review. Plaintiff filed the current civil action on May 9, 2014, challenging defendant's final decision.[2]

3. On October 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket No. 8). Defendant filed a response in opposition on December 1, 2014. (Docket No. 9). After full briefing, this Court deemed oral argument unnecessary and took the motion under advisement. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted.

4. A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § § 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner's determination will only be reversed if it is not supported by substantial evidence or there has been a legal error. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). Substantial evidence is that which amounts to "more than a mere scintilla, " Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971), and it has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id . Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).

5. "To determine on appeal whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight." Williams on Behalf of Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988). If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's finding must be sustained "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F.Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner's determination considerable deference, and will not substitute "its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review." Valente v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).

6. The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an individual is disabled as defined under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520, 416.920. The United States Supreme Court recognized the validity of this analysis in Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2291, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), and it remains the proper approach for analyzing whether a claimant is disabled.

7. This five-step process is detailed below:

First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a "listed" impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.

Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (quotations in original); see also Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

8. While the claimant has the burden of proof as to the first four steps, the Commissioner has the burden of proof on the fifth and final step. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5; Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1984). The final step of this inquiry is, in turn, divided into two parts. First, the Commissioner must assess the claimant's job qualifications by considering his physical ability, age, education and work experience. Second, the Commissioner must determine whether jobs exist in the national economy that a person having the claimant's qualifications could perform. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 1954, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983).

9. In this case, ALJ Weir made the following findings with the regard to the five step process set forth above: (1) Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of her disability (R. at 19);[3] (2) Plaintiff has a major depressive disorder and an anxiety disorder, each of which constitutes a "severe" impairment within the meaning of the Act (R. at 19); (3) Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (see 20 C.F.R. §§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526b (R. at 20)); (4) Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1529 and SSRs 96-4p and 96-7p, with the following non-exertional limitations: limited to performing simple repetitive task, with transient and superficial contact with coworkers, the public, and supervisors (R. at 21); and (5) Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. (R. at 27). Further, ALJ Weir concluded that given Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform (R. at 28). Based on the record, ALJ Weir ultimately determined that Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined by the Act, from December 31, 2010, through the date of this decision. (R. at 28).

10. Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's final decision. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ incorrectly assessed the Plaintiff's mental residual functional capability ("MRFC") by failing to include and incorporate limitations mentioned in Dr. Wendy Weinstein's assessment of Plaintiff, and further erred by not consulting a vocational expert ("VE") when determining Plaintiff's RFC to perform work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Plaintiff contends VE testimony was required because her nonexertional limitations significantly eroded her occupational base.

11. The MRFC for work-related mental activities generally required by competitive, remunerative work include the abilities to: understand, carry out, and remember instructions; use judgment in making work-related decisions; respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work situations; and deal with changes in a routine work setting. SSR 96-8p, at *6 (S.S.A. 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 404.1545(c); SSRs 85-15, 96-9p. When it is determined that Plaintiff is unskilled and the Commissioner relied on the medical vocational guidelines ("the grids"), the Commissioner ...

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