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Heendeniya v. St. Joseph's Hospital Health Center

United States District Court, N.D. New York

January 19, 2017

UMESH HEENDENIYA, Plaintiff,
v.
ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL HEALTH CENTER, et al., Defendants.

          UMESH HEENDENIYA Plaintiff, pro se

          COSTELLO, COONEY LAW FIRM ROBERT J. SMITH, ESQ. ROBERT J. SMITH, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendants St. Joseph's Hospital Health Center, French, Briscoe, Cate, Spinella, Rybak, Ruscitto, Seifter, Price, Welch, and Gilbert

          MARTIN, GANOTIS LAW FIRM BRIAN M. GARGANO. ESQ. Attorneys for Defendants Tremiti, Roman, Constantine, and Feldman

          SMITH, SOVIK, KENDRICK & SUGNET, P.C. KEVIN E. HULSLANDER, ESQ. JOHN P. COGHLAN, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendant Levine

          DECISION AND ORDER

          THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge

         Plaintiff has filed what has been described by him as an “emergency motion” requesting that I recuse myself from this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) on the grounds of bias against the Second Amendment rights of mentally disabled people such as Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 111 at 2.[1]) Counsel for Defendant Roger Gary Levine, M.D. has filed a letter memorandum opposing the motion. (Dkt. No. 114.) For reasons explained below, Plaintiff's motion is denied.

         I. BACKGROUND

         A. Initial Review of Plaintiff's Complaint

         Plaintiff originally commenced this action against thirty-three named defendants and ten John Does. (Dkt. No. 1.) The lawsuit arose out of the alleged prohibition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)[2] on Plaintiff's ability to receive any firearm shipped in interstate or foreign commerce as a result of his April 2013 involuntary commitment to the Psychiatric Ward at St. Joseph's Hospital Health Center in Syracuse, New York, pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”) § 9.27. Id.

         Plaintiff named three distinct groups of defendants: (1) St. Joseph's Hospital Health Center and St. Joseph's administrators, an attorney, physicians, nurses, a therapist, and five John Does (“SJHHC Defendants”); (2) two State agencies and number of New York State officials; and (3) the United States, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), and various federal officials and employees, a program of the FBI, and five John Does. (See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1-3, 5-38.) The Court construed Plaintiff's complaint as alleging § 1983 and state law claims against the SJHHC Defendants; § 1983 claims against the State Defendants; and claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotic Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (“Bivens”) for violation of Plaintiff's Second, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and 18 U.S.C. § 925A, and state law claims against the Federal Defendants.

         The Court recommended dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint on initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). (Dkt. No. 6 at 13.) The Court recommended dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff's civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as against all of the SJHHC Defendants on the grounds that they were not acting under color of state law. (Dkt. No. 6 at 16.) The Court recommended dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims against the SJHHC Defendants without prejudice and with leave to amend on the grounds that the complaint failed to show that the amount in controversy exceeded $75, 000 for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id. at 17-18.

         The Court recommended dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against State Defendants New York Office of Mental Hygiene (“OMH”); Ann Marie Sullivan, MD (“Sullivan”), OMH Commissioner; NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services (“NYDCJS”); Joshua Benjamin Pepper, Esq. (“Pepper”), Deputy Commissioner and Counsel to NYDCJS; Michael C. Green (“Green”), Executive Deputy Commissioner of NYDCJS; and Eric T. Schneiderman (“Schneiderman”), New York State Attorney General (collectively referred to herein as “State Defendants”), brought against them solely in their official capacities. (Dkt. No. 6 at 18-20.) The grounds for the recommendation were the complaint's complete absence of specific facts alleging the official or personal involvement of any of the State Defendants in the involuntary commitment of Plaintiff under MHL § 9.27, or any unconstitutional application of the provision on their part. Id. at 20. The Court further recommended dismissal of the state law claims asserted against the State Defendants with prejudice on the grounds that they were barred under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 21-22.

         The Court also recommended dismissal with prejudice of the Bivens claims asserted against all of the Federal Defendants in their official capacities on sovereign immunity grounds. (Dkt. No. 6 at 22-23.) The Court, noting that there were no allegations showing personal involvement by either in the alleged violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, recommended dismissal without prejudice of the Bivens claims asserted against Federal Defendants Lombardo and Wysopal in their individual capacities. Id. at 23-24. The Court also recommended dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff's claim that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) violates his constitutional rights under the Second and Fifth Amendments, and claim that MHL § 9.27 does not fall within § 922(g)(4).

         The Court recommended that Plaintiff's state law claims be dismissed with prejudice against all of the federal agency Defendants and the individual federal defendants. However, dismissal without prejudice and with leave to amend Plaintiff's state law claims against the United States was recommended for failure to exhaust under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and as against Defendants Lombardo and Wysopal in their individual capacities. Id. at 23-24.

         The Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby, Chief United States District Judge, adopted this Court's Report-Recommendation on initial review in its entirety and granted Plaintiff leave to amend the following claims: (1) Plaintiff's state law claims against the SJHHC Defendants; (2) Plaintiff's Bivens claims against Defendants Lombardo and Wysopal in their individual capacities; (3) Plaintiff's state law claims against the United States; and (4) Plaintiff's state law claims against Defendants Lombardo and Wysopal. See Heendeniya v. St. Joseph's Hosp. Health Ctr. (SJHHC), No. 5:15-CV-1238 (GTS/TWD), 2016 WL 756537, at * 4-5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2016).[3]

         B. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint

         Plaintiff elected to file an amended complaint solely against the SJHHC Defendants. (Dkt. No. 21.) Plaintiff asserted various state law claims, including a claim for medical malpractice, against the SJHHC Defendants. Id. Finding that the pleading deficiencies in the original complaint had been corrected sufficiently to survive initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court ordered the Defendants to respond to Plaintiff's amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 24.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a second amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 55.) Motions by some Defendants to dismiss the second amended complaint are pending before Judge Suddaby. (Dkt. Nos. 59 and 62.)

         II. ANALYSIS

         A judge must recuse “[herself or] himself in any proceeding in which [her or] his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Specifically, the Court must consider “whether an objective and disinterested observer, knowing and understanding all of the facts and circumstances, could reasonably question the court's impartiality.” S.E.C. v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 29 (2d Cir. 2013), as amended (Nov. 26, 2013); see also U.S. v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 775 (2d Cir. 2007) (the “central focus is on whether [the] allegations [of bias and partiality], when coupled with the judge's rulings on and conduct regarding them, would lead the public reasonably to believe that [the judge's bias or partiality] affected the manner in which [she or] he presided.”).

         “A recusal decision rests within the sound discretion of the judge whose recusal is sought.” Neroni v. Coccoma, No. 3:13-cv-1340 (GLS/DEP), 2014 WL 2532482, at * 4 (N.D.N.Y. June 5, 2014). The Second Circuit has, however, instructed that when “the standards governing disqualification have not been met, disqualification is not optional; rather it is prohibited.” In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 201 (2d Cir. 2001). In other words, “[a] judge is as much obliged not to recuse [herself or] himself when it is not called for as [she or] he is obliged to when it is.” Id. (citation and internal quotations marks omitted).

         Plaintiff claims that I showed bias by placing his original complaint under “very harsh scrutiny” in my Order and Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 6) recommending dismissal of Plaintiff's original complaint (in part with prejudice and in part without prejudice and with leave to amend) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), despite: (1) a notation on the civil cover sheet that “due to plaintiff's documented mental and physical disabilities, he respectfully requests disability accommodation from the court and defendants pursuant to the ADA (42 USC 12101 et seq.)”; (2) numerous allegations in his original complaint that due to his two mental disabilities, it takes him longer to complete complex tasks; and (3) his having alleged in ¶ 116 of the complaint that he would be “amending his complaint, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 15(a)(1), and serving process on the defendants, per Fed.R.Civ. 4(m) and L.R. 4.1(b).” (Dkt. Nos. 1 at ¶ 116; 111 at 2; 111-1 at ¶¶ 3-6.)

         The Supreme Court has found that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion . . . and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required . . . when no extrajudicial source is involved.” Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994) (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)); see also Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218, 227 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Generally, claims of judicial bias must be based on extrajudicial matters, and adverse rulings, without more, will rarely suffice to provide a reasonable basis for questioning a judge's impartiality.”).

         My initial review of Plaintiff's original complaint shows no bias on my part. I was required to undertake the initial review of Plaintiff's original complaint before Plaintiff could proceed with the action, and to make a report-recommendation for the District Judge, who would then determine whether claims alleged in the complaint should be dismissed or the action should be allowed to go forward in whole or in part based upon criteria set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) (“the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous or malicious; [ ] fails to state a claim . . .; or [ ] seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief”).

         District courts have been instructed by the Second Circuit that a pro se complaint should not be dismissed “without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). Where, however, “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it, [r]epleading would be futile . . . and a request to replead should be denied.” Id. On initial review, I made a determination from the allegations in the complaint and applicable law that a number of Plaintiff's alleged claims were deficient in ways that could not be cured by an amended complaint and recommended dismissal of those claims with prejudice. (Dkt. No. 6.) However, with respect to the remaining claims alleged in Plaintiff's complaint, while he had failed to state a claim in his original complaint, I did recommend that he be granted leave to amend. Id. As noted above, the District Court adopted my Report-Recommendation, including the recommendation that Plaintiff be allowed to amend his complaint, which he has now done. Heendeniya, 2016 WL 756537, at * 4-5.

         Based upon the foregoing, I find that “an objective and disinterested observer, knowing and understanding all of the facts and circumstances, could [not] reasonably question [my] impartiality” in this case. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d at 29.

         WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Dkt. No. 111) is DENIED; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Decision and Order, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

         IT IS SO ORDERED.

         2016 WL 756537

         Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

         United States District Court, N.D. New York.

         Umesh Heendeniya, Plaintiff, v.

         St. Joseph's Hosp. Health Ctr. (SJHHC); Roger Gary Levine, MD; Lisa Marie O'Connor, MD; George E. Tremiti, MD; Horatius Roman, MD; Joanne Mary French, RN; Wendy Briscoe, RN; Susan Lynn Cate, Lmft; Rosaline Spunelka, RN; Robert Michael Constantine, MD; Mitchell Bruce Feldman, MD; Cynthia A. Rybak, NP; Kathryn Howe Ruscitto, President and CEO of SJHHC; Lowell A. Seifter, JD, Senior VP and Gen. Counsel of SJHHC; Meredith Price, VP of Fin. Servs. and CFO of SJHHC; Deborah Welch, VP for People at SJHHC; Gael Gilbert, RN and Dir. of SJHHC's Psychiatric Ward; SJHHC Does 1-5, Inclusive;New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH); Ann Marie T. Sullivan, M.D., Comm'r of OMH; Joshua Benjamin Pepper, Esq., Deputy Comm'r and Counsel; New York State Div. of Crim. Justice Servs. (DCJS); Michael C. Green, Exec. Deputy Comm'r of DCJS; Eric T. Schneiderman, Esq., New York State Atty. Gen.; U.S. Dep't of Justice; Loretta E. Lynch, Atty. Gen. of the United States; Fed. Bur. of Investigation (FBI); James B. Comey, Jr., Dir. of the FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); Thomas E. Brandon, Dir. of the ATF; Nat'l Instant Background Check Sys. (NICS); United States of America; Regina Lombardo, Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of ATF's Tampa, FL Office; Paul Wysopal, Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of FBI's Tampa Office; and Fed. Does 1-5, Defendants.

         5:15-CV-1238 (GTS/TWD)

         Signed 02/25/2016

         Attorneys and Law Firms

         UMESH HEENDENIYA, Plaintiff, Pro Se, P.O. Box 5104, Spring Hill, Florida 34611.

         DECISION AND ORDER

          GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge

         *1 Currently before the Court, in this pro se action filed by Umesh Heendeniya (“Plaintiff”) against the forty-three above-captioned entities and individuals (“Defendants”) pursuant to, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (“Bivens”) arising out of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)'s alleged prohibition on Plaintiff's ability to receive a firearm shipped in interstate or foreign commerce as a result of his involuntary commitment to a psychiatric ward, are the following: (1) United States Magistrate Judge Thérèse Wiley Dancks' Report-Recommendation recommending that Plaintiff's Complaint be sua sponte dismissed (in part with prejudice and in part without prejudice) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); (2) Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the Report-Recommendation; (3) Plaintiff's Objections to the Report-Recommendation; (4) Plaintiff's motion to amend his Objections to the Report-Recommendation; (5) Plaintiff's motion to enlarge the time for service of process; (6) Plaintiff's first motion to amend his Complaint; (7) Plaintiff's motion to withdraw his first motion to amend his Complaint; and (8) Plaintiff's second motion to amend his Complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 6, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19.)

         For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the Report-Recommendation is denied; Plaintiff's motion to amend his Objections to the Report-Recommendation is granted; Plaintiff's Objections to the Report-Recommendation are rejected; Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety; the claims asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint are either dismissed with prejudice or conditionally dismissed as explained below in this Decision and Order; Plaintiff's motion to enlarge the time for service of process is denied without prejudice to renewal before Magistrate Judg Dancks after she has determined whether he has, in his Amended Complaint, corrected the pleading defects identified in her Report-Recommendation; Plaintiff's motion to withdraw his first motion to amend his Complaint is granted; Plaintiff's first motion to amend his Complaint is deemed withdrawn; and Plaintiff's second motion to amend his Complaint is denied without prejudice.

         I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

         A. Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation

         Because this Decision and Order is primarily intended for the review of the parties, the Court will assume the reader's familiarity with the specifics of Magistrate Judge Danck's Report-Recommendation, including which entities and individuals constitute each of the three groups of Defendants in this action: (1) the St. Joseph's Defendants, (2) the New York State Defendants, and (3) the Federal Defendants.

         Generally, in her Report-Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Dancks determined that Plaintiff's Complaint should be sua sponte dismissed in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). More specifically, Magistrate Judge Dancks made the following ten recommendations: (1) that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the St. Joseph's Defendants be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim; (2) that Plaintiff's state law claims against the St. Joseph's Defendants be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction;[1](3) that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the New York State Defendants be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim; (4) that Plaintiff's state law tort claims seeking money damages against the New York State Defendants be dismissed with prejudice based on the Eleventh Amendment; (5) that Plaintiff's Bivens claims against the Federal Defendant in their official capacities be dismissed with prejudice based on sovereign immunity; (6) that Plaintiff's Bivens claims against Defendants Lombardo and Wysopal in their individual capacities be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim; (7) that Plaintiff's claim for a declaratory judgment against all Federal Defendants regarding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (e.g., that the statute violates his rights under the Second and Fifth Amendments and that the statute does not apply to involuntary commitments under N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 9.27) be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim; (8) that Plaintiff's state law tort claims against the federal agency Defendants and the individual Federal Defendants (except for Defendants Lombardo and Wysopal) sued in their official capacities be dismissed with prejudice; (9) that Plaintiff's state law tort claims against Defendants Lombardo and Wysopal be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (10) that Plaintiff's state law tort claims against the United States be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under the FTCA. (Dkt. No. 6, at Part IV.)

         B. Plaintiff's Objections to the Report-Recommendation

         *2 Generally, in his Objections (and Amended Objections), Plaintiff argues that the Court should reject the Report-Recommendation for 16 reasons:[2] (1) Magistrate Judge Dancks erred in finding that Plaintiff's state law claims against the St. Joseph's Defendants should be dismissed without prejudice, because (a) those claims are legally sufficient and (b) dismissing them without prejudice would effectively preclude him from refiling them due to the governing statute of limitations; (2) despite that Plaintiff nowhere alleged that he had been involuntarily committed (but admitted), Magistrate Judge Dancks erred in finding that he had been involuntarily committed; (3) because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court should grant him an opportunity to amend his Complaint to cure its legal deficiencies, which he can easily do; (4) Magistrate Judge Dancks erred in finding that the St. Joseph's Defendants provided Plaintiff with paperwork during his involuntary state at the psychiatric ward when (in Paragraph 102 of his Complaint) he alleges they did not; (5) to the extent that various of Plaintiff's claims are barred by sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiff should be permitted to amend those claims so that they seek only injunctive and/or declaratory relief; (6) Plaintiff can correct the defects in his claims arising from diversity jurisdiction by discontinuing his claims against the non-diverse Defendants and by alleging damages in excess of $75, 000; (7) it is fundamentally unfair to require Plaintiff to allege the personal involvement of the Federal Defendants in order to seek injunctive and/or declaratory relief from them; (8) when the Supreme Court spoke of the “mentally ill” in D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), it was referring to mental disorders more serious than those that afflict Plaintiff; (9) Magistrate Judge Dancks erred in finding that the Equal Protection Clause has been held not to protect the Second Amendment rights of those who are allegedly prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); (10) Magistrate Judge Dancks erred in finding that SAC Regina Lombardo works for the FBI (when in fact Plaintiff has alleged that she works for the ATF), and in finding that Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Levine did not personally examine him during his stay at the psychiatric ward; (11) Magistrate Judge Dancks erred in granting him in forma pauperis status “solely for the purpose of [her] review” of his Complaint; (12) Magistrate Judge Dancks erred in finding that his state law claims against the St. Joseph's Defendants fail to state a claim because Plaintiff should be allowed to amend them; (13) Magistrate Judge Dancks erred in finding that he failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that the New York State Defendants were acting within the scope of their employment; (14) Magistrate Judge Dancks erred in finding that his Bivens claims against all Federal Defendants should be dismissed, because he can correct those claims; (15) Magistrate Judge Dancks erred in finding that most of his claims against the Federal Defendants and New York State Defendants should be dismissed with prejudice, because Plaintiff can correct those claims; and (16) Magistrate Judge Dancks erred in finding that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of declaratory judgment regarding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), because it is hard to fathom that in 1791 the Founders considered ex-soldiers displaying symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder as being prohibited from having firearms for self-defense in their homes. (Dkt. Nos. 14, 15.)

         C. Plaintiff's Various Motions

         For the sake of brevity, the Court will assume the reader's familiarity with the nature of and bases for Plaintiff's various motions, because (as previously stated) this Decision and Order is intended primarily for the review of the parties.

         II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS

         A. Legal Standard Governing Review of a Report-Recommendation

         When a specific objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to a de novo review. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). To be “specific, ” the objection must, with particularity, “identify [1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection and [2] the basis for the objection.” N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c).[3] When performing such a de novo review, “[t]he judge may ... receive further evidence. ...” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court will ordinarily refuse to consider evidentiary material that could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance.[4] Similarly, a district court will ordinarily refuse to consider argument that could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance. See Zhao v. State Univ. of N.Y., 04-CV-0210, 2011 WL 3610717, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2011) (“[I]t is established law that a district judge will not consider new arguments raised in objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that could have been raised before the magistrate but were not.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Hubbard v. Kelley, 752 F.Supp.2d 311, 312-13 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In this circuit, it is established law that a district judge will not consider new arguments raised in objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that could have been raised before the magistrate but were not.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         *3 When only a general objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), (3); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition; see also Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) [collecting cases], aff'd without opinion, 175 F.3d 1007 (2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, when an objection merely reiterates the same arguments made by the objecting party in its original papers submitted to the magistrate judge, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation challenged by those arguments to only a clear error review.[5] Finally, when no objection is made to a portion of a report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition. When performing such a “clear error” review, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Id.[6]

         After conducting the appropriate review, the Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

         B. Legal Standards Governing Plaintiff's Various Motions

         Again, for the sake of brevity, the Court will assume the reader's familiarity with the legal standards governing Plaintiff's various motions, because (as previously stated) this Decision and Order is intended primarily for the review of the parties.

         III. ANALYSIS

         After carefully reviewing the relevant papers herein, including Magistrate Judge Dancks' thorough Report-Recommendation, the Court can find no error in those parts of the Report-Recommendation to which Plaintiff has specifically objected, and no clear error in the remaining parts of the Report-Recommendation: Magistrate Judge Dancks employed the proper standards, accurately recited the facts, and reasonably applied the law to those facts. As a result, the Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety for the reasons stated therein. To those reasons, the Court adds six points.

         First, given the legal analysis (and “Blue Booked” citations) contained in Plaintiff's numerous memoranda of law, the Court doubts that he is actually proceeding pro se in this action sufficient to warrant an extension of special solicitude (rendering his repeated representations of that fact both false and material);[7] however, the Court will assume he is proceeding pro se for the sake of brevity.

         *4 Second, Plaintiff argues that the written notice attached to his Complaint (informing of his right to a court hearing and counsel) was received by him only after his stay at the psychiatric ward. (Dkt. No. 14, at ¶ 4.) The problem is that the notice contains a staff physician's signature confirming that Plaintiff had been provided with a copy of the notice. (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 7, at 6.) In his Objections, Plaintiff does not point to any portion of his Complaint in which he alleges facts plausibly suggesting that the physician's signature was fraudulent. (Dkt. No. 14, at ¶ 4.) Rather, he appears to argue that his own signature should have been required. (Id.) However, such a requirement does not appear to be contained in N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law §§ 9.27 or 9.29.

         Third, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (which was not expressly submitted to Magistrate Judge Dancks) is denied on each of the following three grounds: (1) it is improper in that the only Order issued by Magistrate Judge Dancks was her Order granting his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, but he is not challenging that Order; (2) the procedural mechanism for challenging a Report-Recommendation is an Objection, which he pursued, and which is redundant of the relief requested by his motion for reconsideration; and (3) the motion is unsupported by a showing of cause.

         Fourth, Plaintiff's motion to amend his Objections to the Report-Recommendation is granted. Although Plaintiff had previously been given a generous extension of time in which to file all of his Objections, and although his proposed Amended Objections are somewhat redundant of his original Objections, the Court has carefully considered them in reviewing the Report-Recommendation.

         Fifth, Plaintiff's motion to enlarge the time for service of process is denied without prejudice as premature. Plaintiff may renew his motion before Magistrate Judg Dancks after she has determined whether he has, in his Amended Complaint, corrected the pleading defects identified in her Report-Recommendation.

         Sixth, Plaintiff's second motion to amend his Complaint is denied on each of the following three grounds: (1) by her Text Orders of December 21 and 29, 2015, Magistrate Judge Dancks denied Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time in which to file a motion to amend without prejudice to renewal after the undersigned has acted on her Report-Recommendation (which had not yet occurred when Plaintiff filed his second motion to amend on February 16, 2016); (2) Plaintiff's motion does not identify the amendments in his proposed pleading, either through the submission of a red-lined version of the original pleading or other equivalent means, in violation of Local Rule 7.1(a)(2) (nor is Plaintiff's motion supported by an unsigned copy of the proposed amended pleading, in violation of Local Rule 7.1[a][4]); and (3) Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint appears to attempt to reassert various claims that the Court has dismissed with prejudice in this Decision and Order.

         ACCORDINGLY, it is

         ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 13) is DENIED; and it is further

         ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to amend his Objections to the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. ...


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