United States District Court, E.D. New York
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
brings this pro se action against Abraham Clott, a
New York City Criminal Court Judge in Manhattan,
invokes the Court's federal question and diversity
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1332. Along with the complaint, plaintiff has filed an order
to show cause seeking a temporary restraining order.
Plaintiff has paid the requisite filing fee to initiate the
action. For the reasons stated below, plaintiff's
complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and his request for a temporary restraining
order is denied as moot.
following facts are drawn from plaintiff's pleading and
the exhibits attached thereto, the allegations of which are
assumed to be true for purposes of this memorandum and order.
Plaintiff's son, Santino Boderick
(“Santino”), was convicted following a jury trial
before defendant Judge Abraham Clott. Santino is due to be
sentenced on January 18, 2017. Although unclear, plaintiff
appears to allege that defendant Clott did not have the
authority to preside over his son's trial. On his
son's behalf as “Lawful Moor Consul, ” he
seeks to have this Court enjoin the state court proceedings,
order the immediate release of his son, and award monetary
complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir.
2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)). Although all allegations contained in the complaint
are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to
legal conclusions.” Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678. In
reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must be
mindful that a plaintiff's pleadings should be held
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)); see also
Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting
that even after Twombly, the court “remain[s]
obligated to construe a pro se complaint
a plaintiff has paid the court's filing fee, a district
court may dismiss the case, sua sponte, if it
determines that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
or the action is frivolous. Fitzgerald v. First E.
Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir.
2000); see also Hawkins-El III v. AIG Federal Savings
Bank, 334 F. App'x 394, 395 (2d Cir. 2009)
(affirming district court's sua sponte dismissal
of a frivolous complaint though the fee was paid).
order to bring suit in a federal court, a plaintiff must
establish that he has standing to pursue his claims under
Article III of the United States Constitution. E.M. v.
N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 449 (2d Cir.
2014). “To establish that a case or controversy exists
so as to confer standing under Article III, a plaintiff must
satisfy three elements: (a) the plaintiff must suffer an
injury in fact, (b) that injury must be fairly traceable to
the challenged action, and (c) the injury must be likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision of the federal
court.” Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S.
Food & Drug Admin., 710 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013)
(“[F]or a federal court to have authority under the
Constitution to settle a dispute, the party before it must
seek a remedy for a personal and tangible harm.”).
standing to assert a constitutional claim, a plaintiff must
show that he was personally deprived of rights or privileges
guaranteed by the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Collins v. W. Hartford Police Dep't, 324 F.
App'x 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2009). Here, to the extent that
any constitutional deprivation allegedly occurred, the injury
would have been to plaintiff's son, not to the plaintiff
himself. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to allege any facts to
show that he personally suffered a constitutional injury and
that he has standing to bring this suit. See,
e.g., Collins, 324 F. App'x at 139 (finding
that plaintiff has no standing to challenge constitutional
deprivations alleged to have been experienced by his mother
and had not adequately alleged that he personally had
suffered a constitutional injury); Guichardo v.
Hanson, No. 15 CV 0585, 2015 WL 6866308, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 6, 2015) (grandmother, grandfather, and mother lacked
standing where the complaint related to the harm allegedly
suffered by their adult son).
Court further notes that to the extent plaintiff is
attempting to represent his son in this action as if an
attorney (given his references to his role as his son's
“Lawful Moor Consul”), he may not do so. See
Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2002) (a
pro se litigant, who is not a licensed attorney, may
not represent another's interest in federal court);
Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 281,
284 (2d Cir. 2005) (“a parent not admitted to the bar
cannot bring an action pro se . . . on behalf of his
or her child.”).
still, this action is baseless given well-settled precedent
that judges have absolute immunity for their judicial acts
performed in their judicial capacities. Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Dupree v. Bivona,
No. 07-4599-cv, 2009 WL 82717, at *1-2 (2d Cir. Jan. 14,
2009); Colson v. N.Y. Police Dep't, No. 13 CV
5394, 2015 WL 64688, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2015). This
absolute “judicial immunity is not overcome by
allegations of bad faith or malice, ” nor can a judge
“be deprived of immunity because the action he took was
in error . . . or was in excess of his authority.”
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (internal quotation marks
omitted); Horton v. City of New York, No. 14 CV
4279, 2014 WL 3644711, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014);
Gamez v. U.S. Dist. Ct. E. & S. Dists. of - Tyranny,
N.Y., No. 11-CV-4068, 2011 WL 3949807, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 6, 2011).
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, § 309(c),
Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996) (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1983) bars all claims for injunctive relief
against a judicial officer for a judicial action or omission
“unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.” Rodriguez v.
Trager, No. 10 CV 0781, 2010 WL 889545, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 8, 2010). Here, plaintiff takes issue with how his
son's criminal trial has proceeded. Even if plaintiff had
standing to bring his son's claims against Judge Clott
and Judge Clott was not protected by ...