United States District Court, W.D. New York
DECISION and ORDER
MICHAEL A. TELESCA United States District Judge
Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”)
brought this declaratory judgment action under the
Court's diversity jurisdiction seeking interpretation of
an insurance contract involving defendants Harleysville
Insurance Company (“Harleysville”), University of
Rochester Medical Center/Strong Medical Center
(“UR” or “the Hospital”), Lechase
Construction Corp., LeChase Construction Services LLC
(“Lechase”), J.T. Mauro Co., Inc.
(“Mauro”), and The Kimmel Company, Inc.
(“Kimmel”). Cincinnati (the insurance carrier to
Mauro) specifically claimed that Harleysville (the insurance
carrier to Kimmel) was required to defend and provide primary
insurance coverage to defendants LeChase, Mauro, and UR in a
pending action in New York Supreme Court in which a Kimmel
employee sought damages for injuries sustained while
performing repairs to a building owned by UR.
result of Harleysville's refusal to defend and indemnify
Mauro, LeChase and UR in the state action, Cincinnati
commenced the instant federal court action on August 20, 2015
requesting, inter alia, a determination
that the Harleysville insurance contract issued to Kimmel
provided additional insured status coverage to UR, LeChase,
and Mauro. On May 16, 2016, Cincinnati moved for summary
judgment against Harleysville, and, on July 15, 2016,
Harleysville filed a cross-motion for summary judgment
requesting that the Court interpret the insurance contract in
its favor. By Decision and Order dated October 25, 2016, this
Court granted in part and denied in part the parties'
respective motions for summary judgment, finding that
Harleysville was required to afford insurance coverage to
Mauro and UR as additional insureds under its insurance
policy with Kimmel but not LeChase, which the Court found did
not qualify as an additional insured under the same policy.
November 9, 2016, Cincinnati filed motions for attorney's
fees and to alter judgment (Docket No. 34). On November 21,
2016, Harleysville filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Court's October 25, 2016 decision and order and a
memorandum of law in opposition to Cincinnati's motion
for attorney fees and to alter judgment (Docket Nos. 35 and
Harleysville's Motion for Reconsideration
Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the Western District of
New York provide that reconsideration motions fall within the
scope of Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See L.R. Civ. P. 7(d)(3). “Reconsideration of
a court's previous order is an ‘extraordinary
remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality
and conservation of scarce judicial resources.'”
Parrish v. Sollecito, 253 F.Supp.2d 713, 715
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), quoting In re Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc.
Sec. Litig., 113 F.Supp.2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y.2000);
see also In re Houbigant, Inc., 914 F.Supp. 997,
1001 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (a reconsideration motion is not an
opportunity for the moving party “to reargue those
issues already considered [by the Court] when a party does
not like the way the original motion was resolved.”).
Nevertheless, “[r]econsideration may be granted to
correct clear error, prevent manifest injustice or review the
court's decision in light of the availability of new
evidence.” Id., citing Virgin Atlantic
Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245,
1255 (2d Cir.1992).
Harleysville has failed to raise any issue that would
constitute an intervening change of controlling law, new
evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent a
manifest injustice. Harleysville asserts that reconsideration
should be granted to correct a “clear error” in
the Court's October 25, 2016 holding that UR was an
additional insured under the Harleysville insurance policy
issued to Kimmel. There is no question that Harleysville
disagrees with the Court's determination for the reasons
set forth in its original summary judgment motion, which are
reiterated in its present reconsideration motion. As stated
above, however, a movant is not permitted to reargue an issue
that the Court has previously considered.
Court initially reviewed and throughly considered
Harleysville's reasoning in support of its contention
that the Harleysville insurance policy does not confer
additional insured status to UR, the owner of the subject
premises. This repeated reasoning, however, continues to be
unpersausive. Therefore, Harleysville's reargument of
this issue in its present motion does not warrant the
extraordinary remedy of reconsidering the Court's finding
for the reasons set forth in its October 25, 2016 decision
and order, which concluded that UR is entitled to additional
insured status pursuant to the Kimmel subcontract.
Cincinnati's Motion to Alter Judgment
respect to Cincinnati's motion to alter judgment under
Rule 59(e), Cincinnati again attempts to reiterate an
argument that was raised in its original motion for summary
judgment and previously considered by this Court. As such,
the Court declines to entertain Cincinnati's request for
reconsideration of the Court's previous finding that
Lechase was not entitled to additional insured status under
the Harleysville policy by the language in the Kimmel
subcontract and finds no ground raised in Cincinnati's
motion sufficient to compel alteration of the Court's
Cincinnati's Motion for Attorney Fees
support of Cincinnati's request for attorney fees and
costs incurred in the underlying state court action, it has
submitted the attorney affirmation of Patrick B. Nylon, Esq.
with attached invoices and a copy of defendants' answer
to the amended complaint filed in Monroe County Supreme
Court. Mr. Nylon affirms that the total fees and costs billed
and paid by Cincinnati in that action amounts to $29, 938.45.
Harleysville opposes the request for fees and costs as set
forth in Mr. Nylon's affirmation, contending that
Cincinnati has failed to establish that its defense of the
three defendants in the underlying action was so inextricably
intertwined such that Cincinnati should be entitled to
reimbursement for the ...