United States District Court, E.D. New York
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
K. BRODIE, United States District Judge
D.K. Johnson, proceeding pro se, filed the
above-captioned action against Judge Reena Raggi for her role
in adjudicating a criminal proceeding against Plaintiff.
(Compl., Docket Entry No. 1.) Plaintiff seeks money damages.
(Id.) By Memorandum and Order dated June 30, 2016,
the Court sua sponte dismissed the Complaint on
grounds of absolute immunity (the "June 30
Decision"). Johnson v. Raggi, No. 16-CV-2765,
2016 WL 3647865, at *l-2 (E.D.N.Y.July 1, 2016). On July 15,
2016, Plaintiff submitted a letter to Chief Judge Dora
Irizarry, challenging the June 30 Decision. (Docket Entry No.
8.) Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the
Court has construed the letter as a motion for
reconsideration, (PI. Mot. for Reconsideration ("PI.
Mot.")). See Wiley v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51,
62 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that courts must liberally
construe papers submitted by pro se litigants). For
the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration.
Court assumes familiarity with the facts as set forth in the
June 30 Decision and provides only a summary of the pertinent
facts. See Johnson, 2016 WL 3647865, at *l-2.
Plaintiff alleges that in November of 1989, while he was
employed by the United States Navy at the Brooklyn Naval
Station, he was “arrested, indicted and tried for
attempted murder” in the Eastern District of New York.
(Aff. of D.K. Johnson (“Johnson Aff.”) ¶ 3,
annexed to Compl.) Plaintiff was brought before Judge Raggi
in the criminal proceeding, and Plaintiff's counsel
“challenged the jurisdiction” of the court.
(Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff alleges that the
prosecutor failed to establish the court's jurisdiction
over his prosecution, and that Judge Raggi stated that she
had jurisdiction over the matter. (Id. ¶ 4-5.)
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Raggi “knew that she
lacked jurisdiction” over his prosecution and
sentencing and “knew that she was committing a crime
the moment [his] attorney challenged the jurisdiction.”
(Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Judge
Raggi's actions were “in violation of the due
process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment[s].” (Id.) In July of 1991,
Plaintiff was “tried, convicted and sentenced to ten
years in federal prison” by Judge Raggi. (Id.
Standard of review
standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict,
and “[r]econsideration will generally be denied unless
the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data
that the court overlooked - matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached
by the court.” Cedar Petrochem., Inc. v. Dongbu
Hannong Chem. Co., Ltd., 628 F. App'x 793, 796 (2d
Cir. 2015) (quoting Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70
F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)); Bank of Am. Nat'l
Ass'n v. AIG Fin. Prods. Corp., 509 F. App'x 24,
27 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The standard for granting such a
motion is strict . . . .” (quoting Shrader, 70
F.3d at 257)); see also Local Civ. R. 6.3 (The
moving party must “set forth concisely the matters or
controlling decisions which counsel believes the Court has
overlooked.”); Smith v. N.Y.C. Dep't of
Educ., 524 F. App'x 730, 734 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“To warrant reconsideration, a party must ‘point
to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked -
matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to
alter the conclusion reached by the court.'”
(quoting Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257)).
thus “well-settled” that a motion for
reconsideration is “not a vehicle for relitigating old
issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a
rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a ‘second
bite at the apple.'” Analytical Surveys, Inc.
v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012)
(quoting Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144
(2d Cir. 1998)). A motion for reconsideration is
“neither an occasion for repeating old arguments
previously rejected nor an opportunity for making new
arguments that could have previously been made.”
Simon v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 18 F.Supp.3d 423,
425 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). In order to prevail on a motion for
reconsideration, “the moving party must demonstrate
that the Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual
matters that were put before the Court on the underlying
motion.” Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Grp. Inc., 28
F. App'x 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Stoner v. Young
Concert Artists, Inc., No. 11-CV-7279, 2013 WL 2425137,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013) (“A motion for
reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy, and this Court
will not reconsider issues already examined simply because [a
party] is dissatisfied with the outcome of his case. To do
otherwise would be a waste of judicial resources.”
(alteration in original)); Henderson v. City of New
York, No. 05-CV-2588, 2011 WL 5513228, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 10, 2011) (“In order to have been
‘overlooked, ' the decisions or data in question
must have been put before [the court] on the underlying
motion . . . and which, had they been considered, might have
reasonably altered the result before the court.”
(alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
Reconsideration is unwarranted
argues that reconsideration is appropriate because the Court
failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the June 30 Decision.
(Pl. Mot. 2.) In the June 30 Decision, the Court dismissed
the Complaint on the basis of absolute immunity.
Johnson, 2016 WL 3647865, at *2. The Court explained
that Plaintiff's claims against Judge Raggi relate to
actions that she took pursuant to her official duties as a
district judge. Id.
fails to point to any facts or controlling law that the Court
overlooked. See Cedar Petrochem., Inc., 628 F.
App'x at 796. In arguing for reconsideration, Plaintiff
does not argue that the Court overlooked controlling law; he
merely argues that the Court incorrectly interpreted the law.
(Pl. Mot. 2.) In any event, Plaintiff's argument is
meritless because the Court applied the appropriate standard
in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Johnson, 2016 WL
3647865, at *2 (“A complaint must plead enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. . . .
[And] [a] complaint will be dismissed as frivolous when it is
clear that the defendants are immune from suit.”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
foregoing reasons, the Court declines to reconsider ...