United States District Court, S.D. New York
OPINION AND ORDER
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA United States District Judge
Jessica Lumpkin and Jaylina Lloyd - mother and daughter,
respectively - bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against New York City Police Department (“NYPD”)
Detectives Lauren Brehm, Shkelzen Ahmetaj, and John Doe, and
NYPD Sergeant Richard Roe (together,
“Defendants”). Defendants have moved to dismiss
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (the
“SAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). The brief supporting Defendants' motion relies
heavily on documents the Court may not consider under Rule
12(b)(6). Moreover, it cites law that is inapposite to
Plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, and for the reasons set
forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.
6:00 a.m. on July 1, 2014, Detectives Ahmetaj and Doe arrived
at Plaintiffs' shared apartment in Brooklyn, New York.
(SAC ¶¶ 6-7, 15). Lumpkin was home; Lloyd was not.
(Id. at ¶ 16). The detectives had an arrest
warrant for a man who was not then in Plaintiff's
apartment, but they informed Lumpkin that they were also
looking for Lloyd. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-19).
Ahmetaj and Doe then ordered Lumpkin to accompany them to the
stationhouse of the NYPD's 13th Precinct in Manhattan.
(Id. at ¶ 20). Ahmetaj and Doe drove Lumpkin to
the stationhouse, but did not handcuff her. (Id. at
stationhouse, Ahmetaj and Doe took Lumpkin's shoes and
phone, but told her that she was not under arrest. (SAC
¶¶ 22, 24). This was false: Lumpkin was
under arrest. (Id. at ¶¶
22-23). Brehm told Lumpkin as much, then
handcuffed Lumpkin. (Id. at ¶ 25). And at
around 1:00 p.m., Brehm ordered Lumpkin to call Lloyd in
order to “get [Lloyd] to come to the
stationhouse.” (Id. at ¶ 26). Roe
informed Lumpkin “that she would not be released from
custody until she produced her daughter.” (Id.
at ¶ 28).
Lloyd did not pick up her phone when Lumpkin called her,
Lumpkin remained at the stationhouse, “illegally held
hostage, ” for roughly nine hours. (SAC ¶¶
27, 29, 30-31). Brehm released Lumpkin only after she
promised to produce Lloyd at the stationhouse on some future
date. (Id. at ¶ 31). In exchange, Brehm issued
Lumpkin a desk appearance ticket that “falsely and
maliciously accuse[d] [Lumpkin] of petit larceny” and
ordered Lumpkin to appear before the Criminal Court of the
City of New York on August 5, 2014. (Id. at
¶¶ 31-32, 39; id. at Ex. A). Brehm
promised Lumpkin that she would void the desk appearance
ticket once Lloyd came to the stationhouse, but never
followed through. (Id. at ¶¶ 33, 38).
went to the stationhouse at around 9:00 a.m. on July 17,
2014. (SAC ¶ 35). Around 12:30 a.m. on July 18, after
“the New York County District Attorney”
determined that “there was not probable cause for
[Lloyd's] arrest, ” Lloyd was released.
(Id. at ¶¶ 36-37).
appeared in Criminal Court on August 5, 2014. (SAC ¶
39). But that same day, Lumpkin received from the District
Attorney's Office a document indicating that it
“was not ready to proceed with [her]
prosecution.” (Id. at ¶¶ 40-41;
id. at Ex. B). And when Lumpkin's attorney
called the District Attorney's Office on December 29,
2014, he learned “that the charge against [Lumpkin] had
been dismissed and sealed.” (Id. at ¶ 42;
id. at Ex. C).
filed their initial complaint on February 4, 2015. (Dkt. #1).
After a conference with the Court on April 14, 2016
(see Dkt. #22), Plaintiffs submitted an amended
complaint (Dkt. #16). And on April 21, 2016, Plaintiffs filed
the SAC, the operative complaint in this case. (Dkt. #18;
see Dkt. #20). Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC
on August 8, 2016. (Dkt. #32). Plaintiffs responded on
September 7, 2016 (Dkt. #35), and briefing concluded when
Defendants submitted their reply on September 23, 2016 (Dkt.
survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A “plausible” claim is one
“that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. As relevant here, “[a]
complaint based upon a violation of [§] 1983 that does
not allege facts establishing the personal ...