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Lumpkin v. Brehm

United States District Court, S.D. New York

January 27, 2017

JESSICA LUMPKIN and JAYLINA LLOYD, Plaintiffs,
v.
DETECTIVE LAUREN BREHM, Shield No. 969, DETECTIVE SHKELZEN AHMETAJ, Shield No. 6476, DETECTIVE “JOHN DOE, ” and SERGEANT “RICHARD ROE, ” Defendants.

          OPINION AND ORDER

          KATHERINE POLK FAILLA United States District Judge

         Plaintiffs Jessica Lumpkin and Jaylina Lloyd - mother and daughter, respectively - bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) Detectives Lauren Brehm, Shkelzen Ahmetaj, and John Doe, and NYPD Sergeant Richard Roe (together, “Defendants”). Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The brief supporting Defendants' motion relies heavily on documents the Court may not consider under Rule 12(b)(6). Moreover, it cites law that is inapposite to Plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.

         BACKGROUND[1]

         A. Factual Background

         Around 6:00 a.m. on July 1, 2014, Detectives Ahmetaj and Doe arrived at Plaintiffs' shared apartment in Brooklyn, New York. (SAC ¶¶ 6-7, 15). Lumpkin was home; Lloyd was not. (Id. at ¶ 16). The detectives had an arrest warrant for a man who was not then in Plaintiff's apartment, but they informed Lumpkin that they were also looking for Lloyd. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-19). Ahmetaj and Doe then ordered Lumpkin to accompany them to the stationhouse of the NYPD's 13th Precinct in Manhattan. (Id. at ¶ 20). Ahmetaj and Doe drove Lumpkin to the stationhouse, but did not handcuff her. (Id. at ¶ 21).

         At the stationhouse, Ahmetaj and Doe took Lumpkin's shoes and phone, but told her that she was not under arrest. (SAC ¶¶ 22, 24). This was false: Lumpkin was under arrest. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23).[2] Brehm told Lumpkin as much, then handcuffed Lumpkin. (Id. at ¶ 25). And at around 1:00 p.m., Brehm ordered Lumpkin to call Lloyd in order to “get [Lloyd] to come to the stationhouse.” (Id. at ¶ 26). Roe informed Lumpkin “that she would not be released from custody until she produced her daughter.” (Id. at ¶ 28).

         Because Lloyd did not pick up her phone when Lumpkin called her, Lumpkin remained at the stationhouse, “illegally held hostage, ” for roughly nine hours. (SAC ¶¶ 27, 29, 30-31). Brehm released Lumpkin only after she promised to produce Lloyd at the stationhouse on some future date. (Id. at ¶ 31). In exchange, Brehm issued Lumpkin a desk appearance ticket that “falsely and maliciously accuse[d] [Lumpkin] of petit larceny” and ordered Lumpkin to appear before the Criminal Court of the City of New York on August 5, 2014. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-32, 39; id. at Ex. A). Brehm promised Lumpkin that she would void the desk appearance ticket once Lloyd came to the stationhouse, but never followed through. (Id. at ¶¶ 33, 38).

         Lloyd went to the stationhouse at around 9:00 a.m. on July 17, 2014. (SAC ¶ 35). Around 12:30 a.m. on July 18, after “the New York County District Attorney” determined that “there was not probable cause for [Lloyd's] arrest, ” Lloyd was released. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-37).

         Lumpkin appeared in Criminal Court on August 5, 2014. (SAC ¶ 39). But that same day, Lumpkin received from the District Attorney's Office a document indicating that it “was not ready to proceed with [her] prosecution.” (Id. at ¶¶ 40-41; id. at Ex. B). And when Lumpkin's attorney called the District Attorney's Office on December 29, 2014, he learned “that the charge against [Lumpkin] had been dismissed and sealed.” (Id. at ¶ 42; id. at Ex. C).

         B. Procedural Background

         Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on February 4, 2015. (Dkt. #1). After a conference with the Court on April 14, 2016 (see Dkt. #22), Plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint (Dkt. #16). And on April 21, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the SAC, the operative complaint in this case. (Dkt. #18; see Dkt. #20). Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC on August 8, 2016. (Dkt. #32). Plaintiffs responded on September 7, 2016 (Dkt. #35), and briefing concluded when Defendants submitted their reply on September 23, 2016 (Dkt. #39).

         DISCUSSION

         A. Applicable Law

         “To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A “plausible” claim is one “that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. As relevant here, “[a] complaint based upon a violation of [§] 1983 that does not allege facts establishing the personal ...


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