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McIntosh v. The City of New York

United States District Court, E.D. New York

February 3, 2017

IMAN MCINTOSH, Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF NEW YORK; POLICE OFFICER HAROLD TAYLOR; SERGEANT HONG CHEN; POLICE OFFICER CHONG YI; POLICE OFFICER JAWAD JAVED; POLICE OFFICER JAMES KELLY; POLICE OFFICER JASON RAGOO; SERGEANT RONALD WARNETT; SERGEANT MICHAEL ELDERBAUM; and JOHN/JANE DOE #1-20, Defendants.

          For the Plaintiff: GREGORY PAUL MOUTON Law Office of Gregory P. Mouton, Jr.

          For the Defendants: KARL J. ASHANTI RYAN GLENN SHAFFER The City of New York Law Department.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          FREDERIC BLOCK Senior United States District Judge.

         On the night of August 26, 2013, Iman McIntosh (“Iman” or “McIntosh”) fought with her boyfriend and was subsequently arrested for domestic assault. On September 12, 2013, the charges spawned by this incident were dismissed at the request of the Queens County District Attorney's Office (“DA”). Iman now sues the City of New York (“City”) and, individually, eight officers of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD” or “NYCPD”): Police Officers Harold Taylor (“Taylor”), Chong Yi (“Yi”), Jawad Javed (“Javed”), James Kelly (“Kelly”), and Jason Ragoo (“Ragoo”), and Sergeants Hong Chen (“Chen”), Ronald Warnett (“Warnett”), and Michael Elderbaum (“Elderbaum”) (“defendant officers”).[1] Against the City and the defendant officers (collectively, “defendants”), Iman brings nine claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983[2]-unlawful search; false arrest; denial of substantive due process; malicious abuse of process; malicious prosecution; deliberate indifference to her medical needs; conspiracy; failure to intervene; and municipal liability[3]--and two claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”) and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended in 2008 (“ADA”).[4] Having completed discovery, both parties now move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the following reasons, Iman's motion is DENIED, defendants' motion is GRANTED.

         I

         The following undisputed material facts[5] are taken from the parties' submissions, including their Local Rule 56.1 Statements. The Court deems as undisputed only those factual assertions, advanced by one party, which are supported by citations to the record and are not controverted by the other party and which both parties acknowledged as such at oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3) (authorizing court to “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it”); Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[I]n determining whether the moving party has met this burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue for trial, the district court may not rely solely on the statement of undisputed facts contained in the moving party's Rule 56.1 statement” and “must be satisfied that the citation to evidence in the record supports the assertion.”).

         A. Undisputed Facts

         During the summer of 2013, Iman lived with Kristopher Vecchio (“Vecchio”), her then-boyfriend, and her son at 149-29 34th Avenue, Apartment 2, Queens, New York (“Apartment”). At the time, Iman worked for Brink's Global Services. On August 26, 2013, Iman left work at approximately 7:00 p.m. and went to dinner with a friend. At around 9:45 p.m., Iman took a cab directly home.

         Later that night, Vecchio and Iman fought with fists, nails, and scissors. In the midst of this altercation, Vecchio called 911 and reported that Iman, having been drinking, had hit and bit him, resulting in injuries to his face and chest. The dispatcher classified the matter as both an assault in progress and a domestic incident.

         Five officers-Taylor, Chen, Yi, Javed, and Kelly-were dispatched to the Apartment; they had been informed of these classifications as well as the substance of When Chen and Taylor arrived, Vecchio expanded upon his telephoned account and accused Iman of punching and scratching him and drawing blood. At the same time, the defendant officers noticed and noted plaintiff's own injuries, including lacerations on her right leg. Based on the 911 call, these additional statements, and his observations of Vecchio's physical injuries, such as fresh cuts and bite marks, Taylor, with Chen's approval, arrested and searched Iman. Subsequently, as both parties agreed at oral argument, Vecchio was also arrested.

         Because Iman had sustained obvious lacerations and claimed to be suffering from a panic attack, Taylor and Kelly first took Iman to New York-Presbyterian Hospital in Queens (“Hospital”). Handcuffed, Iman was referred to the Hospital's Urgent Care Center and treated for the physical injuries sustained during her fight with Vecchio. As to this hospital stay, “[t]here is no indication anywhere in plaintiff's medical records that she actually was taken out of the hospital against medical advice.” Defs.' L.R. 56.1 State. ¶ 20; see also Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' L.R. 56.1 State. 11 (admitting allegations set forth in paragraph 20). Upon her release, within hours of her arrival at the Hospital, Iman was first transported to the local precinct and then to Queens Central Booking (“QCB”).

         Shortly afterwards, plaintiff was returned to the precinct and placed in a holding cell. During this time, Ragoo and Elderbaum questioned Iman about her fight and relationship with Vecchio. After this questioning, Iman was sent back to QCB. While at QCB, Iman requested medical attention from, among others, Warnett. On the same day, she was again taken to the Hospital for further evaluation. In regards to this second visit, as with plaintiff's first, “[t]here is no indication anywhere in plaintiff's medical records that she actually was taken out of the hospital against medical advice.” Defs.' L.R. 56.1 State. ¶ 20; see also Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' L.R. 56.1 State. 11 (admitting allegations set forth in paragraph 20). Afterward, plaintiff was returned to QCB.

         Based on Taylor's paperwork and observations, a criminal complaint against Iman was filed. Once her case had been docketed by the Criminal Court of the City of New York and the complaint and her criminal history compiled, Iman was arraigned and released. In total, Iman spent slightly less than forty-eight hours in custody. On September 12, 2013, the charges against Iman were dismissed with the DA's consent.

         II

         “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court may not undertake credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or select amongst competing but legitimate inferences from disputed facts. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Rather, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his [or her] favor.” Id. Nonetheless, unless the nonmoving party “offers some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful, ” summary judgment should be granted to the moving party. D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1988).

         A. ...


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