United States District Court, S.D. New York
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GREGORY H. WOODS, District Judge
second amended complaint, Plaintiff Carl Davis brings a claim
against Defendant Joseph McCready, RPA, alleging that he
received constitutionally inadequate medical treatment while
incarcerated at Riker's Island between June 15, 2014 and
June 20, 2014. Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's
second amended complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the
following reasons, Defendant's motion is GRANTED, and Mr.
Davis's second amended complaint is DISMISSED.
Mr. Davis entered the Robert N. Davoren Complex
(“RNDC”), a jail on Riker's Island, on June
15, 2014, he was seen by Defendant Joseph McCready, RPA. ECF
No. 111, Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”), ¶ 5. Mr.
Davis explained to Defendant that he had extreme pain in his
legs and back, foot drop, heart problems, sleeping problems,
and breathing problems due to asthma and having been shot in
the chest. SAC ¶ 5-6. Mr. Davis requested pain
medication for the “excruciating pain” in his
legs and back, a special therapeutic mattress for his back
and sleeping disorder, and a cane to help him walk. SAC
¶ 6-7. Mr. Davis does not expressly allege whether
Defendant ever granted these requests. He alleges only that
Defendant “purposely ignor[ed]” his
“serious medical needs.” SAC ¶ 8.
approximately June 20, 2014, Mr. Davis was transferred to the
Brooklyn Detention Center. SAC ¶ 9. Mr. Davis alleges
that Defendant failed to document his meeting with Mr. Davis
clearly in his medical records before Mr. Davis's
transfer to the Brooklyn Detention Center. Id. Mr.
Davis asserts that he “[s]hould have immediately
received the requested medication, mattress and cane”
after the transfer. Id.
Davis alleges that Defendant “was fully apprised of
[his] medical needs and ignored the risk of ameliorating
conditions, extreme pain and debilitating conditions.”
SAC ¶ 10. He further alleges that he “suffered
heart pain, loss of breath, loss of sleep, intense &
extreme pain, emotional distress, and other pain as a result
of the injury suffered as a result of defendant's
unprofessional care.” SAC ¶ 11.
Davis filed his initial complaint on August 5, 2014, bringing
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the RNDC
“medical department” and “medical
director.” ECF No. 1. Following an order from the Court
to identify the specific defendants in the proceeding, Mr.
Davis filed a first amended complaint on March 6, 2015,
alleging that a number of defendants, including Mr. McCready,
had denied him adequate medical treatment. ECF No. 14. On
February 22, 2016, the Court granted the defendants'
motions to dismiss for failure to allege facts sufficient to
state a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs and granted Mr. Davis leave to replead no later than
March 18, 2016. ECF No. 100.
numerous extensions to accommodate Mr. Davis's transfer
to Riverview Correctional Facility, Mr. Davis filed his
second amended complaint on June 29, 2016. ECF No. 111. In
his second amended complaint, Mr. Davis names only Mr.
McCready as a defendant. Id. Defendant McCready
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) on August 12, 2016. ECF No. 117. Mr. Davis
submitted an affidavit in opposition on November 21, 2016,
and Defendant submitted a reply affirmation on December 6,
2016. Dkt Nos. 131, 136.
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). To meet this plausibility standard, the plaintiff
must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court “must accept all
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences
in the nonmoving party's favor.” LaFaro v. New
York Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475 (2d
Cir. 2009). The Court, however, is not required to credit
“mere conclusory statements” or
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint
that offers “labels and conclusions” or
“naked assertion[s]” without “further
factual enhancement” will not survive a motion to
dismiss. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
he is proceeding pro se, the Court must liberally
construe Plaintiff's submissions and interpret them
“to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis in
original); see also, e.g., Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed
pro se is to be liberally construed . . . .”)
(citation omitted). This mandate “‘applies with
particular force when a plaintiff's civil rights are at
issue.'” Bell v. Jendell, 980 F.Supp.2d
555, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Maisonet v. Metro.
Hosp. & Health Hosp. Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d 345, 348
(S.D.N.Y. 2009)). However, “the liberal treatment
afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party
from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law.” Id. at 559 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Rahman v.
Schriro, 22 F.Supp.3d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“[D]ismissal of a pro se complaint is
nevertheless appropriate where a plaintiff has clearly failed
to meet minimum pleading requirements.” (citing
Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir.
Claim for ...