United States District Court, S.D. New York
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
G. KOELTL, District Judge.
plaintiff Grazyna Sklodowska-Grezak (“Grezak” or
“plaintiff”) filed this action on June 3, 2016
under 42 U.S.C §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging
violations of her First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. She also asserts several state law claims. Grezak
claims that the defendants, Judith A. Stein, Ph.D.
(“Stein”), Gianni Faedda, M.D.
(“Faedda”), and Nancy B. Rubenstein, M.D.
(“Rubenstein”), motivated by racial animus,
harassed her and conspired to have her falsely imprisoned.
claims against Dr. Rubenstein were dismissed on December 22,
2015. Stein and Faedda moved on July 1, 2016 and August 11,
2016, respectively, to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint
(“SAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. ECF Nos. 37, 67.
plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit from a prior ruling in this case. This Court
indicated that it would take no action pending determination
of the appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court turns now to the
fully briefed motions to dismiss.
deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the
allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all
reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's
favor. McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482
F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court's function on a
motion to dismiss is “not to weigh the evidence that
might be presented at a trial but merely to determine whether
the complaint itself is legally sufficient.”
Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir.
1985). The Court should not dismiss the complaint if the
plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). While the Court should construe the factual
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
“the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions.” Id.; see also Villar
v. Ramos, No. 13-CV-8422 (JGK), 2015 WL 3473413, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2015).
faced with a pro se complaint, the Court must “construe
[the] complaint liberally and interpret it to raise the
strongest arguments that it suggests.” Chavis v.
Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Even in a pro se case,
however, . . . threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, although the Court is “obligated to
draw the most favorable inferences” that the complaint
supports, it “cannot invent factual allegations that
[the plaintiff] has not pled.” Id.; see
also Villar, 2015 WL 3473413, at *1.
purposes of the motions to dismiss, the Court accepts as true
the following factual allegations in the SAC.
September 10, 2012, the plaintiff brought an action against
her daughter and Dr. Stein, her daughter's psychiatrist,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York. See Am. Compl. at 2. The plaintiff
alleges that she named her daughter an “unwilling
plaintiff” in the action and “ordered mediation
with” the daughter on January 21, 2013 at “Dr.
Stein's office.” Id. The SAC alleges that
Stein “ordered to [the plaintiff's daughter] Pro
Bono counsel, ” Beth Finkelstein
(“Finkelstein”), who “came to the
lawsuit” on February 25, 2013. Id.
plaintiff alleges that on February 26, 2013, Stein, Faedda
(who had an office with Stein), and Finkelstein had a
“secret meeting” at which they
“hatched” a “fraudulent scheme” to
injure and harass the plaintiff. Id. The SAC alleges
that Stein, Faedda, and Finkelstein have continually harassed
her since March 2013. See id. at 8. The SAC alleges
that Stein, Faedda, and Finkelstein embarked on this campaign
of harassment because of Grezak's “Polish Christian
Noble Heritage, ” id. at 5, and that their
actions have “put [Grezak] on the edge of death.”
Id. at 3.
particular, the SAC alleges that the three individuals
“fabricated [f]alse evidence” and “ordered
[Grezak's] unlawful confinement.” Id. at
3. According to the plaintiff, Stein and Faedda, at
Finkelstein's direction, “fabricated psychiatric
certificates” in order to classify the plaintiff as
mentally ill. Id. at 4; see also id. at
9-10. The plaintiff also claims that Stein, Faedda, and
Finkelstein threatened to “forcibly medicate” and
use physical force against the plaintiff. Id. at 7,
8. The SAC also alleges that Stein and Faedda falsified
records, which led to Grezak's indictment for homicide.
Id. at 11-12.
plaintiff also alleges that Stein, Faedda, and Finkelstein
have interfered with legal proceedings involving the
plaintiff and with the plaintiff's family life. See
id. at 4-7. In particular, the SAC alleges that the
three have encouraged Grezak's daughter “to commit
[a] crime against” her, have destroyed her relationship
with her daughter, and have made her daughter “run away
from” her. Id. at 3-4, 6-7.
includes seven claims alleging violations of the
plaintiff's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, see id. at 4, 6-10, two claims
for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, see id.
at 4-5, and state law claims for ...