United States District Court, S.D. New York
BETTY M. ALEXIDOR, Plaintiff,
PATRICK R. DONAHOE, Postmaster General, Defendant.
M. Alexidor Pro Se Plaintiff
Brandon H. Cowart, Esq. Counsel for Defendant
OPINION & ORDER
KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge
Betty M. Alexidor (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro
se, brings this Action against Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster
General (“Defendant”), alleging that the United
States Postal Service (“USPS”) discriminated
against her on the basis of her disability, race, sex, and
national origin, and retaliated against her, all in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, as codified, 42 U.S.C. §§
12112-12117. Before the Court is Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 (the “Motion”). (See Dkt.
No. 100.) For the reasons stated below, the Motion is
factual and procedural history of the Action is recounted in
the Court's September 30, 2016 Opinion & Order
(“Opinion”), (see Op. & Order
(“Opinion”) 2-7 (Dkt. No. 95)), and therefore,
what follows is an abbreviated account of the relevant facts
and procedural history subsequent to the Court's prior
is an African-American woman who began working for USPS as a
letter carrier in 2001. (Def.'s Local Rule 56.1 Statement
of Undisputed Facts (“Def.'s 56.1”) ¶ 1
(Dkt. No. 107); Decl. of Betty Alexidor (“Alexidor
Decl.”) ¶ 5 (Dkt. No. 110).) Plaintiff
suffered an on- the-job injury that resulted in her taking
disability leave beginning July 17, 2008. (Def.'s 56.1
¶ 2; Aff'n in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ.
J. (“Pl.'s 56.1”) ¶ 5 (Dkt. No. 87).)
to the Department of Labor (“DOL”) Office of
Workers Compensation Programs (“OWCP”), federal
employees receive Federal Employee Compensation
(“FEC”) benefits for disabilities due to personal
injury sustained while in the performance of their duties.
(Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 4.) DOL forms CA-7 and CA-7a allow a
worker to claim compensation for lost wages due to injury.
(Id. ¶ 5.) The forms require the worker to
specify the number of wage-hours she would have been working
had she not sustained the injury. (Id.) To ensure
her eligibility for FEC benefits for injuries sustained in
performance of her work, Plaintiff was put on the Daily Roll
and required to regularly submit updated CA-7 and CA-7a
forms. (Id. ¶ 6.)In the forms, Plaintiff was to
identify the number of wage hours lost due to injury for each
preceding work period. (Id.) Once Plaintiff
submitted the forms, USPS management compared them to
personnel records to confirm accuracy, (id. ¶
7), and then submitted the forms to OWCP, (id.
September 21, 2010, Plaintiff returned to work on a part-time
basis, working a schedule of four hours per day, five days a
week. (Id. ¶ 10; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 8.) For
the remaining four hours per day, Plaintiff was on Leave
Without Pay (“LWOP”) and was to be placed on the
Daily Roll. (See Decl. of Aleta Rice (“Rice
Decl.”) ¶ 4 (Dkt. No. 108).) Despite
Plaintiff's return to work, OWCP erroneously kept
Plaintiff on the Periodic Roll for the entire pay period of
September 26 to October 21, 2010. (Def.'s 56.1 ¶
For each scheduled workday, Plaintiff received FEC
compensation for eight hours a day, for the pay period from
September 21 to October 23, totaling $2, 267.08.
(Id. ¶ 11.) The USPS also paid Plaintiff for
working 20 days during the pay period. (Id.) In
other words, Plaintiff continued to receive workers'
compensation benefits as if she had not returned to work, but
was also paid wages during that time.
Breyer, Manager of Human Resources Management for the
USPS's Westchester District, prepared forms CA-7 and
CA-7a to correct the records to reflect that Plaintiff was on
the Periodic Roll for September 22 to September 27, and that
for the remainder of the pay period, Plaintiff was paid four
hours per workday and on LWOP for four hours each day.
(Id. ¶ 13.)Plaintiff signed the forms and Breyer
sent them to OWCP, (id. ¶ 14; see also
Decl. of Brandon Cowart, Esq. (Oct. 29, 2016) Ex. 4, at 1208
(Dkt. No. 103)), but Breyer failed to include the back of the
CA-7 form in her submission, (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 15). On
December 10, 2010, Breyer sent the full forms to OWCP.
(Id. ¶ 16.)
December 9, 2010, Plaintiff signed and submitted CA-7 and
CA-7a forms for the November 6 to November 19, 2010 pay
period. (Id. ¶ 17.) Breyer noted that Plaintiff
had omitted six days of compensable time and added the
omitted days to the CA-7a form before sending the forms to
OWCP. (Id.) Plaintiff received FEC benefits for the
pay period on December 17, 2010. (Id.)
February 3, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a CA-7 form for the pay
period from November 20, 2010 to February 3, 2011.
(Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff's submission failed
to include a CA-7a form and thus was incomplete.
March 19, 2011, Plaintiff and Breyer prepared CA-7 and CA-7a
forms for all pay periods from November 4, 2010 to March 11,
2011, despite the fact that Plaintiff had already received
benefits for certain periods within the timeframe.
(Id. ¶ 20.) On April 8, 2011, Plaintiff
received benefits for each pay period from December 2010 to
February 2011, for which Plaintiff was eligible.
April 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Equal Employment
Opportunity (“EEO”) Complaint of Discrimination,
alleging she was given “unreasonable accommodations and
improper restoration” and that Plaintiff's
supervisor “failed to return credits for
seniority.” (See Decl. of Brandon Cowart, Esq.
(Jan. 20, 2016) Ex. 42 (Dkt. No. 81).) Plaintiff's EEO
Complaint was amended on May 20, 2011 to add a challenge to
the Notice of Removal. (Id. Ex. 1, at ¶ 0269.)
filed her Complaint in the instant Action on December 13,
2011, alleging that USPS discriminated against her on the
basis of her disability, race, sex, and national origin, and
retaliated against her for prior EEO activity, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. (See Dkt. No. 2.)
Specifically, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that she was
denied a reasonable accommodation upon her return to work and
was discriminatorily denied a Good Standing Letter, prevented
from returning to her pre-injury route, and ultimately
terminated. (See generally id.) Plaintiff ...