United States District Court, E.D. New York
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, United States District Judge.
Charline Collins brings this pro se action and
asserts federal claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e el seq.
("Title VII") and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 el seq. (the
"'ADEA"). She also asserts unspecified
state-law claims. Collins's request to proceed in
forma pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 is granted. For the reasons stated below,
Collins's claims against defendant Frank Niglia are
dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). With
respect to defendant Colgate Palmolive ("Colgate7'),
Collins is granted leave to file an amended complaint within
thirty (30) days of the date of this Memorandum and Order.
utilizes an employment discrimination form supplied by the
Court in order to submit her complaint. She alleges claims of
race, sex, religious, and age discrimination. Although
unclear, it appears that Collins was employed by Colgate for
seven years, and her employment was terminated on May 19,
2016. (Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at ¶ V.) Collins's
complaint alleges no facts in support of her claim of
discrimination. Collins annexes her rebuttal to Colgate's
position statement that she submitted to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The rebuttal
likewise fails to allege sufficient facts in support of her
claim of discrimination. (See id at
8-12.) The rebuttal lists the following as
Colgate's reasons for not promoting her: (1) her
altitude, (2) her "[u]n-professional communications with
[her] manager and [c]o-workers, " and (3) her
"[p]oor quality of written communications." (Compl.
at 9.) Collins maintains that those enumerated reasons are
discriminatory. (See Id. at 9-12.)
11, 2016, the EEOC issued Collins a Dismissal and Notice of
Rights, staling "[b]ased upon its investigation, the
EEOC is unable to conclude that the information obtained
established violations of the statutes." (See
Id. at 14.) Collins seeks reinstatement to her job and
retroactive salary in the amount of $26, 500. (Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall
dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it is
satisfied that the action "(i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief." An action is
"frivolous" when either: (1) "the 'factual
contentions are clearly baseless.' such as when
allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy"; or
(2) "the claim is 'based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory."' Livingston v.
Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir.
1998) (internal citation omitted).
Court must be mindful that a. pro se plaintiffs
pleadings should be held "to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976));
see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66. 72 (2d Cir.
2009) (noting that even after Bell All, Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). the court "remain[s]
obligated to construe a pro se complaint
pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the
truth of "all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual
allegations" in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010),
aff'd, 133 S. Cl. 1659 (2013) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-78 (2009)). A
complaint must plead sufficient facts to "state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face."
Twambly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).
plausibility standard does not impose an across-the-board,
heightened fact-pleading standard. Boykin v.
KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2008). The
plausibility standard does not "require a complaint to
include specific evidence [or] factual allegations in
addition to those required by Rule 8." Arista
Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2010).
However, the plausibility standard does impose some burden to
make factual allegations supporting a claim for relief. As
the Iqbal court explained, the plausibility standard
"does not require detailed factual allegations, but it
demands more than an unadorned,
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Sufficiency of the Pleading
to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
plaintiff must provide a short, plain statement of claim
against each defendant named so that they have adequate
notice of the claims against them. See Id. A
pleading that only "tenders naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement" will not suffice.
Id. (internal citations and alterations omitted). A
plaintiff must provide facts sufficient to allow each
defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff
is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal
basis for recovery. See Twombly v. Bell. 425 F.3d
99, 106 (2d Cir. 2005) (defining "fair notice" as
'"that which will enable the adverse party to answer
and prepare for trial, allow the application of res judicata,
and identify the nature of the case so that it may be
assigned the proper form of trial/") (quoting
Simmons v. Abruzzo,49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)).