United States District Court, E.D. New York
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Victor Coureau ("Coureau") brings this pro
se action against defendant 1233 Realty Associates
("1233 Realty") and invokes diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Coureau has paid the
requisite filing fee to initiate the action. For the reasons
that follow. Coureau does not adequately allege the existence
of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, Coureau is
granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and
Order to file an amended complaint establishing the existence
of subject matter jurisdiction. If he fails to do so, the
action will be dismissed for lack of subject matter
following facts are drawn from Coureau's pleading and the
exhibits attached thereto, the allegations of which are
assumed to be true for purposes of this Memorandum and Order.
On or about March 28, 1998, Coureau moved into a rent
stabilized apartment. (Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at
Although Coureau's complaint is far from a model of
clarity, Coureau avers that 1233 Realty is overcharging rent
in violation of the rent stabilization guidelines. (Compl. at
7-11.) 1233 Realty brought at least two actions against
Coureau in the Civil Court of New York, Kings County for
nonpayment of rent. (Compl. at 22-23.) Coureau seeks monetary
damages in the amount of "450.000 three times the
bill." (Compl. at 1 .)
complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." BellAtl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is
plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Matson v. Bd. of Educ, 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir.
2011) (quoting Ashetoft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)). Although all factual allegations contained in the
complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is
"inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal
556 U.S. at 678.
Court must be mindful that a pro se plaintiffs
pleadings should be held "to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976));
see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009)
(noting that even after Twombly, the court
"remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se
a plaintiff has paid the court's filing fee, a district
court may dismiss the case, sua sponte, if it
determines that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
or the action is frivolous. Fitzgerald v. First E.
Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir.
2000); see also Hawkins-El III v. AIG Fed. Sav.
Bank, 334 F.App'x. 394, 395 (2d Cir. 2009)
(affirming district court's sua sponte dismissal
of fee paid frivolous complaint); Paige v. City of New
York, No. 10-CV-5469 (SLT), 2011 WL 3701923, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2010).
to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
plaintiff must provide a short, plain statement of claim
against each defendant named so that they have adequate
notice of the claims against them. Iqhal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned,
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. A pleading that only
"tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement" will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (internal citations and alterations omitted). A
plaintiff must provide facts sufficient to allow each
defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff
is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal
basis for recovery. See Twombly v. Bell, 425 F.3d
99, 106 (2d Cir. 2005) (defining "fair notice" as
'"that which will enable the adverse party to answer
and prepare for trial, allow the application of res judicata,
and identify the nature of the case so that it may be
assigned the proper form of trial'") (quoting
Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)).
A court may dismiss a complaint that is "so confused,
ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true
substance, if any, is well disguised." Salahuddin v.
Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
district courts of the United States are "courts of
limited jurisdiction" and may not preside over cases
absent subject matter jurisdiction. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
"Congress has granted district courts original
jurisdiction over cases in which there is a federal question,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and certain cases between
citizens of different states, so long as the requirements of
complete diversity and amount in controversy are met,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, " Perdue
Pharma LP. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir.
2013). "[B]ecause [subject matter jurisdiction] involves
a court's power to hear a case, [it] can never be
forfeited or waived." United States v. Cotton,
535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). "[W]hen a federal court
concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety."
Arbaugh v. Y&HCorp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).