In the Matter of Scott B. Gilly, an attorney and counselor-at-law: Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner, Scott B. Gilly, Respondent.
proceedings instituted by the Attorney Grievance Committee
for the First Judicial Department. Respondent, Scott B.
Gilly, was admitted to the Bar of the State of New York at a
Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the
First Judicial Department on October 26, 1999.
Dopico, Chief Attorney, Attorney Grievance Committee, New
York (Naomi F. Goldstein, of counsel), for petitioner.
Michael S. Ross, for respondent.
Tom, Justice Presiding, Rolando T. Acosta, Angela M.
Mazzarelli, Karla Moskowitz, Judith J. Gische, Justices.
Scott B. Gilly was admitted to the practice of law in the
State of New York by the First Judicial Department on October
26, 1999, under the name Scott Browning Gilly. At all times
relevant to this proceeding, respondent has maintained an
office for the practice of law within this Department.
February 2013, the Committee on Grievances for the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(COG) suspended respondent for one year based upon his
efforts, and those of an associate he supervised, to conceal
a client's new employment and the use of a false and
misleading expert report on economic damages in an attempt to
extract a favorable settlement in Fryer v Omnicom Media
Group (09 Civ 9514). Respondent had been additionally
charged with misleading the District Court as to those
events, but after respondent claimed several times, in two
declarations, that his misstatements were inadvertent rather
than knowing, the COG ultimately did not impose discipline
for lying to the District Court, and did not make a
determination as to whether respondent's explanations for
his misrepresentations were persuasive or credible.
Respondent was eventually reinstated in the Southern District
on April 17, 2014.
April 2013, the Attorney Grievance Committee (Committee)
sought an order imposing a one-year reciprocal suspension
based upon respondent's misconduct before the District
Court. Respondent consented to the relief requested but asked
that the suspension be imposed nunc pro tunc to February 28,
2013, the date that he voluntarily ceased practicing law. By
order entered September 10, 2013, this Court granted the
petition and suspended respondent from the practice of law
for a period of one year, nunc pro tunc to February 28, 2013
(110 A.D.3d 164');">110 A.D.3d 164 [1st Dept 2013]). In February 2014,
respondent moved for his reinstatement without a hearing,
which the Committee did not oppose, and on May 29, 2014, this
Court reinstated respondent to the practice of law in the
State of New York.
August 2014, after respondent had already been reinstated in
the Southern District, the COG became aware of new evidence
suggesting that respondent had intentionally lied to the
court in the Fryer matter and to the COG in
connection with the 2013 disciplinary proceeding.
Specifically, two of respondent's former law partners
stated that they had recently discovered evidence that
respondent had knowingly lied to the District Court during a
sanctions hearing in the Fryer matter, and that his
subsequent explanations to the court, which he repeated to
the COG during the 2013 disciplinary proceeding in defending
himself on the charge of lying, falsely asserted that his
misstatements were inadvertent instead of deliberate.
letters dated December 2014 and February 2015, the COG
directed respondent to answer the allegations, which he did
by submitting an affidavit and a supplemental affidavit. In
those submissions, respondent disputed certain factual
allegations in the complaint that his former law partners had
submitted, but he largely conceded the offending conduct -
namely, falsely stating to the District Court and the COG
that his conduct in the Fryer matter had been
inadvertent when, in fact, it had been knowing. Based upon
respondent's submissions, the COG issued an order to show
cause and statement of charges alleging that respondent had
violated New York Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYRR
1200.0) rules 3.3 and 8.4. In a March 2016 affidavit,
respondent admitted to the factual allegations and each of
the charges, presented mitigating evidence, and proposed a
sanction of no greater than a public censure, with a
condition that he provide one year of full time pro bono
review of all of respondent's submissions, the order to
show cause, and the statement of charges, the COG concluded
that respondent had raised no issues requiring a hearing,
and, on the basis of the record and respondent's own
admissions, found respondent had, knowingly and with venal
intent, engaged in professional misconduct by making false
statements to the District Court and to the COG in connection
with his conduct in the Fryer matter. Thus, the COG
concluded, there was clear and convincing evidence that
respondent had violated rules 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c), (d) and
(h). Taking the mitigating and aggravating circumstances into
account, the COG decided that a one-year suspension from
practice in the Southern District was the appropriate
discipline. The opinion and order suspending respondent was
dated September 12, 2016, and directed that respondent's
one-year suspension be effective immediately.
on the Southern District's September 12, 2016 order, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an order, dated January
18, 2017, imposing reciprocal discipline on respondent. The
Pennsylvania order imposed a one-year suspension on
respondent, effective 30 days from the date of the order.
petition dated November 16, 2016, the Attorney Grievance
Committee now moves, under the Rules for Attorney
Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.13 and the
doctrine of reciprocal discipline, for an order finding that
respondent has been disciplined by a foreign jurisdiction and
directing him to demonstrate why a final order of discipline
in New York should not be imposed, and for such further
relief that is just and proper.
does not oppose the imposition of reciprocal discipline in
New York based upon the underlying misconduct as set forth in
the September 12, 2016 order, and asks that this Court impose
a one-year suspension nunc pro tunc to September 12, 2016 -
that is, the effective date of his one-year suspension from
the Southern District. In support of the effective date being
made nunc pro tunc, respondent notes that he has already
"self-suspended" beginning on September 12, 2016,
insofaras he ceased practicing law altogether, either in the
Southern District of New York, the State of New York, or any
other jurisdictions in which he was admitted at the time.
Respondent maintains that this ...