United States District Court, S.D. New York
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
J. NATHAN, District Judge
the Court are two motions to dismiss pro se Plaintiff James
Jiggetts's Second Amended Complaint, filed by Defendant
Mohanie Sukhu, see Dkt. No. 37; Dkt. No. 38
(hereafter "Sukhu MTD"), and Defendants United
Parcel Service ("UPS"), John Mannion, and Doug
Trandiak (collectively, the "UPS Defendants"),
see Dkt. No. 39; see also Dkt. No.
41 (hereafter "UPS MTD"). For the reasons that
follow, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED.
Procedural History and Background
Relevant Procedural History
October 10, 2014, pro se Plaintiff James Jiggetts filed a
Complaint against some, but not all, of the Defendants in
this action, alleging, with almost no factual specificity,
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101, et seq, the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., the New York State
Labor Laws, N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 650, et seq.,
and the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution,
Art. I, § 10, CI. 1. See Dkt. No. 1. On January
6, 2015, Chief Judge Preska dismissed that Complaint sua
sponte, on the ground that the "allegations [were]
so unclear and without factual detail that the Court [could
not] discern whether Plaintiff ha[d] stated a plausible claim
for relief, " and that the Court could not
"understand what Plaintiffs federal claims [were]."
Dkt. No. 4 at 3. Thereafter, the Plaintiff, with leave of the
Court, filed his First Amended Complaint. See Dkt.
No. 5. The Defendants moved to dismiss that complaint on the
grounds that it was indecipherable and that the Plaintiff had
not provided a right to sue letter from the EEOC.
See Dkt. No. 19. The Plaintiff thereafter filed what
he denoted an opposition to the Defendants' motion,
see Dkt. No. 27, but which the Court construed as a
Second Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 28. On March 23, 2016, the
Court administratively denied the pending motion to dismiss
and deemed the Second Amended Complaint the operative
complaint in this case. See id.; see also
Dkt. No. 27 (hereafter "Amended Complaint" or
"Am. Compl."). Sukhu moved to dismiss the Amended
Complaint on April 20, 2016, Dkt. No. 37, and the UPS
Defendants moved to dismiss on April 25, 2016, Dkt. No. 39.
The Amended Complaint
Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff cites a number of federal
statutes, pursuant to which he purports to bring claims. He
cites the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29
U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §
1001, etseq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, etseq.;
42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act ("OWBPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 626(f); and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 42
U.S.C. § 621, e/ seq. See Am. Compl. at 6-8.
The Plaintiff also makes several ambiguous references to
additional legal regimes. See Am. Compl. at 3
(citing to "the C.F.R. 48, Chapter 54, Subchapter 8b on
the right of the employee regarding whistleblower
rights"); id. at 6 (noting that Plaintiffs
"NYS Civil Rights Laws of Article 4-7, Sects.74-77 have
been called into question . . . along with [his] NYS, Labor
text of the Amended Complaint itself is largely devoid of
factual allegations in support of these claims. Jiggetts,
however, also attaches to the Amended Complaint a letter he
purportedly sent to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") on June 12, 2014, in connection
with a pending charge. See Am. Compl. at 26-35;
see also Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank of N.Y.,
199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that courts may
consider facts in documents appended to the complaint in
deciding a motion to dismiss). Plaintiff does not identify
the date that he made that charge to the EEOC, or allege
anywhere in his Amended Complaint which specific allegations
or claims he made to the EEOC. See generally Am.
Compl. He has provided, however, a right to sue letter
arising out of the otherwise unidentified charge.
See Dkt. No. 42, Ex. O.
letter, Plaintiff alleges that he worked for UPS for 26 years
prior to his termination. See Am. Compl. 26. He
claims that, over those 26 years, white male employees were
promoted over him, often despite lacking the requisite
qualifications for the positions or otherwise having violated
company policies, and that his complaints about such
treatment were either ignored or met with hostility. See
Id. at 26-30. He also alleges that he was an
insulin-dependent diabetic, but that, at various points over
a span of 10 years, managers at UPS forced him to work night
shifts, which he was unable to do without compromising his
health, at times in retaliation for complaints he made of
racial discrimination. See Id. at 27-30. Plaintiff
claims that at least one white, Irish male coworker received
"special provisions" for his diabetes, but that the
same was not offered to Plaintiff. Id. at 27.
2011, Plaintiff alleges that his manager at the time, a white
male who Plaintiff claims had previously been terminated for
a violent altercation in the workplace, called Plaintiff a
derogatory racial name. Id. at 28-29. When Plaintiff
complained of the incident to management, he alleges that he
was told that the manager denied making any inappropriate
statement. Id. Shortly after this meeting, Plaintiff
was not given a raise for the first time in his 24 years at
UPS, as a result of a bad performance review he received from
the manager in question. Id. at 29. Plaintiff
thereafter filed a charge with the EEOC - an earlier charge
from that preceding the present lawsuit. Id. at
point thereafter, Plaintiff began to work under Kathy
Bresnahan, a white woman. Id. at 29. Plaintiff
alleges that under Bresnahan's tenure, Plaintiff was
again forced to work the night shift, although he alleges
that Jim Fitzgerald, the head of the Department where
Plaintiff worked, was aware that Plaintiff was an
insulin-dependent diabetic and "that the A.D.A. said
[he] could not work nights." Id. at 30.
Plaintiff does not specify precisely when this event
occurred, or whether he complained of the treatment (as he
had previously done). Id.
working for Bresnahan, Plaintiff was assigned (at an
unspecified date) to work for John Mannion, a white Irish
male who supervised Plaintiff in the Loss Prevention and
Security Department. Id. at 27, 30. Plaintiff claims
that Mannion was promoted over several people who were not
white males in loss prevention, though Plaintiff alleges that
these people had been in the department longer and
"yielded very good results." Id. at 27.
Plaintiff also alleges that Mannion had previously quit UPS
to seek an outside opportunity, but that Mannion had been
rehired, despite a custom of not hiring such individuals
back, and ultimately given a supervisory position over
non-white employees. Id. In August 2013, Mannion
informed Plaintiff that he was not getting a raise, and that
Mannion was "not recommending [Plaintiff] to get [his]
stock." Id. at 30.
August 2013, Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely accused of
sexual assault by a security guard, Mohanie Sukhu, who worked
for a company called "Adelis Security."
Id. at 30. After the accusation, Plaintiff alleges
that Mannion and Doug Trandiak, UPS's human resources
manager, put Plaintiff on a leave of absence status, without
his permission, resulting in his losing medical benefits for
30 days. Id. at 32. Plaintiff spoke to human
resources and Mr. Trandiak, neither of whom restored his
benefits. Id. In a meeting that took place on
September 13 of either 2013 or 2014,  Mannion, and Trandiak
informed Plaintiff he was being terminated "for
violation of [UPS's] Anti-Harassment Policy."
Id. After he was terminated, Plaintiff sought relief
through the Employee Dispute Resolution process, but UPS
"den[ied him] the chance to go to Arbitration, "
the final step of that process. Id. at 32-33.
letter to the EEOC, Plaintiff asserts that the choice to
terminate him was motivated by discriminatory animus, on the
basis of Plaintiff s race, and retaliatory animus, on the
basis of his complaints about racial discrimination.
Id. at 33-34. He alleges that Trandiak and Mannion
used Sukhu's complaint as pretense to fire the Plaintiff.
Id. at 34-35. Plaintiff also alleges that, as result
of his termination, he will not be able to collect his
pension until the age of 62, whereas he would otherwise have
been eligible to collect his pension at the age of 55.
Id. at 34. Plaintiff notes that, by firing him, UPS
"save[d] on paying [his] pension and benefits for 10
years." Id. Plaintiff also alleges that,
because of his termination, he had to pay $500 monthly
premiums for "COBRA [Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act] coverage, " and that "[UPS]
cashed some of the checks that [he] sent in and some they did
not cash, " resulting in the termination of Plaintiff s
benefit coverage. Id. at 33.
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting BellAtl Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible
"when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The
"plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability
requirement, ' but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."
Id. If a complaint "pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a ...