United States District Court, S.D. New York
LEON SILVERMAN, JAMES CROWLEY, JANET SACHS, HERBERT POBINER, LOUIS FLACKS, and PAUL BERKMAN, as Trustees of the Union Mutual Medical Fund, and UNION MUTUAL MEDICAL FUND, Plaintiffs,
GEORGE MIRANDA, ROBERT BELLACH, ANTHONY CERBONE, and MARTIN SHEER, as Trustees of the Teamsters Local 210 Affiliated Health and Insurance Fund, and TEAMSTERS LOCAL 210 AFFILIATED HEALTH AND INSURANCE FUND, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Edgardo Ramos, U.S.D.J.
September 30, 2016, the Court entered an Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment, denying Defendants' motion for
summary judgment, and awarding Plaintiffs judgment in the
amount of $2, 460, 777.33 plus pre-and post-judgment
interest. Doc. 364 at 17 & n.7. In accordance with the
Court's Order, on October 4, 2016, the Clerk of the Court
entered Judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in the amount of $2,
460, 777.33 plus pre-judgment interest at the rate of 4.82%
from April 1, 2006, for a total sum of $3, 706, 989.13, with
post-judgment interest to be calculated in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 1961(a). Doc. 365. On October 18, 2016,
Defendants moved for reconsideration of the October 4, 2016
Judgment, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e). Doc. 366. In response, Plaintiffs
cross-moved for sanctions against Defendants' counsel.
Civil Rule 6.3 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
provide for reconsideration or reargument of a court's
order on a motion only where the court has overlooked
controlling decisions or factual matters that were “put
before it on the underlying motion . . . and which, had they
been considered, might have reasonably altered the result
before the court.” Mikol v. Barnhart, 554
F.Supp.2d 498, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Greenwald v.
Orb Commc'ns & Mktg., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 1939
(LTS) (HBP), 2003 WL 660844, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2003)).
“Reconsideration of a court's previous order is an
‘extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the
interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial
resources.'” Parrish v. Sollecito, 253
F.Supp.2d 713, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting In re Health
Mgmt. Sys. Inc. Sec. Litig., 113 F.Supp.2d 613, 614
(S.D.N.Y. 2000)). These rules are “narrowly construed
and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on
issues that have been considered fully by the Court.”
Mikol, 554 F.Supp.2d at 500 (quoting Dellefave
v. Access Temps., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 6098 (RWS), 2001 WL
286771, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001)). “Where the
movant fails to show that any controlling authority or facts
have actually been overlooked, and merely offers
substantially the same arguments he offered on the original
motion or attempts to advance new facts, the motion for
reconsideration must be denied.” Id. (citing
Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d
motion for reconsideration is not a substitute for appeal,
Boart Longyear Ltd. v. Alliance Indus., Inc., 869
F.Supp.2d 407, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), nor is it a vehicle for a
party dissatisfied with the Court's ruling to voice its
disagreement with the decision, R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi
So, 640 F.Supp.2d 506, 512-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
“Courts have repeatedly been forced to warn litigants
that such motions should not be made reflexively to reargue
those issues already considered when a party does not like
the way the original motion was resolved.”
Boart, 869 F.Supp.2d at 418 (quoting Makas v.
Orlando, No. 06 Civ. 14305 (DAB), 2008 WL 2139131, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see, e.g., Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich
Ltd., 884 F.Supp.2d 92, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The
provision for reargument is not designed to allow wasteful
repetition of arguments already briefed, considered and
decided.”); see also Assoc. Press v. U.S. Dep't
of Defense, 395 F.Supp.2d 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (motion
for reconsideration is not “an occasion for repeating
old arguments previously rejected”).
argue that the Court overlooked: material facts in ruling
that the Local 210 Fund accepted an obligation to make
remittances to the UMMF; that the AWF's liabilities for
the Duane Reade proceeds were not transferable to the Local
210 Fund; that Plaintiffs had a remedy against the
contracting employers of the pre-amendment CBAs; and the
significance of the Second Circuit's statement that
employers are not obligated to contribute to the UMMF. Doc.
367 at 4-9. Defendants' arguments were extensively
briefed in the parties' summary judgment papers and were
not overlooked by the Court.
also argue that the Court's formulation for pre-judgment
interest must be modified to avoid manifest injustice upon
the Local 210 Fund. Doc. 367 at 1-4. Defendants have never
before raised concerns with the method of calculating
pre-judgment interest, although Plaintiffs put the question
squarely at issue in their summary judgment papers.
See Doc. 352 at 24-25 (urging the Court to
“set April 1, 2006 as the ‘reasonable date from
which to award pre-judgment interest'”) (quoting
Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys., Ltd., 330 F.Supp.2d
383, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). “A motion for
reconsideration is ‘not intended as a vehicle for a
party dissatisfied with the Court's ruling to advance new
theories that the movant failed to advance in connection with
the underlying motion.'” WestLB AG v. BAC Fla.
Bank, 912 F.Supp.2d 86, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting
Parrish v. Sollecito, 253 F.Supp.2d 713, 715
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). In any event, the Court finds there to be
no manifest injustice resulting from its calculation of
prejudgment interest, as April 1, 2006 is a reasonable date
from which to award pre-judgment interest in this case.
argue that Defendants' motion is so frivolous that the
Court should sanction Defendants' counsel pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1927, which authorizes a court to assess
"costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees" against
any attorney who "so multiplies the proceedings in any
case unreasonably and vexatiously." See Doc.
371 at 5. But an award under § 1927 is proper only
"when there is a finding of conduct constituting or akin
to bad faith." Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Team Tankers
A.S., 811 F.3d 584, 591 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting
State St. Bank v. Inversiones Errazuriz, YIA F.3d
158, 180 (2d Cir. 2004)). "The attorney's actions
must be 'so completely without merit as to require the
conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some
improper purpose such as delay'" Id. On the
present record, the Court cannot conclude that Defendants
have acted in bad faith.
reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion for
reconsideration is DENIED, and Plaintiffs' cross-motion
for sanctions is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is