United States District Court, N.D. New York
L. Sharpe U.S. District Judge
defendant Universal Instruments Corporation commenced this
action against defendant/consolidated plaintiff Micro System
Engineering, Inc. (MSEI) and defendant Missouri Tooling and
Automation (MTA) alleging copyright infringement, breach of
contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair
competition, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel.
(See generally 3d Am. Compl., Dkt. No.
103.) MSEI commenced a separate action against
Universal alleging breach of the duty of confidentiality,
unfair competition, misappropriation of trade secrets, and
“an injunction.” (See generally Compl.,
Dkt. No. 1, 3:13-cv-1144.) The two actions were consolidated,
and the earlier-filed designated as the lead. (Dkt. No. 26.)
On February 24, 2017, this court issued a Memorandum-Decision
and Order which, as relevant here, denied MSEI and MTA's
motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. No. 196), and granted in
part and denied in part Universal's cross motion for
partial summary judgment, (Dkt. No. 209). (Dkt. No. 228.)
Pending is defendants MSEI and MTA's motion for
reconsideration. (Dkt. No. 230.) For the reasons that follow,
the motion is denied.
for reconsideration proceed in the Northern District of New
York under Local Rule 7.1(g). “In order to prevail on a
motion for reconsideration, the movant must satisfy stringent
requirements.” In re C-TC 9th Ave. P'ship v.
Norton Co., 182 B.R. 1, 2 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). Such motions
“will generally be denied unless the moving party can
point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked-matters, in other words, that might reasonably be
expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.”
Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d
Cir. 1995); see Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga
Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012). The
prevailing rule “recognizes only three possible grounds
upon which motions for reconsideration may be granted; they
are (1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) the
availability of new evidence not previously available, or (3)
the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice.” In re C-TC 9th Ave. P'ship,
182 B.R. at 3 (citation omitted); see Kolel Beth Yechiel
Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729
F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013). “[A] motion to reconsider
should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to
re[-]litigate an issue already decided.”
Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.
and MTA make two general arguments supporting
reconsideration. First, without applying their argument to
the pertinent standard, MSEI and MTA contend that “MSEI
owns all rights in customized software based upon [s]ection
8.4 [of the Equipment Purchase Agreement (EPA)] because the
parties intended that ‘equipment' include
software.” (Dkt. No. 230, Attach. 1 at 2.) MSEI and MTA
go on to itemize sections of the EPA which they argue the
court either did not address or only “make sense”
if equipment is interpreted to include software.
(Id. at 2-10.) Second, MSEI and MTA argue that,
independent of the definition of equipment in the EPA, the
parties intended that MSEI would own all of the intellectual
property rights in the customized software. (Id. at
10-13.) As discussed below, both arguments fail to identify
an intervening change in controlling law, to present new
evidence not previously available, or to demonstrate a clear
error committed by the court. See In re C-TC 9th Ave.
P'ship, 182 B.R. at 3.
MSEI and MTA's first argument, the court has already
reviewed the EPA, necessarily considered and accounted for
its contractual provisions, and resolved the interpretation
of “equipment” adversely to MSEI and MTA. (Dkt.
No. 228 at 17-23.) MSEI and MTA challenge the court's
holding by resorting to the same arguments advanced in their
submissions on their motion for summary judgment.
(Compare Dkt. No. 199, Attach. 1 at 34-44,
with Dkt. No. 230, Attach. 1 at 2-10.) Such
arguments are reserved for an appeal and are not proper on a
motion for reconsideration. See Sequa Corp. v. GBJ
Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming the
“basic principle” that parties do not get a
“second bite at the apple” to relitigate old
issues) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
Schonberger v. Serchuk, 742 F.Supp. 108, 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding reconsideration “is not
designed to allow wasteful repetition of arguments already
briefed, considered and decided”).
to the extent that MSEI and MTA's second argument raises
new issues not previously litigated, it also fails to meet
the standard for a motion for reconsideration. A party cannot
“try out one theory of [argument] and, if that theory
proves unavailing, to then seek reconsideration by offering a
different theory.” Trudeau v. Bockstein, No.
05-cv-1019, 2008 WL 541158, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2008);
see Kaufman v. Columbia Mem'l Hosp., No.
1:11-CV-667, 2014 WL 2776662, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 19, 2014)
(“A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity
for a losing party to advance new arguments to supplant those
that failed in the prior briefing of the issue.”). Nor
can a party “plug the gaps of a lost motion with
additional matters.” Trudeau, 2008 WL 541158,
at *2 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Consequently, MSEI and MTA's motion for reconsideration
it is hereby
that MSEI and MTA's motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No.
230) is DENIED; and it is further
that the Clerk provide a copy of this Summary Order to the
 Unless otherwise specified, citations
are to ...