Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Olsen v. Doldo

United States District Court, S.D. New York

April 20, 2017

THOMAS PATRICK OLSEN, Petitioner,
v.
NUNZIO E. DOLDO, Superintendent, and TINA STANFORD, NYS Board of Parole, Respondents.

          OPINION AND ORDER

          RONNIE ABRAMS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Petitioner Thomas Patrick Olsen brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his state-law convictions for attempted first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and second-degree assault. Before the Court is Olsen's motion for a preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order, and an order requiring Respondents to produce documents and witnesses for examination. For the reasons set forth below, Olsen's motion is denied.

         BACKGROUND

         On November 3, 2011, a jury convicted Olsen of attempted first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and second-degree assault in the Supreme Court of New York. Pet. at 1 (Dkt. 1). On March 28, 2012, the state court sentenced Olsen to six years in prison with ten years of post-release supervision. See Pet. at 2.

         Olsen then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in state court, which the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department denied in a summary order on May 29, 2012. Id. at 4. Olsen also filed a direct appeal to the Appellate Division, which unanimously affirmed his conviction on March 17, 2015. See People v. Olsen, 2 N.Y.S.3d 902, 903 (1st Dep't 2015); see also Pet. at 2. The Appellate Division held, inter alia, that "[t]he verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence, " and that "[t]here is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibility determination." 2 N.Y.S.3d at 903. The Appellate Division also found that Olsen's "ineffective assistance of counsel claims are unreviewable on direct appeal because they involve matters not reflected in, or fully explained by, the record, " but that, "[i]n the alternative, to the extent the existing record permits review, [Olsen] received effective assistance under the state and federal standards." Id. On January 20, 2016, the New York Court of Appeals denied Olsen leave to appeal in a summary order. See People v. Olsen, 47 N.E.3d 99 (N.Y. 2016); see also Pet. at 2.

         On July 6, 2016, Olsen filed this habeas petition. In the petition, Olsen asserts eleven claims: (1) he was denied due process on direct appeal because the Appellate Division did not hold a reconstruction hearing after the trial court was unable to locate his case file; (2) the prosecution failed to investigate the victim's psychiatric history; (3) the evidence supporting the jury's verdict was legally insufficient; (4) he was denied the right to a speedy trial; (5) the prosecution presented false evidence; (6) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on missing evidence; (7) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (8) the prosecution violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) by failing to disclose evidence of the victim's medical history; (9) the prosecution violated his Confrontation Clause rights by failing to disclose the victim's criminal history; (10) the Appellate Division engaged in misconduct by appointing an appellate judge's relative to serve as his counsel and by denying his counsel access to the case file; and (11) he was denied the opportunity to appear at a court hearing. See Pet. 5-24. On August 11, 2016, Olsen was released on parole. See Pet'r. Aff. in Supp. of Mot. ¶ 10 ("Pet'r Aff.") (Dkt. 13).

         On September 28, 2016, Olsen filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order, and discovery order. See Notice of Mot. ¶ 1 (Dkt. 13). Olsen's motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order seeks to enjoin Respondents from enforcing a supervised release condition that requires him to remain drug-free. See Pet'r Aff ¶¶ 16-17. Olsen's motion for a discovery order requests that the Court order Respondents to produce police records and transcripts and to make trial witnesses and other individuals available for examination. See Notice of Mot. ¶2; Pet'r Aff. ¶¶30-32. On October 4, 2016, Olsen also filed a letter asking the Court to "issue an immediate Injunction" enjoining Respondents from preventing him from attending his daughter's wedding in "early October 2016." See Dkt. 14.[1]

         On October 14, 2016, in response to the Court's order directing a response, Respondents submitted a letter opposing Olsen's motions for injunctive relief. See Dkt. 17. On January 27, 2017, Respondents submitted a letter opposing Olsen's request for discovery. See Dkt. 42. Olsen submitted a responsive letter on February 13, 2017. See Dkt. 43.

         LEGAL STANDARD

         "In general, district courts may grant a preliminary injunction where a plaintiff demonstrates 'irreparable harm' and meets one of two related standards: 'either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of its claims to make them fair ground for litigation, plus a balance of the hardships tipping decidedly in favor of the moving party.'" Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. State Dep 't of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lynch v. City of New York, 589 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2009)). "This two-track rule, however, is subject to an exception: A plaintiff cannot rely on the 'fair-ground-for- litigation' alternative to challenge 'governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme.'" Id. (quoting Plaza Health Labs., Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also Friends of the E. Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town of E. Hampton, 841 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2016); Hardy v. Fischer, 701 F.Supp.2d 614, 618-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining that this "more rigorous standard" applies in the context of habeas petitions). Under any standard, a "preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (emphasis in original) (quotation marks omitted).

         In addition, the Second Circuit has held that a district court lacks jurisdiction to issue "preliminary injunctive relief where a motion for a preliminary injunction "presents issues which are entirely different from those which were alleged in [the] original complaint." Stewart v. INS, 762 F.2d 193, 199 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLCv. Queen's Med. Ctr, 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 2015) ("When a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on claims not pled in the complaint, the court does not have the authority to issue an injunction."). That is because, as the Fourth Circuit has explained, the "purpose of interim equitable relief is to protect the movant, during the pendency of the action, from being harmed or further harmed in the manner in which the movant contends it was or will be harmed through the illegality alleged in the complaint." Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, 111 F.3d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1997). "Thus, a preliminary injunction may never issue to prevent an injury or harm which not even the moving party contends was caused by the wrong claimed in the underlying action." Id. Rather, "a party moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint." Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); see also Pac. Radiation Oncology, 810 F.3d at 636 (holding that a party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish "a sufficient nexus between the claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying complaint itself); accord Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 300 (6th Cir. 2010); Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2010); Martin v. Keitel, 205 F.App'x 925, 929 (3d Cir. 2006) (unpublished); Liner v. Fischer, No. 1 l-CV-6711 (PAC) (JLC), 2013 WL 1832316, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2013).

         DISCUSSION

         A. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order

         Olsen's motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order seeks to enjoin Respondents from enforcing a condition of his supervised release that requires him to remain drug-free. See Pet'r Aff. ¶¶ 16-17. Olsen argues that Respondents have made this condition impossible to satisfy by requiring him to reside at a homeless shelter known for housing active marijuana users. See id.. ΒΆΒΆ 14, 16, 21. Olsen argues that, as a result, this parole condition ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.