United States District Court, N.D. New York
NANCY A. DIPPOLD, Plaintiff,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
OF PETER MARGOLIUS PETER MARGOLIUS, ESQ. Counsel for
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. MONIKA CRAWFORD, ESQ. OFFICE OF
REG'L GEN. COUNSEL - REGION II Counsel for Defendant
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
William B. Mitchell Carter, U.S. Magistrate Judge
matter was referred to me, for all proceedings and entry of a
final judgment, pursuant to the Social Security Pilot
Program, N.D.N.Y. General Order No. 18, and in accordance
with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.
73, N.D.N.Y. Local Rule 73.1 and the consent of the parties.
(Dkt. Nos. 4, 12.).
before the Court, in this Social Security action filed by
Nancy Dippold (“Plaintiff”) against the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or
“the Commissioner”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), are the parties'
cross- motions for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 9,
10.) For the reasons set forth below, it is ordered that
Plaintiff's motion is denied and Defendant's motion
was born in 1960. (T. 64.) She completed high school. (T.
144.) Generally, Plaintiff's alleged disability consists
of neck impairment, back impairment, knee impairment, hearing
loss, and carpal tunnel syndrome. (T. 143.) Her alleged
disability onset date is July 1, 1997. (T. 64.) Her date last
insured is June 30, 2002. (Id.) She previously
worked as a printer. (T. 145.)
April 30, 2013, Plaintiff applied for a period of Disability
Insurance Benefits (“SSD”) under Title II, and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title
XVI, of the Social Security Act. (T. 70.) Plaintiff's
applications were initially denied, after which she timely
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“the ALJ”). On September 16, 2014, Plaintiff
appeared before the ALJ, Dale Black-Pennington. (T. 30-63.)
On November 24, 2014, ALJ Black-Pennington issued a partially
favorable decision. (T. 11-29.) On March 22, 2016, the
Appeals Council (“AC”) denied Plaintiff's
request for review, rendering the ALJ's decision the
final decision of the Commissioner. (T. 1-6.) Thereafter,
Plaintiff timely sought judicial review in this Court.
The ALJ's Decision
in her decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact
and conclusions of law. (T. 17-24.) First, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through June
30, 2002 and Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since July 1, 1997, her alleged onset date. (T. 17.)
Second, the ALJ found that since the alleged onset date
Plaintiff had the severe impairments of chronic knee problems
status post multiple surgical procedures, lumbar spondylosis,
cervical stenosis, carpal tunnel syndrome, and sensorineural
hearing loss. (Id.) Third, the ALJ found that since
her alleged onset date Plaintiff did not have an impairment
that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments
located in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix. 1. (T.
18-19.) Fourth, the ALJ found that prior to September 16,
2014, the date Plaintiff became disabled, Plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform:
light work; except, Plaintiff could stand and walk
for up to two hour intervals for six hours during the course
of an eight hour workday; could occasionally climb stairs and
ramps; must avoid climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; and
required a moderate to low noise work environment. (T. 19.)
Fifth, the ALJ determined that beginning on September 16,
2014, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform: sedentary
work; except, she could stand and walk in 20
minute intervals up to less than two hours during the course
of an eight hour workday; could sit for up to one hour
intervals for a total of less than six hours during an eight
hour workday; could push and pull occasionally; must avoid
climbing ropes, ladders and scaffolds; could climb stairs or
ramps rarely; and required a low noise work environment. (T.
21.) Sixth, the ALJ determined that since July 1, 1997,
Plaintiff was incapable of performing her past relevant work.
(T. 22.) The ALJ determined that prior to September 16, 2014,
there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the
national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Id.)
The ALJ determined that beginning September 16, 2014, there
were no jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform. (T. 23.)
THE PARTIES' BRIEFINGS ON Plaintiff's MOTION
makes one argument in support of her motion for judgment on
the pleadings. Plaintiff argues the ALJ's RFC
determination, that prior to September 16, 2014, Plaintiff
could perform light work with limitations, is not supported
by substantial evidence in the record. (Dkt. No. 9 at 4-5
[Pl.'s Mem. of Law].)
response, Defendant makes one argument. Defendant argues
substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC