United States District Court, W.D. New York
DECISION AND ORDER
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Deborah Ann Buczek filed this pro se
action on April 4, 2016, alleging that defendants
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692, et seq., and the New York Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 601,
during the course of a state foreclosure action filed by
Defendant HSBC N.A. USA.
March 20, 2017, this Court screened Buczek's complaint
consistent with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2)(B) and determined that she failed to properly state
claims under both statutes. (Docket No. 3.) But rather than
dismiss Buczek's federal claims, this Court granted her
leave to file an amended complaint to afford her the
opportunity to properly state claims under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act. (Docket No. 3.) This Court denied
leave to amend as to claims under the New York Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, because that statute contains no
private right of action. See Graham v. Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc., 156 F.Supp.3d 491, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
April 10, 2017, Buczek filed a Motion for Reconsideration, or
in the alternative, for an Extension of Time to file her
amended complaint. (Docket No. 4.) Buczek thereafter filed a
supplemental motion to extend time (Docket No. 5), which this
Court granted (Docket No. 6), thereby leaving only
Buczek's request for reconsideration pending for
resolution. By requesting reconsideration, Buczek presumably
objects to the dismissal of her state claims, yet she offers
no authority establishing a private right of action under the
governing statute. Her motion must therefore be denied.
district judge may modify pre-trial rulings and interlocutory
orders at any time prior to final judgment. See In re
United States, 733 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1984).
Reconsideration of a prior decision is generally justified in
any one of the following three circumstances: (1) an
intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence; or
(3) the need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent
manifest injustice. See Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v.
Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d
Cir.1992); see also Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Laserage Tech.
Corp., No. 96-CV-6313, 1998 WL 310750, *1 (W.D.N.Y. Feb.
12, 1998) (citing United States v. Adegbite, 877
F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 1989)).
decision whether to grant or deny a motion to reconsider lies
in this Court's discretion. See McCarthy v.
Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1983). Parties
bringing motions to reconsider “should evaluate whether
what may seem to be a clear error of law is in fact simply a
point of disagreement between the Court and the
litigant.” Duane v. Spaulding and Rogers Mfg.
Inc., No. 92-CV-305, 1994 WL 494651, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.
10, 1994) (quoting McDowell Oil Serv. v. Interstate Fire
and Cas., 817 F.Supp. 538, 541 (M.D.Pa. 1993)). Motions
for reconsideration are not to be used as a means to reargue
matters already disposed of by prior rulings or to put
forward additional arguments that could have been raised
before the decision. See Duane, 1994 WL 494651 at
*1. After all, a “motion for reconsideration is not a
device intended to give an unhappy litigant one additional
chance to sway the judge.” Nossek v. Bd. of Ed. of
Duanesburg Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 94-CV-219, 1994 WL
688298, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1994).
consideration of Buczek's Motion for Reconsideration,
this Court is not convinced that its March 20, 2017 Decision
and Order must be revisited. Buczek has not persuasively
alleged any of the three circumstances under which
reconsideration may be warranted. See Virgin Atl.
Airways, 956 F.2d at 1255. Instead, she simply reargues
and reiterates her baseless positions and continues to extol
irrelevant theories. These arguments have already been raised
Buczek is obviously dissatisfied with this Court's
decision. But use of a motion to reconsider as a vehicle to
reargue a case is improper. See Nossek, 1994 WL
688298 at *1; United States v. Chiochvili, 103
F.Supp.2d 526, 530-31 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (reargument is not a
proper basis for a motion to reconsider);
Schonberger, 742 F.Supp. at 119 (“the
provision for reargument is not designed to allow wasteful
repetition of arguments already briefed, considered and
decided”). Accordingly, reconsideration is denied.
HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration (Docket No. 4) is DENIED.
entitles her submissions to broad consideration. Because of
the distinct disadvantage that pro se litigants face, federal
courts routinely read their submissions liberally, and
interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92
S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Burgos v.
Hopkins, 14 F.3d ...