United States District Court, S.D. New York
OPINION AND ORDER
PAUL OETKEN, District Judge.
Guerrero brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Defendants the City of New York, Chris Goubeaud,
James Roche, Andrew Freeman, Edward McDonough, and Does 1-10,
alleging that he was falsely arrested in early 2014. (Dkt.
No. 19 (“Compl.”).) Defendants move to dismiss
several of Guerrero's claims. For the reasons that
follow, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
following facts are taken from the operative complaint and
are presumed true for the purposes of this motion.
night of March 31, 2014, Guerrero visited a friend at 350
East 143rd Street in the Bronx, New York. (Compl. ¶ 12.)
Guerrero was approached by Defendants Roche and McDonough,
who placed him in handcuffs, held him for ten to fifteen
minutes, and released him. (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.)
Around 12:30 a.m. on April 1, 2014, as Guerrero was leaving
the building, he was approached by Defendants Roche,
Goubeaud, and Freeman, who arrested him for trespassing.
(Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) Guerrero was transported
in a police van to a police precinct where he was held until
his arraignment later that day. (Id. ¶¶
19-20.) Guerrero alleges that Defendants manufactured false
evidence that was used against him in legal proceedings
following his arrest. (Id. ¶ 22.) All charges
against Guerrero were dismissed on October 28, 2014.
(Id. ¶ 23.)
initiated this lawsuit on January 22, 2016, and filed the
operative complaint on August 15, 2016. (Dkt. No. 1; Compl.)
He brings seven causes of action: false arrest, malicious
prosecution, violation of the right to a fair trial,
malicious abuse of process, failure to intervene, supervisory
liability, and municipal liability. (Compl. ¶¶
35-69.) Defendants move to dismiss in part. (Dkt. No. 32.)
considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the Court accepts as true all allegations in the complaint
and draws all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor.
Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d
Cir. 2006). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint
must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
move to dismiss Guerrero's claims for malicious abuse of
process, failure to intervene, supervisory liability, and
municipal liability. (Dkt. No. 33 at 1.) Defendants do not (at
this stage) challenge Guerrero's claims for false arrest
and malicious prosecution. (Id. at 1 n.1.)
threshold matter, Guerrero voluntarily withdraws his claims
for malicious abuse of process and supervisory liability.
(Dkt. No. 39 at 1 n.1.) Accordingly, the Court addresses only
Guerrero's claims for municipal liability and failure to
is axiomatic that municipalities cannot be held liable
pursuant to § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.” Betts v. Shearman, No. 12 Civ. 3195,
2013 WL 311124, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013) (citing
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978)). “[T]o hold a city liable under [Section]
1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a
plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1)
an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to
be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional
right.” Betts v. Rodriquez, No. 15 Civ. 3836,
2016 WL 7192088, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2016) (alteration
in original) (quoting Wray v. City of N.Y., 490 F.3d
189, 195 (2d Cir. 2009)); see also Monell, 436 U.S.
at 690-91 (“[A]lthough the touchstone of the §
1983 action against a government body is an allegation that
official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights
protected by the Constitution, local governments . . . may be
sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to
governmental ‘custom' even though such a custom has
not received formal approval through the body's official
municipality can be liable for failing to train its employees
where it acts with deliberate indifference in disregarding
the risk that its employees will unconstitutionally apply its
policies without more training.” Amnesty Am. v.
Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 129 (2d Cir. 2004)
(citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
387-90 (1989)). To allege liability under a failure-to-train
theory, a plaintiff must “establish not only that the
officials' purported failure to train occurred under
circumstances that could constitute deliberate indifference,
but also that plaintiffs identify a specific deficiency in
the city's training program and establish that that